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Energy policy in the European Union (EU) is a patchwork of diverging interests and 
preferences.  While the European Commission pushes for a common energy policy, 
Member States are responsible for their own separate energy policies. These 
divergences in interests and preferences might create a conflict situation between the 
Commission and Member States. This thesis explores the Commission’s behaviour 
vis-à-vis the Member States, investigating the conditions under which the Commission 
is likely to try to deviate from Member States’ preferences in the external dimension 
of the EU internal energy market.  
 
Adopting a Principal-Agent Model (PAM), this thesis conceptualizes the Member 
States as principals and the Commission as their agent. A qualitative case study 
approach and process-tracing method are applied to appreciate the variety of 
preferences of the actors involved, and provide a means to study the various shades of 
post-delegation agent’s behaviour. This thesis looks at four in-depth case studies: 1) 
Decision 994/2012 on establishing an information exchange mechanism with regard 
to intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third countries in the 
field of energy; 2) Directive 2009/73/EC on common rules for the internal market in 
gas; 3) Energy Community Treaty; and 4) Energy Charter Treaty. These were selected 
based on their relevance to the research question. 
 
Findings suggest that two factors are likely to affect the Commission’s deviation from 
Member States’ preferences: a) the preference alignment among the principals and b) 
the preference alignment between the principals and the agent. This thesis suggests 
that when the preferences between the agent and the principals are heterogeneous, the 
agent is more likely to deviate from the preferences of the principals. This thesis also 
suggests that the preference alignment among the principals only has a secondary 
effect on the agent’s deviation. Finally, this research contributes to the further 
development of the PAM offering a possible categorisation of post-delegation agent’s 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  







1.1.  Introduction  
Energy policy is one the most sensitive policies at both European and national level. 
Given its economic importance, energy policy has – and probably will always have – 
a high political sensitivity. If we consider that the EU is heavily dependent on energy 
supplied by non-EU countries, it does not come as a surprise that energy policy has a 
strong and particularly relevant external dimension. Some EU Member States have 
very high dependency rates from one single country. It must also be considered that 
the internal and external dimensions of EU energy policy are strongly interrelated. An 
internal energy market has been one of the main objectives of the EU since the 1990s 
when the first directives prescribing the liberalisation of the energy markets entered 
into force. An internal energy market however, cannot exist without a coherent 
external dimension. For this reason, this thesis looks at the external dimension of the 
EU internal energy market. 
The topic of the external dimension of the EU internal energy market is particularly 
important because it impacts the economies of individual Member States and of the 
EU as a whole. Energy policy is becoming increasingly important because of the 
political instability of the countries from which energy is imported (e.g. Northern 
Africa and the Middle East, Russia, Ukraine). In addition, world demand for energy is 
increasing with countries like China and Japan becoming great EU competitors.  




This thesis suggests that energy policy cannot be considered exclusively from the point 
of view of the Member States any longer. Rather, it seems that energy policy has 
gained an important European dimension and that the European Commission is now 
an important actor in this policy area. An academic explanation the role of the 
European Commission in the external dimension of the EU internal energy market is 
warranted. How does the Commission behave when it comes to the external dimension 
of the EU energy policy? Does the Commission behave as an entrepreneur pushing for 
more liberalisation? Does the Commission constrain the Member States in their 
national energy policies, or is the Commission constrained by Member States? To 
address these questions, this research focuses on the relation between the Commission 
and the Member States as a key explanatory factor of the external dimension of EU 
energy policy.  
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section offer facts and definitions about 
energy policy (1.2.). Section 1.3. moves to the review of the literature and stresses the 
gap which this thesis aims to address. The chapter then turns to the research question 
(1.4.) and the theoretical framework (1.5.) of this study. The research design is 
explained in section 1.6. The chapter concludes with an outline of the thesis (1.7.).  
1.2. Energy Policy in the European Union: facts and 
definitions 
Two of the treaties establishing the European communities dealt with energy: the 
Treaty of Paris, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the 
Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Atomic Energy Community in 1957. The 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community in 1957 however “contains 
no word” on energy policy (Cross et al 2007, 227). The lack of a specific chapter on 
energy in this Treaty has hindered the development of Community energy law and 
policy (Ibid). According to Pielow and Lewendel (2012, 265) this “self-effacement of 
the Treaty has to be explained by the Member States’ determination to sustain their 
independence in the sense of an own and national energy (supply) policy and to 
consider this area as part of their sovereignty”. As a result, the structures of energy 
industry and the choices of energy mixes differ greatly across Member States.  




The Single European Act (SEA), signed in 1987, established the objective of an 
“internal market” by the end of 1992, together with a legal basis for the adoption of 
related legislation with qualified majority voting instead of unanimity. The European 
Commission then used these provisions for broad legislative initiatives in the 
electricity and gas sectors, together with a more vigorous enforcement of the Treaty 
rules on competition and free movement. The Treaty on European Union,  signed in 
1992, listed measures in the “spheres of energy, civil protection and tourism” among 
the Community activities and also added an Article on the promotion of trans-
European networks (TENs) in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy 
infrastructure (Pielow and Lewendel 2012).  
Since the 1990s, the body of Community energy and environmental legislation has 
been extended significantly (Ibid). According to Cross et al (2007, 230), “although 
various deficiencies in the legal framework for energy have become more apparent of 
late, the overall experience demonstrates that the Community’s policy-making engines 
and law-making institutions have found the necessary means and modalities to 
elaborate and update a fairly thorough legislative framework relating to the energy 
sector without having to rely upon the formality of an “energy chapter” in the Treaty”.  
Regardless of the absence of a specific legal basis, the European Community 
developed a “step-by-step policy” (Pielow and Lewendel 2012, 266) making use of 
the general competence of the EC treaty applying to all economic sectors.  
As far as the external dimension of energy policy is concerned, this has been 
“constructed through a conjunction of interests between the Member States” (Belyi 
2007, 198). A first coordination among Member States emerged after the first oil crisis 
in 1973; however, it did not result in a specific common policy. Despite the lack of a 
clear legal basis for energy in the Treaties, the EU has negotiated international 
agreements with third countries in the field of energy. Relying on the former Articles 
133, 300 EC Treaty (now Articles 207, 218 TFEU), the European Community took 
action under the framework of the WTO, and signed bilateral agreements such as the 
energy partnership negotiations and commitments with Russia (Pielow and Lewendel 
2012, 273). In this context, a framework was also developed, providing mechanisms 
for the integration of regional energy markets in neighbouring countries into the EU 




internal energy market under a “common regulatory space” (Cross et al. 2007, 231). 
Examples include the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Community Treaty. In 
1991 Member States and the European Community signed the Energy Charter 
concerning the production and transportation of gas from the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). Similarly, in 2005, the EU signed the Energy Community 
Treaty aiming to extend the internal energy market to include South Eastern Europe 
and the Black Sea region. In addition, the EU has developed both bilateral cooperation 
agreements with third countries as well as with international organizations such as the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
In short, despite the limits of the Treaty framework, the EC/EU has managed to create 
what Pielow and Lewendel (2012, 273) call a “de facto foreign energy policy of the 
EU”; this means that the EC/EU has not only been able to take part in international 
organizations dealing with energy but also to sign bilateral and multilateral agreements 
with non-EU countries in the field of energy.  
A legal basis for energy was only introduced with the Lisbon Treaty. Article 4 para 2 
lit. i) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)1 establishes a 
shared competence between the Union and Member States in the energy sector. This 
means that, in principle, both the EU and the Member States may adopt legally binding 
acts in energy. Article 194 TFEU establishes that Union policy on energy shall aim to 
(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure security of energy supply 
in the Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of 
new and renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the interconnection of energy 
networks. The article also states that these aims shall be achieved “in a spirit of 
solidarity between Members” and “in the context of the establishment and functioning 
of the internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the 
environment.”  
                                                 
1 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, 13 December 2007 (2007/C 306/01). Available from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML. 




On the other hand, the second paragraph of Article 194 TFEU states that the measures 
necessary to achieve the objectives in paragraph 1 shall be established by the European 
Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure. More importantly, the paragraph states that such measures shall not affect 
a Member State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, 
its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy 
supply. 
Article 194 TFEU has been called a “typical political compromise” that created “a real 
and additional strengthening of competences in favour of the EU” but also allows 
Member States to deviate from the Union’s energy policy (Pielow and Lewendel 2012, 
267–8). 
To summarise so far, EU energy policy was initially developed as a set of provisions 
for broad legislative initiatives in the electricity and gas sectors in the framework of 
the completion of the internal market in early 1990s. Given the reluctance of Member 
States to give up sovereignty and control over this area, a clear legal basis for energy 
in the Treaties was established only when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 
December 2009. Despite the lack of a legal basis, an external dimension of the EU 
energy policy also developed as the EC/EU signed international agreements in the field 
of energy.   
The next section turns to the current academic debate on energy policy, identifying the 
gaps and illustrating how this thesis aims to contribute to the development of 
knowledge in this field.  
1.3. Literature on EU Energy Policy 
The literature on EU Energy policy is rather broad and diverse. One of the most 
relevant themes concerns EU-Russia energy relations, looking at EU-Russia energy 
dialogue (Aalto 2008; Hadfield 2008), the impact of rational cost–benefit orientations 
in individual Member States on collective bargaining outcomes in EU–Russia energy 
negotiations (Bozhilova and Hashimoto, 2010), and the role of Russia in energy 
relations with the EU (Larsson 2006; Romanova 2013; Romanova 2014).  Other 




scholars have focused on energy security, looking at securitisation (Khrushcheva 
2011), regional and inter-regional energy co-operation (Kirchner and Berk 2010), 
discourse on energy security (Kurze 2010), EU’s soft power in the energy sector 
(Goldthau and Sitter 2015), Member States' decisions on domestic supply security 
(Schmidt-Felzmann 2011), and perceptions of energy security of internationally 
operating energy firms and EU institutions (Stoddard 2012). For this research 
however, four main themes are of particular importance: a) difficulties in building a 
common energy policy, b) the external dimension, c) the role of the Commission, and 
d) the role of Member States.  
a) Difficulties in building a Common Energy Policy (CEP) 
The most complete piece of academic work on EU energy policy is Matlary (1997) in 
which the author analyses the development of energy policy in the EU, and focuses in 
particular on the key period between 1985 and 1995 and the role of the major states 
and their interaction with the Commission. Matlary claims that energy policy is one of 
the fields in which there have been the biggest and most persistent conflicts of interest 
between the Commission, Member State governments, and other interest groups. The 
role of Member State governments in this policy area has traditionally been dominant, 
and in many ways, still is. The emergence of the EU as a major actor in European 
energy policy since 1985 however, has brought about an increase in the importance of 
energy policy on the EU agenda.  
The problem of a CEP is often analysed in relation to liberalisation, law and the 
regulation of energy markets (McGowan 2008; Cameron 2002; Buchan 2010a). 
Because of the national interests in this field, liberalisation has become an important 
principle of EU’s internal energy policy and of its energy diplomacy. There appears 
however to be a mismatch between, on the one hand, an ostensible commitment to 
internal and external liberal strategies led by EU authorities and, on the other hand, 
conduct inside and outside the Union where governments support and protect 
incumbent firms (McGowan 2008). It appears difficult for the EU to conduct common 
energy diplomacy when many Member States not only maintain policies at odds with 
the overall orientation of market liberalisation but also seem to prefer to work with 
national companies to arrange future energy supplies with external suppliers.   




b) The external dimension  
Broadly speaking, there is general agreement among scholars that the internal and 
external dimensions of energy policy are mutually dependent. Differences over 
internal market liberalisation, for example, have undermined external energy strategy 
(Youngs 2007). Scholars point out that the external dimension is seriously hampered 
by Member States’ efforts to defend their sovereignty (Baumann and Simmerl 2011; 
Belyi 2008; Haghighi 2007; Youngs 2007; Axelrod 1996) . Most of this literature has 
focused on the relations between the EU and third countries. More specifically, some 
authors have looked at the EU’s attempt to seek to expand its energy market and its 
principles and regulations in the near-abroad (Lavenex 2004; Prange-Gstöhl 2009; 
Padgett 2011; McGowan 2008). Other scholars have also provided useful overviews 
of the EU’s external relations with major supplying countries (Haghighi 2007; Youngs 
2009). More recently, Herranz-Surrallés (2014) has offered a comprehensive review 
of the literature on the European external energy policy identifying three specific 
dimensions: a) the external dimension of the internal energy market; b) energy security 
or foreign energy policy and c) the intersection between energy policy and other 
foreign policy aims. In doing so, this categorization stresses the links between the 
internal and external dimensions of EU energy policy. As will be illustrated in more 
detail in section 1.4, this literature is used to define the research question of this thesis.  
c) The role of the Commission 
The role of the European Commission in both the internal and external dimension of 
energy policy has also been considered. Scholars have highlighted the Commission’s 
pressure on Member States to implement the liberalisation of the internal market in 
gas and electricity (Eikeland 2011), as well as its policy entrepreneurship and 
supranationalism (Maltby 2013), and its activism in the evolution of the European 
Union's external energy policy (Mayer 2008). The Commission’s difficulties in 
dealing with the increasing heterogeneity of needs and preferences among member 
states have also been discussed (Braun 2009). Finally, Buchan (2011b) offered a very 
useful overview of the latest Commission’s initiatives in expanding the European 
dimension of energy policy. The picture emerging from the analysis of this literature 
is particularly interesting for the purpose of this study: the Commission is frequently 




depicted as a particularly active actor in the external dimension of the energy policy 
(McGowan 2008; Mayer 2008). It has been argued that the European Commission is 
trying to “externalise” internal energy market principles in its neighbour countries and 
to extend internal energy market rules to third countries’ energy companies operating 
within the EU (Riley, 2012). Other scholars argue, more generally, that the European 
Commission is “constantly speeding up its output […] in order to push the project of 
a common energy policy forward (Baumann and Simmerl 2011). To sum up, literature 
depicts the Commission as playing an active role in both the internal and external 
dimension of EU energy policy.  
d) The role of Member States 
Conversely, scholars also stress the persistence of Member States in conducting “their 
own foreign energy policies” (Buchan 2010a). Andoura, Hancher, and Van Der Woude 
(2011) for example, argue that Member States perceive energy as a strategic issue and 
are intent on maintaining national control and preferences over energy resources as a 
matter of national policy. Nonetheless, scholars also suggest that there are “some signs 
of willingness, or at least connivance, on the part of Member States to coordinate and 
even to delegate some of their security of supply functions to the EU” (Youngs 2011). 
(Buchan 2011b, 40) argues that in some areas of external energy policy “Member 
States have been content for Commission officials to talk about energy to their hearts’ 
content in all the “dialogues” they hold with countries or groupings around the world, 
and to try to “export” EU energy policy and rules to neighbouring countries through 
the Energy Community and the Energy Charter Treaty”.   
The literature reviewed in the four points above indicates that studies so far have 
focused either on the role of the Commission or on the role of Member States, arguing 
that they have divergent interests (Braun 2009) and that the former has been very active 
in pushing for its role in the field (Mayer 2008). The literature however does not seem 
to test any concrete hypothesis about the relationship between these actors and the 
factors likely to affect this relationship. Addressing this gap, this thesis conceptualizes 
the relationship between the Commission and the Member States in a principal-agent 
relationship and tests some hypotheses about the factors likely to affect the 
Commission’s behaviour as agent of the Member States. This will contribute to a better 




explanation of the inter-institutional relationship in other policies areas as well, 
enriching this branch of the literature.  
To conclude, this section has highlighted the main themes in the literature on EU 
energy policy: the difficulties in building a common energy policy, the external 
dimension, the role of the Commission and the role of the Member States. It has 
highlighted a significant gap about the dynamics of the relationship between these 
actors. To address this gap, the following section presents the research question and 
objective of this thesis and outlines the specific contribution to the academic literature 
in this field. 
1.4. Research question and objective 
The primary objective of this thesis is to explain the Commission’s behaviour in the 
external dimension of the EU energy policy. In particular, this thesis discusses the 
Commission’s behaviour vis-à-vis the Member States and whether the Commission 
tends to satisfy the preferences of the Member States or its own preferences in the 
external dimension of the energy policy. The research question that is being address 
therefore is:  
Under what conditions does the European Commission try to deviate from 
Member States’ preferences in the external dimension of the EU internal 
energy market?  
In other words, this study aims to explain the conditions (the independent variables) 
that might affect the Commission in deviating from Member States’ preferences (the 
dependent variable). The analysis is conducted in a specific policy area - the external 
dimension of the internal energy market – with the aim of deriving generalizable 
results about the effect of preferences and interests on the Commission’s behaviour. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter (1.3.b.), the external dimension of the EU internal 
energy market is defined by Herranz-Surrallés (2014) as one of three main dimensions 
of the EU external energy policy.2 It “includes the EU’s activity aimed at the creation 
                                                 
2 The remaining two dimensions are: b) energy security or foreign energy policy and c) the intersection 
between energy policy and other foreign policy aims (Herranz-Surrallés 2014).  




of a common energy regulatory space with third countries” (Ibid).  The external 
dimension of the EU internal energy market manifests itself as 
- internal EU legislation concerning the Internal Energy Market and its external 
dimension (i.e. Directives and Decisions); and 
- initiatives aiming at the creation of an integrated energy market with third 
countries (i.e. Energy Community Treaty, Energy Charter Treaty). 
 
This distinction between the internal and external dimensions of EU energy policy will 
also be revisited in the case selection section of the research design (3.6.1).  
To summarise therefore, this thesis seeks to contribute to the explanation of the 
Commission’s behaviour vis-à-vis the Member States, and the dynamics of their inter-
institutional relations in the external dimension of the EU internal energy market.  
1.5.  Theoretical framework 
This section turns to the theoretical framework of this study. As will be illustrated in 
more depth in Chapter 2, the research question and objective of this thesis pose at least 
three analytical requirements. First, a suitable theoretical framework needs to account 
for the active role of the Commission in the external dimension of the EU internal 
energy market. Second, a framework as such needs also to account for the role of the 
Member States who are willing to keep oversight and control over this policy area. 
Finally, the dynamics of the relation between the Commission and the Member States 
also need to be captured.  
The Principal-Agent Model (PAM) of delegation seems to meet these three criteria, 
providing the theoretical tools to analyse the relationship between one or more 
principals and their agent. The model starts from the assumption that principals 
delegate some power to an agent in order to reduce transaction costs (Pollack 2003). 
The model also assumes that the principals and the agent have different preferences, 
and that the latter will try to behave opportunistically and satisfy its own preferences 
rather than those of the principals. PAM seems useful in explaining the relations 
between the Commission and the Member States in the external dimension of the EU 




internal energy market. Member States delegated powers such as agenda-setting and 
external representation to the Commission which are the object of this study. The 
Member States and the Commission however have different interests and preferences 
when it comes to energy policy. While Member States aim to keep control and 
oversight over energy policy, the Commission aims to maximize its competence in the 
field. As such, the analytical tools provided by the PAM are particularly useful to 
explain the Commission’s behaviour in terms of its relation with the Member States, 
and thus to address the research question of this thesis.  
Another important aspect of the PAM is that it allows taking the role of preferences 
into account. More precisely, building on Rational Choice Theory, the model assumes 
that actors have preferences and tend to maximise their utility. For this reason, the 
PAM is particularly suitable for analysing how preferences drive the Commission and 
the Member States in the external dimension of energy policy. This point will be 
covered more extensively in the discussion of the theoretical framework (Chapter 2).  
In looking for a theoretical framework, this thesis also reviews some alternative 
theoretical approaches that could have been used. Firstly, actor-centric theories such 
as Neofunctionalism and the Rational Choice Institutionalism; secondly, state-centric 
theories such as Intergovernmentalism and its variant, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, 
and, finally Multi-Level Governance that sheds light on inter-institutional relations. 
None of these approaches however, if considered on their own, would be sufficient to 
address the research question of this thesis. The PAM seems to be the most useful to 
address the research question of this thesis.  
1.6. Research design and methodology 
The research design of this thesis aims to explain factors likely to affect the 
Commission’s deviation from Member States’ preferences in the external dimension 
of the EU internal energy market. These conditions – independent variables – are the 
preference alignment among the principals (IV1) and the preference alignment 
between the principals and the agent (IV2). Each variable can take two values: 
preferences can be homogeneous or heterogeneous. Starting from the different values 
that each independent variable can take, this research has developed four hypotheses 




about the conditions under which the Commission might deviate from Member States’ 
preferences.  
As far as the first independent variable (preference alignment among the principals) is 
concerned, potential challenges arise with respect to the measurement when the 
preferences among the principals are heterogeneous. In these cases, a benchmark needs 
to be identified in order to compare these preferences with those of the Commission. 
As will be explained in more depth in Chapter 3, when this is the case, a small subset 
of Member States sharing homogenous preferences is identified. The small subset is 
identified through preliminary research which reveals which Member States are the 
most relevant and active in a particular case study.  The use of an empirically informed 
small subset of active Member States and its value as analytical device will be revisited 
in the conclusion of this work when looking for a possible wider contribution to the 
PA literature.  
The four hypotheses are tested by applying a qualitative case study method to reflect 
diversity and to develop more comprehensive insights into the way the Commission 
and Member States act. Four case studies are selected as intensive studies of a “single 
unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring 2004, 
342). Cases have been selected according to their relevance to the research question 
(Burnham 2004), and according to three selection rules, notably, a) involvement of the 
European Commission; b) conditions that may affect the Commission in its ability to 
deviate from Member States’ preferences and c) the external dimension of the EU 
internal energy market. These criteria are illustrated in more depth in the research 
design chapter (3.6.1). For the purpose of this introductory chapter it is important to 
stress that these criteria reflect the relevance to the research question together with 
variation across the dependent variable and independent variables.  
As far as data collection and data analysis are concerned, this research relies on a wide 
range of both primary and secondary sources to reflect the variety of preferences of 
the actors involved in this study. Primary sources include direct evidence of decision-
making in policy documents and 29 semi-structured interviews conducted by the 
author mainly with officials within the Commission’s Directorate General for Energy 




(DG Energy) and within several Member States’ Permanent Representations. Other 
relevant interlocutors working at the European External Action Service, think tanks, 
business associations and other DGs of the Commission were also interviewed (see 
Appendix I for a list of interviews). These interviews however have not been cited in 
the thesis. The information provided was primarily used by the author to gain a more 
comprehensive insight into EU energy policy. Secondary sources include press 
releases and reports issued by the European Commission, journalistic reports 
(Euractiv, EUobsever, and Economist), and quantitative data issued by the 
Commission and international agencies. The breadth of the data collected is one of the 
main strengths of this research as it allows not only an inference into the preferences 
of both the Commission and the Member States but also an understanding of how these 
preferences drive the actors’ behaviour.  
Data was analysed through the process-tracing method, a method  used extensively in 
principal-agent studies (Pollack 2003). Process-tracing is particularly useful as it 
“attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal 
mechanism(s) – between an independent variable – or variables – and the outcome of 
the dependent variable” (George 2005). For this reason, this method is deemed useful 
to address the research question about the conditions (independent variables) that make 
the Commission’s deviation from the preferences of the Member States (dependent 
variable) change.  
To summarise therefore, this thesis uses a qualitative case study method in conjunction 
with process-tracing to explain how the preference alignment among the principals 
(IV1), and the preference alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2), affects 
the Commission’s deviation from the preferences of the Member States (DV). 
1.7. Thesis outline  
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework of 
this research which is the Principal-Agent Model (PAM) of delegation. The chapter 
presents the main assumptions and concepts of the Model, notably, 1) the reasons for 
delegation and the functions to be delegated, 2) the concepts of interests and 
preferences; the concept of agency losses, 4) control mechanisms, 5) autonomy and 




discretion and 6) agency behaviour. The chapter also reviews other theoretical 
approaches that present at least one of these criteria and might plausibly address the 
research question of this thesis.  
Chapter 3 presents the research design and methods and operationalises the main 
concepts of this research into concrete and measurable variables: the Commission’s 
deviation from the preferences of the Member States (DV), the preference alignment 
among the principals (IV1) and the preference alignment between the principals and 
the agent (IV2). The chapter introduces Milner’s (1997) distinction between interest 
and preferences and explains how they are defined for the purpose of this research.  
The chapter also proposes a categorisation of the agent’s behaviour which will be 
revisited at the end of this thesis. Finally, the main methodological choices, a 
qualitative case study method and process-tracing method, are explained.   
Four empirical chapters then look at four case studies. Chapter 4 analyses Decision 
994/2012 on establishing an information exchange mechanism with regard to 
intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third countries in the field 
of energy. The Decision introduced a mechanism for the exchange of information 
among the Member States and between the Member States and the Commission as far 
as intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) signed between Member States and third 
countries are concerned. This case suggests that the Member States had homogeneous 
preferences on this case (IV1) and that their preferences were heterogeneous with 
those of the Commission (IV2). Indeed, the Commission issued a very ambitious 
proposal that triggered some strong reactions among Member States. This case 
therefore, allows the analysis of how the homogeneity of preferences among the 
principals and the heterogeneity of preferences between the principals and the agent 
affected the Commission’s deviation from the preferences of Member States. 
Chapter 5 analyses Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas. In this case, the Commission proposed Ownership Unbundling 
(OU) as the best means to achieve the separation of supply and production activities 
from network operation in the gas market.  The Commission’s proposal was expected 
to have important consequences for the relations between Member States and non-EU 




countries and triggered strong opposition from Member States. Member States also 
had very different preferences about unbundling due to the different structures of their 
national gas markets (IV1). For this reason, the chapter identifies a small subset of 
Member States sharing homogenous preferences and suggests that the preferences of 
the Member States were heterogeneous with those of the Commission (IV2).  The case, 
therefore, allows analysis of how these values of the independent variables affected 
the Commission deviation from the preferences of the Member States (DV). 
Chapter 6 looks at the Energy Community Treaty (EnCT) which was signed by the 
European Community and nine Contracting Parties of South-East Europe in 2005 and 
aimed to extend the EU internal energy policy to those countries. One of the most 
important features of the EnCT is that the EC/EU, including its Member States, is Party 
to the Treaty while individual Member States are not parties of the Treaty on their 
own. This chapter shows that the preferences among the Member States were 
homogenous on this case (IV1) and so were the preferences between the Member 
States and the Commission (IV2). The chapter analyses how these factors affected the 
Commission’s behaviour (DV).  
Chapter 7 looks at the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) which was signed by fifty states 
and the European Community in 1994. The ECT provides a multilateral framework 
for energy cooperation concerned with the promotion and protection of trade, 
investment, and the transit of energy goods. As far as EU Member States are 
concerned, preliminary research suggests that they have different preferences when it 
comes to the ECT (IV1). For this reason, the chapter identifies a small subset of 
Member States sharing homogenous preferences and suggests that the preferences of 
the Member States were homogeneous with those of the Commission (IV2). The 
chapter analyses how these values of the independent variables affect the 
Commission’s deviation from the preferences of the Member States (DV).  
Finally, chapter 8 concludes by summarising the main findings of this thesis and their 
implications. It revisits the main assumption of the PAM used in this thesis in light of 
the analysis conducted in the empirical chapters. The conclusion highlights in 
particular how this thesis seeks to contribute to the PAM.  It also stresses some of the 




shortcomings of the Model and, at the same time, highlights some plausible avenues 
for future research.




Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework  
Explaining the external dimension 








This chapter presents the theoretical framework of this research, the Principal- Agent 
Model (PAM) of delegation. It starts with a brief account of the research question 
being investigated and looks at the variables of this research, highlighting the 
analytical criteria that a suitable theoretical framework should have in order to address 
the research question of this study.  
The research question3 focuses on three main points: a) the Commission’s behaviour 
in energy policy and its deviation from the preferences of the Member States, b) the 
conditions under which the Commission is likely to deviate from the preferences of 
the Member States and c) the Commission behaviour vis-à-vis the preferences of the 
Member States. The research question suggests that the concept of preferences is 
particularly important for the purpose of this research. This chapter then proceeds to 
identifying three main analytical criteria of a suitable theoretical framework. In 
particular, the theoretical framework needs to duly take into account: a) the role of the 
Commission as an actor; b) the role of Member States and c) the relations between the 
Commission and Member States.  
                                                 
3 Under what conditions does the European Commission try to deviate from Member States’ preferences 
in the external dimension of the EU internal energy market? 




Starting from these criteria, the PAM is presented as the most suitable theoretical 
framework. The main assumption of the model and the hypotheses developed so far in 
the literature are presented in section 2.3. and consider the following aspects: 1) the 
reasons for delegation and the functions to be delegated, 2) the concepts of interests 
and preferences; 3) the concept of agency losses, 4) control mechanisms, 5) autonomy 
and discretion and 6) agency behaviour.  
Section 2.4. looks at other theoretical approaches that are deemed plausible but which 
are not as suitable as the PAM for the purpose of this research. The review of these 
approaches is structured on three subsections reflecting the three analytical criteria 
described above in the introduction (chapter 1). The first subsection (2.4.1.) looks at 
actor-centric theories (Neofunctionalism and Rational Choice Institutionalism), the 
second (2.4.2.) looks at state-centred theories (Intergovernmentalism and its variant 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism), and finally, a third section (2.4.3.) looks at theories 
that provide an account on inter-institutional relations such as Multi-Level Governance 
(MLG).  
2.2. Analytical criteria for a theoretical framework  
The previous chapter has highlighted the main features of the puzzle which this 
research aims to address. It has stressed that the main aim of this thesis is to explain 
the Commission’s behaviour in the external dimension of EU energy policy. This 
chapter aims to outline the rationale underlying the theoretical framework chosen for 
this research. This section therefore provides a brief account of the research question, 
and further explains the essential variables of this study. The general criteria for a 
useful theoretical framework are then illustrated.  
The literature stresses two points about the Commission’s behaviour in the external 
dimension of EU energy policy. On the one hand, scholars argue that the Commission 
plays an “active role” in the external dimension of EU energy policy. This happens in 
various ways, such as the Commission’s attempts at “externalising” internal energy 
market principles in neighbouring countries or in speeding up its output to push for a 
common energy policy (Prange-Gstöhl 2009; Riley 2012; McGowan 2008; Mayer 
2008; Baumann and Simmerl 2011). In contrast however, scholars also stress the 




persistence of Member States in conducting their own foreign energy policies and in 
maintaining national control over energy (Buchan 2010a; Andoura, Hancher, and Van 
Der Woude 2011). This situation raises several questions about the role the 
Commission plays in the external dimension of the EU’s energy policy and the 
relationship between the Commission and the Member States as actors with diverging 
interests. Is the Commission actually playing an active role in a way undesired by the 
Member States? In more analytical terms, under what conditions does the European 
Commission try to deviate from Member States’ preferences in the external dimension 
of the EU internal energy market? 
This research question carries at least three important points. Firstly, the phenomenon 
that this research aims to explain is the Commission’s behaviour in energy policy. This 
will be operationalized as the dependent variable “Commission’s deviation from the 
Member States’ preferences” in the research design of this thesis (Chapter 3). 
Secondly, the research looks at the conditions that might make the dependent variable 
change. As will become clearer in Chapter 3, these conditions are the preference 
alignment among the Member States (IV1) and the preference alignment between the 
Member States and the Commission (IV2). This point also stresses that Member States 
are particularly relevant in the research puzzle. It also stresses that the concept of 
preferences is key in this research as preferences are expected to drive the actors of 
this study. Thirdly, the research question suggests that the relationship between the 
Commission and Member States is also important for understanding the external 
dimension of the EU internal energy market.  
A theoretical framework then, needs to take into account all these factors and to satisfy 
the following criteria: firstly, the theoretical framework needs to be actor-centric, 
looking at the role of institutions. On this point, Rational Choice Institutionalism seem 
to be suitable as it provides an account for the role of institutions and supranational 
actors. Secondly, a suitable theoretical framework needs to take into account the role 
of Member States. In this case, state-centric theories such as Functionalism, Neo-
functionalism or Liberal Intergovernmentalism might contribute as they stress the role 
of national governments. Thirdly, the relationship between the Commission and 
Member States also has to be explained, in particular, the dynamics of conflict and 




cooperation existing between these actors. In this case, Multi-Level Governance may 
also contribute.  
To summarise, the research suggests three analytical criteria that a theoretical 
framework suitable for this research needs to meet. In the following section (2.3.), the 
PAM is presented as the theoretical model chosen for this research. Section 2.4.          
then reviews other theoretical approaches that might also be plausible in answering the 
research question.  
2.3. The Principal-Agent Model of Delegation (PAM) 
The Principal-Agent Model (PAM) of Delegation originated in the field of the new 
economics of organization (Moe 1984) and was then applied to give an account of the 
delegation of power in the American Congress (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; 
McCubbins and Page 1987; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; McCubbins, Noll, and 
Weingast 1987). The core argument of the PAM is simple and straightforward. The 
model is an analytical expression of the agency relationship in which one part, the 
principal, considers entering a contractual agreement with another, the agent, in the 
expectation that the agent will subsequently choose actions that produce outcomes 
desired by the principal (Moe 1984, 756).  Examples of principal-agent relationships 
are lawyer-client, doctor-patient, broker-investor, politician-citizen and employee-
employer relationships (Ibid).  
Recently, the model has been applied in the study of the EU (see, i.a., Egan 1998; 
Franchino 2001; Garrett 1992; Garrett and Weingast, 1993; Kassim and Menon 2003; 
Moravcsik 1998; Moravcsik 1993; Pierson 1996; Pollack 1997; Pollack 2003; Pollack 
2006). Indeed, several scholars have deemed the model suitable in explaining the 
delegation occurring between EU member governments (principals) and a number of 
supranational organisations (agents) that Member States have created and to whom 
have been allocated increasing power and discretions (Pollack 2006, 165). The model 
satisfies the analytical criteria described in the previous section as it provides an 
account for the Commission as an actor, explains the role of national governments, 
and provides analytical tools to analyse the relation between the Commission and the 
Member States.  




This section aims to provide an overview of the PAM, focusing on the main 
assumptions, concepts, hypotheses and variables offered by the literature and 
informing this research. The section is structured as follows. Firstly, an account of the 
reasons for delegation and the functions likely to be delegated is offered (2.3.1.). 
Secondly, the concepts of interests and preferences are described as they are key for 
the purpose of this concept (2.3.2.). The PA literature on preferences is supplemented 
with Milner’s distinction between interest and preferences. The distinction allows not 
only an investigation of the PA assumption of different preferences existing between 
the principals and the agent, but also accounts for some homogeneity of preferences. 
Thirdly, the side-effects of delegation are presented in a subsection on agency losses 
(2.3.3.). The section proceeds by looking at the control mechanisms which principals 
might use to control the agent (2.3.4.) and at the concepts of autonomy and discretion 
(2.3.5.). Finally, the section turns to the actual post-delegation agency behaviour and 
considers the main hypotheses offered in the literature (2.3.6.). 
2.3.1. Reasons for delegation and functions to be delegated 
The act of delegation is a constitution, treaty, legislation or other type of contract 
between a principal and an agent that establishes the parameters of acceptable agent 
behaviour (Pollack 2003, 28).  Delegation can be defined more broadly as “a 
conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to 
act on behalf of the former” (Hawkins et al. 2006, 7). Similarly, the relations between 
a principal and an agent are always governed by a contract, even if this agreement is 
implicit or informal (Ibid). This section addresses two main questions about the 
principal-agent relationship. The first question concerns the reasons why a principal 
should consider entering in a contractual agreement with an agent. The second 
question looks at the functions that principals may decide to delegate to an agent.  
There can be several reasons for delegation. According to the literature, the reduction 
of transaction cost involved in the making of public policy is the most important 
motive of delegation. Some transaction costs are informational, such as when 
principals face a complex environment and require technical information and expert 
advice in order to elaborate effective policies (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999; Huber 
and Shipan 2000). Others are related to credible commitment:  principals may find it 




convenient to commit themselves to certain kinds of policies but they cannot bind 
themselves to maintain those policies in the future. For this reason, they delegate 
power to bureaucratic agencies that are independent and insulated from electoral 
pressures (Moravcsik 1998; Huber and Shipan 2000).  
As far as the motivation for delegation and discretion in the EU are concerned, 
Pollack’s findings suggest  that with treaty-based delegation, the demand for credible 
commitment is the primary motivation (see also Moravcsik (1998) and Majone 
(2001)). By contrast, secondary legislation is better explained by a mix of motivations 
with some areas of high discretion (competition policy, external trade) reflecting a 
logic of credible commitment while other areas (agriculture, fisheries) suggest a 
demand for speedy and efficient decision-making (Pollack 2003, 152). Finally, the 
discretion of the Commission also varies across both functions and issue areas. As far 
as function is concerned, the Commission enjoys its greatest discretion in the 
monitoring of Member States’ compliance with the treaties, while discretion in 
regulatory and agenda setting powers varies across issue-areas. More precisely, the 
Commission is subjected to varying degrees of administrative procedures and 
oversight ranging from the Commission’s broad discretion in competition policy to its 
more constrained role in sensitive areas such as national regulation, taxation and 
foreign affairs (Ibid). 
The functions to be delegated can also be different. Pollack (2003, 21) argues that 
principals may delegate four key functions or powers to their agents. Firstly, principals 
may create an agent to monitor individual compliance with agreements between them, 
and provide information about compliance to all participants. By doing this, they 
reduce the transaction costs and encourage cooperation. Secondly, agents are created 
to solve problems of incomplete contracting. Institutional agreements may be 
theorised as contracts. Contracts are invariably incomplete as they do not spell out in 
detail the obligation of the parties in all circumstances and throughout the duration of 
the contract. Parties, then, may decide to delegate the elaboration and the amendment 
of agreements and the arbitration of disputes to an agent. The agent is then expected 
to impartially interpret the agreement that the principals signed, fill in the details of an 
incomplete contract, or adjudicate disputes. Thirdly, principals may delegate the agent 




to adopt credible, expert regulation of economic activities in areas where the 
principals would be either ill-informed or biased. A classic example is the delegation 
by national legislators of monetary authority to an independent central bank. Finally, 
principals may delegate powers of formal agenda-setting so as to avoid the endless 
“cycling” of policy alternatives that might otherwise result from the possession of 
agenda-setting power by the principals themselves.  
In summary, the PA literature argues that delegation may occur in order to reduce the 
transaction costs that result from the making of public policy. These costs may be 
informational or related to a problem of credible commitment. In order to reduce 
transaction costs, the agents are delegated four main functions: a) monitoring 
compliance, b) filling in incomplete contracts, c) providing expert and credible 
regulation, and d) setting the formal agenda for legislation. Once delegation has 
occurred, however, some side-effects might arise as the principals and the agent have 
different preferences. This latter point is the core of the principal-agent problem. 
Before looking at the side-effects of delegation more in depth (2.3.3.), the next sub-
section (2.3.2.), looks at the concepts of interests and preferences. 
2.3.2. Interests and preferences 
One of the main assumptions of the model is that the principals and the agent have 
different preferences or interests.  Both terms are used in the literature. Pollack, for 
instance, states that “once created […] supranational agents develop their own distinct 
preferences” (Pollack 2003, 19). In explaining this concept further, however, he quotes 
Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991, 5) who argue that “there is always some conflict 
between the interests of those who delegate authority (principals) and the agents to 
whom they delegate it. Agents behave opportunistically, pursuing their own interests 
subject only to the constraints imposed by their relationship to the principals”. 
Building on Rational Choice Institutionalism, PA literature takes preferences or 
interests as givens, assuming that “actors have a fixed set of preferences or tastes” and 
that they “behave instrumentally as to maximize the attainment of these preferences” 
(Hall and Taylor 1996, 944–5).  




This research starts from the assumption that not all of these “tastes” are equally fixed 
or given: some desires and wants are fixed while others might change. For this reason, 
Milner’s distinction between interests and preferences (1997, 7) seems particularly 
useful for the purpose of this study.4 Milner defines interests as “fundamental goals, 
which change little”. On the contrary, preferences derive from interests and refer to 
“the specific policy choice that actors believe will maximise either their income or 
chances of re-election on a particular issue”. Milner’s distinction is particularly useful 
for the purpose of this study because it allows the reconciliation of this research with 
the broader Rational Choice literature, as interests can be seen as given and exogenous 
but preferences can be seen as endogenous. They therefore need to be inferred 
empirically on a case-by-case basis. Doing so accounts for those situations where the 
principals and the agent might agree on some preferences (specific policy choices) and 
yet ultimately pursue different interests (fundamental goals). Analysing these kinds of 
situations would contribute to the PAM, most of which only assumes that the principals 
and the agent always have different interests or preferences. The difference between 
the interest and preferences, together with their operationalization, is explained more 
in detail in section 3.4. Just now, it is important to say that this thesis shares the PA 
assumption that the principals and the agent have different interests (Pollack 2003, 19;  
Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 5).  It introduces, however, an additional level of 
analysis in applying Milner’s distinction between interests and preferences. In doing 
so, this study acknowledges that some instances of common preferences and yet 
divergent interest between the principals and the agent might occur. In the next section 
(2.3.3.) the consequences of the assumption of different preferences between the 
principals and the agent are explained in detail.  
2.3.3. Agency losses 
The assumption that principals and agents have different interests and preferences 
means that “there is almost always some conflict between the interests of those who 
delegate authority (principals) and the agents to whom they delegate it” (Kiewiet and 
                                                 
4 This distinction has been used before in the PA literature (see Delreux 2001; Damro 2006). For the 
purpose of this thesis, I use the italics - preferences and interests – to indicate that I am using the terms 
as defined by Milner (1997). When the italics is not used – preference and interests – I am referring the 
concepts as defined by PA literature more broadly or by the specific author cited. 




McCubbins 1991, 5). Thus, there is no guarantee that the agent, once hired, will in fact 
choose to pursue the principal’s best interest or do so efficiently. According to the 
rationalist framework adopted for this research, this can be explained on the basis that 
the agent has their own interests at heart, and is induced to pursue the principal’s 
objectives only to the extent that the incentive structure imposed in their contract 
renders such behaviours advantageous (Moe 1984). These side effects of delegation 
are known as “agency losses” (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 5).  
PA scholars have used many terms to refer to agency losses such as bureaucratic drift 
(Epstein and O’Halloran 1999), political drift (Keleman 2002), and shirking and 
slippage (Pollack 2003). Bureaucratic drift refers to “the ability of an agency or other 
executive actors to enact outcomes different from the policies preferred by those who 
originally delegated power” (Epstein and O’Halloran 1994, 699). On the other hand, a 
political drift occurs if, for instance, “future holders of public authority direct a 
bureaucratic agency to pursue objectives different from those of the political coalition 
that originally delegated authority to the agency” (Keleman 2002, 96). Shirking and 
slippage are by far the most common terms in the literature and they are often used in 
conjunction. Shirking is the “bureaucratic drift” which occurs when “agents behave 
opportunistically, pursuing their own interests subject only to the constraints imposed 
by their relationship with the principal” (Pollack 1997, 108; quoting Kiewiet and 
McCubbins 1991, 5). Slippage seems to occur when the structure of delegation itself 
provides perverse incentives for the agent to behave in ways inimical to the preferences 
of the principals (Ibid). The difference between the two then, is that while shirking 
depends on “conflicting interests” between the principals and the agent (Da Conceição 
2010, 1108–9) and the “opportunism” (Kerremans 2006, 165) of the latter, slippage is 
the result of the “delegation structure” (Da Conceição 2010, 1108–9) and “incentives” 
(Kerremans 2006, 165). This distinction, however, is not always clear in the literature. 
As stated by Kerremans himself, a situation in which the Commission exceeds the 
negotiating directives that the Council may have defined, could be described as both 
slippage and shirking. It could be slippage as “a narrow negotiating mandate may 
make it impossible for the Commission to really negotiate with the EU’s external 
partners”, and “this may be seen as an incentive to slip into concessions not permitted 




by the directives” (Ibid.). However, “it could also be interpreted as shirking, as the 
Commission could have been expected to convince its external partners to agree with 
an agreement that falls within the limits of the Council’s negotiating directives. If that 
is the interpretation, the Commission could be seen to opportunistically exceeding the 
negotiating directives” (Ibid).  
Regardless of the distinction between shirking and slippage, scholars have paid little 
attention to the question of why and how agency losses occur (Da Conceição 2010, 
1108).  It is on this point that this thesis contributes to PA literature. To explain 
Commission behaviour, Chapter 3 (Research Design) will operationalise the concept 
of agency losses as a concrete dependent variable. Subsequently, the factors likely to 
make the dependent variable changing are also operationalized. This research therefore 
aims to contribute to the PA debate on why and how agency losses occur and what 
they actually entail.  
2.3.4. Control mechanisms 
With agency losses being an unavoidable side effect of every delegation, the core 
challenge of a principal-agent relationship is for the principals to obtain maximal 
compliance from their agent (Moe 1984; Kassim and Menon 2003). In order to do so, 
principals have several control mechanisms at their disposal. The literature classifies 
them as ex-ante, ex-post  and ad locum control mechanisms, depending on the stage of 
the delegation process at which they are used (for a classification of control 
mechanisms see also Gilardi 2001 and Franchino 2001).  First, ex-ante control 
mechanisms are administrative procedures which define ex-ante the scope of the 
agency’s activity, the legal instruments available to the agency and the procedures it 
must follow (McCubbins and Page 1987; Pollack 1997). Second, ex-post control 
mechanisms are oversight procedures that allow principals to monitor and influence 
agency behaviour through positive and negative sanctions.  Furthermore, with regard 
to oversight procedures, it is possible to distinguish between police patrol oversight 
and fire alarm oversight (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). The first category consists 
in active monitoring of the agent’s behaviour by the principal. This category includes 




comitology5, public hearings, field observations and examination of regular agency 
reports. They all have a high cost to the principals as they entail active monitoring. 
Alternatively, in fire alarm oversight, principals rely on third parties (citizens, 
organised interests group) to monitor agency’s activity and seek redress through appeal 
to the agent, to the principals or through judicial review. Examples of fire-alarm 
oversight are institutional checks in which a number of agencies are established with 
conflicting sets of incentives or organizational goals. In the EU system, Pollack argues, 
almost every institution besides the Commission plays a role in monitoring and 
checking the Commission’s behaviour. With regard to the costs and credibility of ex-
post sanctions, Pollack (1997) identifies four possible avenues for principals: cutting 
agencies’ budgets; dismissing or refusing to reappoint agency personnel who are 
perceived to be drifting from the preferences of the principals; overruling a 
Commission or European Court of Justice decision through new Council legislation; 
and unilateral noncompliance with a decision of the Commission or the European 
Court of Justice. 
Third and finally, Delreux (2011) and Kerremans (2006) illustrate a third category of 
control instruments called ad locum which Member States can use when the 
Commission negotiates at the international level. Delreux refers to two instruments:  
a) Principal attending the international negotiations: if the international 
negotiation’s rule of procedures allows Member States to attend, the principals 
are able to observe and control the agent’s negotiation behaviour directly;  
b) Coordination meetings: according to article 300 TEC, the Commission needs 
to consult a “special committee appointed by the Council”. In this committee, 
Member States representatives meet during the negotiation stage. Kerremans, 
who illustrates the ad locum device from the perspective of the EU’s external 
trade policy, defines it as “the activities of a committee of Member States’ 
                                                 
5 Comitology concerns the creation of committees used by the Council to control the Commission. 
Committees are of three types (advisory, management, regulatory) and provide for different levels of 
control (with the regulatory committee as the most effective). As is the case with all other control 
mechanisms however, committees are also costly to the principals as they present a clear and explicit 
trade-off between control, and speed/efficient decision making (Pollack 1997). 




representatives – Committee 133 – whose function is to closely control the 
Commission during the external negotiations” (2006, 178).  
It must be borne in mind that the above categories are not static, and that principals 
can always develop new control mechanisms not yet foreseen by the PA literature. 
This point on control mechanisms will therefore also be revised in the conclusion of 
this thesis (Chapter 8).  
Regardless of the category they belong to, the use of control mechanisms is usually 
costly and risky for principals. Firstly, imposing sanctions or strictly controlling the 
agent can negatively affect the ability of an agent to perform its tasks. Cutting an 
agency’s budget, for example, might have a negative effect for member governments’ 
domestic constituencies. Secondly, the use of control mechanisms can be very difficult 
in practice. Appointment of agency personnel in the EU institutions (e.g. 
Commissioners of the European Commission, judges of the European Court of Justice, 
Members of the European Parliament) is subject to rules that make it difficult to be 
used as a control mechanism. Overruling and noncompliance are also difficult to put 
into practice as, in the first case, a common view among principals is required and, in 
the second case, being an incompliant state is costly in terms of reputation among 
Member States, and bearing in mind that national courts have accepted the supremacy 
of EU law over national laws. The most effective and costly sanction however, would 
be revising the agent’s mandate by amending the treaty or regulation that delegates 
authority. This is the ultimate threat and is costly to apply as the institutional barriers 
to carry it out are significant. However, some of the Commission’s executive powers 
are established by Council regulations with fixed expiration dates that allow principals 
to cut back those powers. In this last case, it would be relatively easier for the principals 
to sanction their agents. Generally speaking however, every agency relationship entails 
a balance between the need for the principals to control the agent, and the requirement 
of providing the agent with the means to carry out their mandate.  
In summary therefore, principals have several mechanisms (ex-ante, ex-post and ad 
locum) in order to control the agent. Controlling the agent however, is costly to the 
principals and the latter have to find a balance between delegation and control. It is 




indeed this balance between delegation and control that makes for what the PA 
literature calls autonomy or discretion.  
2.3.5. Autonomy and discretion 
Autonomy is the range of potential independent action available to an agent after the 
principals have established control mechanisms (Hawkins et al. 2006, 8). Discretion 
is a dimension of the contract between principals and the agent (ibid). More precisely, 
discretion refers to  the “characteristics of the act of delegation – that is, a constitution, 
treaty, legislation, or other type of contract – that establishes the parameters of 
acceptable agent behaviour” (Pollack 2003, 28).  
The PA literature has developed many testable hypotheses about the degree of 
discretion allocated to the agents as well as about the autonomy which agents might 
enjoy (Pollack 2003). PA analysts have argued that the degree of discretion allocated 
to agents is dependent on several factors. Firstly, the uncertainty inherent in a given 
issue area can provide an incentive to principals to delegate in order to acquire 
information. Secondly, the difficulty of establishing credible commitments might also 
provide an incentive for principals to delegate in order to establish their commitment 
to a given line of policy over time. Finally, the degree of policy conflict might also 
influence delegation decisions, as principals would be most likely to delegate 
discretion where the degree of conflict is low both among and between themselves and 
their agents (Ibid, 34).  
The PA literature has also developed hypotheses about what agents do with the 
discretion they are granted and which factors are likely to affect their behaviour. 
Literature on legislative delegation to agencies, for instance, stresses that the agent’s 
discretion is a function of the ex-ante and ex-post control mechanisms established by 
the principals to control their agent in a given area (Ibid, 47). In line with this literature, 
this research therefore also looks at the post-delegation behaviour and how the agent 
uses autonomy and discretion. This point is analysed in more depth in the next sub-
section.  




2.3.6. Agency behaviour in the post-delegation phase 
This research identifies the European Commission as an agent of the Member States, 
which are the principals. The Commission is delegated powers through both primary 
and secondary legislation. Considering the Commission as an agent, Pollack (2003) 
argues that according to the EU Treaties, the Commission has been delegated the 
following functions: a) setting the agenda for the EC legislative process; b) monitoring 
and enforcing primary and secondary EC law (‘guardian of the treaties’ role); and c) 
implementing policies adopted by the Council. Clearly these functions correspond 
closely to the functions mentioned earlier in this chapter (2.3.1.):  agenda-setting, 
monitoring, enforcement and adoption of credible regulations. Pollack also offers an 
overview of the nature of control mechanisms adopted in the EC and EU treaties such 
as a) appointments and dismissal procedures, b) oversight procedures, c) 
administrative law and judicial review, d) the budget and e) institutional checks. 
Several hypotheses about the powers delegated in primary and secondary legislation, 
together with the range of issue areas where delegation has occurred, have been tested 
in the literature (Pollack 2003; Majone 2001; Franchino 2001). Building on the work 
of Majone (2001) and Franchino (2001), Pollack (2003) stresses that the treaties 
explicitly delegate executive powers to the Commission in a relatively small range of 
issue areas, the most important of which are competition policy and the common 
commercial policy. In these areas the Commission is relatively unconstrained by the 
control mechanisms (Ibid, 101). With regard to secondary legislation however, 
Member States have delegated more executive powers to the Commission than in the 
treaties, where the terms of delegation would be more difficult to change and where 
shirking by the Commission more difficult to correct.  
PA theory has also developed hypotheses about the actual behaviour of the agent once 
delegation has occurred. There is broad agreement that the behaviour of the agent is 
affected by two factors: a) the preferences of the agent itself and those of the principals 
and b) the control mechanisms used by the principals.  Ex-ante and ex-post control 
mechanisms established by member state governments to control supranational agency 
in a given issue area, affect the discretion of the agent. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter (2.3.5.) discretion can be defined as “the ability to pursue an integrationist 




agenda and move policy outcomes beyond what member governments would 
collectively have decided” (Pollack 2003, 263). While control mechanisms have been 
analysed in section 2.3.4., this sub-section focuses on the role of preferences: whether 
the principals (the Member States) share the same preferences and whether the 
principals and the agent share the same preferences. These are two factors likely to 
affect the behaviour of the agent.   
Existing research suggest that the preference alignment among the principals can affect 
the agent’s discretion. When the principals have homogeneous preferences for 
example, the agent’s discretion is understood to decrease (Delreux 2011; Pollack 2003; 
Hawkins et al. 2006). On the other hand, the autonomy of the agent increases when 
the principals have divergent interests (Elsig 2007, 931–2).6 This is because the 
existence of divergent interests among the principals can impact the successful use of 
principal’s control mechanisms vis-à-vis the agent. Regardless of the distinction 
between autonomy and discretion, the literature suggests that preferences among the 
principals affect agency behaviour.  
The preference alignment between the principals and the agent is also duly taken into 
account in the literature (Pollack 1997; Da Conceição 2010; Delreux 2011). When 
principals have different preferences, the agent can “operate creatively” and “act 
autonomously” (Pollack 1997, 129). The agent could also “exploit” a given situation 
“to shirk within certain limits, exploiting cleavages among the Member States to avoid 
sanctions, Council overruling of decisions, or alteration of the agent’s mandate”. 
Moreover, having agenda-setting power, the Commission may also “push through 
those proposals closest to its own preferred policy that also can garner a qualified 
majority in the Council” (Ibid).  
As any other theoretical model, PA also presents strengths and weaknesses. While the 
points discussed so far suggest that the model offers several strong analytical tools for 
analysis, some shortcomings are also present. Firstly, PA might be statics and 
simplistic. This is so because the model focuses on a relationship between an agent 
                                                 
6 Elsig uses the phrasing “constellations of interests among the principals” (2007: 931-2) to refer to 
principals having divergent interests.  
 




and principals neglecting other actors. Secondly, PA literature often assumes that the 
agent and the principals are unitary actors while this is not always the case. The 
Commission and the Member States are complex actors but in PA models they are 
assumed to be monolithic actors for the sake of simplification. Thirdly, most of the PA 
literature simply defines the agent behaviour in terms of deviation/not deviation 
without considering some more nuanced behaviour which might occur between these 
two opposite situations. Finally, the model misses that other factors – external to the 
principal-agent relationship – might affect the behaviour of the actors. In applying the 
PAM, therefore, both strengths and weaknesses need to be taken into account. 
Although the model presents some limitations it nonetheless provides strong 
explanatory power as outlined so far and summarised below. 
The PAM helps to address the research question of this thesis in three particular ways. 
Firstly, it accounts for the Commission as an actor. The Commission is treated as an 
agent of the Member States but with specific interests and preferences which it will try 
to satisfy. Secondly, Member States are also accounted for, as they are deemed to 
delegate powers to the Commission in order to reduce transaction costs and satisfy 
their interests and preferences. For this reason, Member States as principals will 
control the agent (the Commission) using the control mechanisms at their disposal. 
Finally, the model allows the analysis of the principal-agent relationship where the 
Commission tries to satisfy its own preferences (agency losses). The model therefore 
not only provides analytical tools to look at the Commission’s behaviour, but also to 
investigate the conditions that might affect that behaviour, notably, the preference 
alignment or constellation  among the principals and the preference alignment between 
the principals and the agent.  
2.4. Review of other theoretical approaches 
The decision about an appropriate theoretical framework requires that alternative 
theoretical approaches are considered. This section reviews some theoretical 
approaches that meet the three criteria illustrated earlier in this chapter (2.2.) and are 
thus deemed plausible for the purpose of this research. The section concludes that 
although useful, none of the approaches is as suitable as the PAM for this research. An 




exception is Rational Choice Institutionalism (reviewed in section 2.4.1.) from which 
the PAM stems.  
2.4.1. Actor-centric theories: Neofunctionalism and Rational 
Choice Institutionalisms  
Actor-centric theories look at institutions as actors. In this sense, Neofunctionalism 
and Rational Choice Institutionalisms provide analytical tools which might be useful 
to address the research question of this thesis about the Commission’s behaviour. As 
is analysed further below however, Neofunctionalism fall short of explaining the entire 
picture of the inter-institutional relationship between the Commission and the Member 
States. Rational Choice Institutionalism, from which the PAM originates, is instead 
more useful in this sense.  
Neofunctionalism 
Neofunctionalism developed largely through the work of Ernst Haas (1958; 1964) and 
Lindberg (1963). Neofunctionalism is a classic integration theory that starts from the 
argument that European integration begins when two or more countries agree to work 
for integration in a given sector (sector A). They appoint a supranational bureaucracy 
– a “high authority” – to accomplish this task more effectively. Integration in the first 
sector creates functional linkage pressure for related sectors, as the full advantage of 
integration will not be achieved unless cognate sectors are involved in integration. The 
“high authority” becomes a key sponsor of European integration, and it develops a 
strategy to deepen integration in an expanding range of policy areas. Moreover, it seeks 
to increase its institutionalization at the regional level. The “high authority” is seen as 
“entrepreneurial” as it acts as a constant advocate of integration and may sponsor the 
emergence of regional-level interests associations (Ibid).  
A second important feature of Neofunctionalism is the concept of ‘spillover’. Spillover 
is the way in which the creation and deepening of integration in one policy area would 
create pressure for further integration within and beyond that sector (Haas 1958). 
Consequently, greater authoritative capacity at the European level would also occur 
(Ibid).  A further definition is provided by Lindberg (1963, 10): “a situation in which 
a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal 




can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition 
and a need for more action and so forth”.  Hence, Neofunctionalism illustrates a 
process of functional spillover in which sectoral integration produces the unintended 
consequence of promoting further integration in additional issue areas (Haas 1964; 
Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). Moreover, this process of functional spillover is 
complemented by a political spillover in which supranational and subnational actors 
create additional pressures for further integration. Spillover, however, is not 
completely automatic but requires a measure of political activism. Eventually, the 
concept of “cultivated spillover” emphasises the role of a group of states in 
international organisation which, if left to their own devices, will bargain down to a 
lowest common denominator position (Ibid).  
According to neofunctionalists then, the driving forces of integration are non-state 
actors rather than sovereign nation-states. On the one hand, domestic social interests 
(such as business associations, trade unions and political parties) press for further 
policy integration to promote their economic or ideological interests; these subnational 
actors appreciate the benefits from integration and transfer their demands, expectations 
and loyalties to a new centre. This new centre, on the other hand, is constituted by 
supranational actors (the European institutions and particularly the Commission), 
which argue for the delegation of more powers in order to increase their influence over 
policy outcomes. 
The neofunctionalist approach has been applied in European studies including the 
study of political integration in the social policy and labour market field (Strøby Jensen 
2000) or the expansion of EU competencies in health policy (Greer 2006). Probably 
the most important reappraisal of Neofunctionalism has been written by Rosamond 
(2005), who has argued that its conceptual repertoire can contribute to EU studies and 
comparative regionalism.  
Although significant because of its focus on non-state actors, Neofunctionalism 
remains a meta-theory of integration and can add little to the PAM. The 
neofunctionalist argument about additional pressure for further integration by 
supranational actors (notably the European Commission (Haas 1961; Lindberg and 




Scheingold 1970)), is reasonable. This approach however underestimates that national 
governments can have preferences against further integration and that they can act in 
order to prevent such further integration occurring. In addition, neofunctionalists 
overestimate the role of non-state actors and assume their preference for further 
integration which may or may not be accurate. Neofunctionalism therefore provides 
analytical tools to look at the subnational and supranational level. The role of national 
governments however, is almost dismissed. For this reason, this theoretical framework 
can only partly contribute to this research. 
Rational Choice Institutionalism  
Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) is one of the so-called three New 
Institutionalisms (together with  Historical Institutionalism (HI) and Sociological 
Institutionalism (SI)) which developed in the early 1980s as an alternative to the debate 
between Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism (March and Olsen 1989; Hall 
and Taylor 1996). Given its analytical focus on institutions, RCI satisfy the first of the 
three analytical criteria presented earlier in this chapter as it allows consideration of 
the European Commission as an actor. 
Hall and Taylor (1996, 945–6) emphasize four notable features of RCI. Firstly, it starts 
from the behavioural assumptions that relevant actors have a set of preferences or 
tastes, and that they behave instrumentally and strategically in order to maximise the 
attainment of these preferences. Secondly, it sees politics as a series of collective 
action dilemmas in which individuals acting to maximise the attainment of their own 
preferences are likely to produce an outcome that is collectively suboptimal. Thirdly, 
it postulates that actors’ behaviour is driven by a strategic calculus which, in turn, will 
be affected by the actor’s expectations about other actors’ behaviour. Finally, the 
actors create institutions because they perform specific functions and minimize 
transaction, production or influence costs.  
These four assumptions have been tested by American political scientists in the study 
of the origins and effects of US Congressional institutions on legislative behaviour and 
policy outcomes (Moe 1984; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). The insights of RCI have 
also been applied to the study of the EU.  More precisely, EU studies have focused on 




the analysis of institutional reforms and the subsequent redistribution of power among 
the competing actors. Scholars have in particular focused on the introduction of the 
cooperation procedure (Steunenberg 1994; Moser 1997) and the study of single 
institutions such as the European Parliament (Tsebelis 1994) and the European Court 
of Justice (Garrett 1992). More importantly for this research, is from RCI that the PAM 
stems. Initially developed by American political scientists in the 1970s (Kassim and 
Menon 2003), the model has been applied to study the Community’s comitology 
procedure (Gerus 1991), the Community standardization bodies (Egan 1994), and the 
role of the European Court of Justice as an agent of the Member States (Garret (1992); 
Garrett and Weingast 1993; Kilroy 1995). Other scholars have used the model to 
analyse specific policy areas such as regulatory policies (Majone 2000), 
telecommunication policy (Thatcher 2001) and migration policy (Stetter 2000).  The 
PAM has also been applied to the study of EU external representation (Da Conceição 
2010; Eugenia Da Conceição-Heldt 2011; Eugénia Da Conceição-Heldt 2011; Damro 
2006; Damro 2007; Delreux 2011; Elsig 2011). 
RCI can thus speak to the theoretical model of this research as it provides analytical 
tools to look at the role of institutions. In particular, RCI also provides a theoretical 
framework to look at inter-institutional relations.  
2.4.2. State-centric theories: Intergovernmentalism and 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
A deeper insight on the role of national governments is offered by 
Intergovernmentalism and its variant Liberal Intergovernmentalism. This theory 
emerged after the developments of the 1960s and 1970s that seemed to demonstrate 
the limits of Neofunctionalism in giving an account of the integration process.  
The first Intergovernmentalist was probably Hoffmann (1966), who declared the 
nation state not “obsolete” but “obstinate”. This is to say that, contrary to what neo-
functionalists affirmed about the shift of authority from Member States to a new centre, 
Hoffmann postulated that states still played a fundamental role in Europe. Hoffman 
emphasised the central role of nation-states and the importance of national interests in 
driving European integration. The main aim of governments is to protect their 




geopolitical interests (for example, national security and sovereignty). Interests are 
defined as “constructs in which ideas and ideals, precedents and past experiences, and 
domestic forces and rulers all play a role” (Hoffmann 1995: 5). Any international 
system would be likely not to produce integration among units, as argued by 
neofunctionalists, but rather diversity, as situations and domestic interests vary across 
states: “in areas of key importance to the national interest, nations prefer the certainty, 
or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled 
uncertainty of the untested blunder” (Hoffmann 1966, 882). These aspects in part 
explain the difficulties in getting further with political integration during the 1960s. A 
further explanation lies in the distinction between “high” and “low” politics: 
integration is possible in certain technocratic and uncontroversial areas but is likely to 
generate a conflict in matters where the autonomy of governments or components of 
national identity are at stake. Moreover, Hoffman criticised the concept of spillover 
and the automaticity of integration as, in his opinion, national interests and the 
centrality of state actors would play a decisive role. 
Building on Hoffmann’s Intergovernmentalism, Moravcsik developed the Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist theory of European integration (Moravcsik 1993; Moravcsik 
1998).  His central argument is that “European integration can best be explained as a 
series of rational choices made by national leaders. These choices responded to 
constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful 
domestic constituents, the relative power of each state in the international system and 
the role of international institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate 
commitments” (Moravcsik 1998, 18). Like Hoffman, Moravcsik emphasises the 
power and preferences of EU member states but he goes more in-depth by employing 
a rationalist framework which allows disaggregation of the phenomenon he seeks to 
explain into elements, which can be treated separately and with different theories. 
According to this rationalist framework, international negotiations consist of three 
stages explained by three different theories: national preference formation, interstate 
bargaining and institutional choice (Ibid, 21).  
In the first stage, governments formulate a consistent set of national preferences. With 
the term “preferences”, Moravcsik designates “not simply a particular set of policy 




goals but a set of underlying national objectives independent of any particular 
negotiations to expand exports, to enhance security vis-à-vis any particular threat, or 
to realize those national preferences more efficiently than do unilateral actions”. In the 
second stage, states develop strategies and bargain with one another at the 
supranational level in order to reach substantive agreements that help to further their 
national preferences in a more efficient way than unilateral actions. Finally, they 
decide to delegate or pool sovereignty to international institutions in order to secure 
the agreements they have made and increase the credibility of their mutual 
commitments. According to Moravcsik then, European integration was not driven by 
an entrepreneurial Commission or by an unintended spillover. Rather, it was driven by 
a gradual process of preference convergence among the most powerful member states. 
These states succeeded in doing this by bargaining among themselves, offering side-
payments to smaller states and delegating limited power to supranational organisations 
(Ibid).   
As indicated above, Moravcsik uses alternative theories and hypotheses for each of the 
three stages. In order to explain variation in national preferences, he evaluates theories 
based on geopolitical and economic interests. For the second stage (interstate 
bargaining), he evaluates theories that stress supranational entrepreneurship and 
interstate power. Finally, Moravcsik uses theories that stress federalist ideology, the 
greater efficiency of centralising the generation of technocratic information, and the 
need to increase the credibility of national commitments.  
Although Moravcsik does take into account the role of national governments and the 
delegation of power from Member States to supranational institutions and provides a 
very rich theory on preference formation, some aspects make this approach insufficient 
to answer the research question this thesis is addressing. Firstly, it is not Moravcsik’s 
aim to provide a comprehensive account of problems that occur within delegation, 
such as conflicting interests or agency losses, which this thesis aims to do. Secondly, 
Moravcsik does not look at the role of the Commission as policy entrepreneur: even 
though  “most states are likely to consider a supranational body to be more neutral than 
even a randomly chosen national government” (Moravcsik 1993, 512), this does not 
necessarily imply that the Commission will in practice act neutrally (Kassim and 




Menon 2003, 127–8). Because of this, is seems unlikely that this theoretical approach 
could explain the tension that exists between the Commission and the Member States. 
Moreover, Intergovernmentalism underestimates the role of the Commission in the 
same way that Neofunctionalism underestimates the role of national governments. 
This dichotomy must be overcome in order to provide an account of the relation 
between the Commission and the Member States.  
2.4.3. Inter-institutional relations: Multi-Level Governance 
(MLG) 
The main difference between the governance approach and classic integration theories 
is in the way they look at the EU itself. While the latter asks how and why the Euro-
polity came into existence, the governance approach takes the Euro-polity as given 
and looks at its impact on national and European policies and politics (Jachtenfuchs 
2001).7 The MLG approach argues that “European integration is a polity-creating 
process in which authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple 
levels of government – subnational, national, and supranational”  (Marks et al. 1996, 
342). In contrast to the classical theories of integration, the MLG not only restates the 
importance of the supranational institutions but also looks at the relations between 
them and the national level. As such, it seems a plausible approach for addressing the 
research question of this project and is therefore worthy of review.   
MLG can be described according to three main features (Ibid). Firstly, decision making 
competencies are not monopolized by state executives but shared by actors at different 
levels. Supranational institutions such as the European Commission, the European 
Court and the European Parliament therefore have an independent influence in policy-
making that is not merely a direct consequence of their role as agents of state 
executives.  Second, individual state executives might lose control in the collective 
decision-making process. This is because Decisions concerning rules to be enforced 
across the EU involve gains or losses for individual states. Third, political arenas are 
                                                 
7 For the sake of clarity it should be noted that the label “governance” includes a great variety of ideas 
and positions among scholars: some of them refer to their studies as “supranational”, other as “Multi-
Level Governance” (Marks, Hooghe, & Blank 1996; Jachtenfuchs 2001; Bache & Flinders 2004; Sweet 
& Sandholtz 1997). This thesis uses the label “Multi-Level Governance” as it seems to be the most 
common and prominent in the governance literature. 




interconnected rather than nested. This means that although national arenas are 
important for the formation of state executive preferences, states are no longer the only 
interface between the supranational and subnational arenas. States share control with 
subnational actors who operate in both national and supranational arenas and create 
transnational associations.  
Starting from these premises, MLG focuses, among other things, on the impact of the 
EU on the domestic affairs of its Member States and vice versa. In this debate, three 
major lines have developed in the literature: the Europeanization of policies and 
politics, the rise of regulatory policy-making and the emergence of a new mode of 
governance (Jachtenfuchs 2001).8 An important aspect of MLG is that it provides a 
clear distinction between institutions and actors. That is to say, a distinction between 
the state and the EU as sets of rules on one side, and the particular individuals, groups 
and organizations which act within those institutions on the other. Based on this 
assumption Marks et al. (1996) argue that the key actors in European decision-making 
are not the whole states or national governments but elected domestic politicians. The 
executive branch of national government will not necessarily give priority to 
sustaining the state as an institution. In contrast, it will focus on the implementation of 
the goals which will depend, among other things, on winning the next election. 
Government leaders then decide to shift decision-making at the supranational level. 
This might happen for several reasons but the main argument is that national 
governments are constrained in their ability to control the supranational institutions 
they created at the European level (Ibid, 340).  
                                                 
8 Europeanization may be defined as the degree to which public policies are carried out either by the 
Member State alone, jointly by Member States and the EU, or exclusively by the EU (Ibid. 2001:250). 
Scholars argue that “joint policy decision-making seems to be both a general and a fairly stable pattern” 
(Ibid). Moreover, in describing the EU as a “regulatory-state” some scholars argue that the creation of 
a European market requires constant regulation together with a high degree of specialized technical 
knowledge, and that the institutions, particularly the Commission, the Court and the regulatory agencies, 
can be an “independent fourth branch of government” or “non-majoritarian institutions” (Majone 1994, 
1996 quoted in Jachtenfuchs 2001: 253). The role of institutions is confirmed in the network governance 
literature, which focuses on informal and loose structures that extend across and beyond hierarchies. 
This approach has often been applied to the analysis of multi-level governance in the EU (Marks 1992; 
Kohler-Koch 1999).  
 




MLG demonstrate some elements that are a typical field of analysis of the PAM. The 
ability of Member States executives, as principals, to control supranational agents, is 
constrained by several factors such as the multiplicity of principals, the mistrust that 
exists among them, impediments to coherent principal action, informational 
asymmetries between principals and agents and by the unintended consequences of 
institutional change (Ibid, 353-4). Marks et al. also look at different stages of the policy 
making processes in the EU, and highlight the important role of supranational 
institutions, particularly the Commission, and the loss of control by national 
governments. They argue that “EU decision-making can be characterized as one of 
multiple, intermeshing competencies, complementary policy functions, and variable 
lines of authority – features that are elements of multi-level governance” (Ibid, 364). 
Taking the policy initiation stage as an example, they emphasise the role of subnational 
authorities in mobilising at the supranational level and pushing for certain initiatives 
and, in doing so, in influencing the process of agenda-setting. They also show however 
that the Commission is a critical actor in the policy initiation phase as it can use its 
alacrity and present national governments with a fait accompli. These scholars 
conclude that supranational institutions are decisive actors but are not the only ones: 
the system is one of multi-level governance characterized by mutual dependence, 
complementary functions and overlapping competencies.   
Multi-Level Governance thus appears to be able to take into account the tension 
between the supranational and intergovernmental level. As a stable equilibrium is 
lacking, the allocation of competencies between national and supranational actors is 
ambiguous and contested. However, there are several elements that make this approach 
unsuitable for this research. Some criticisms of this approach are well illustrated by 
George (2004). Multi-Level Governance sometimes overestimates the role of 
subnational actors stating that the relations between the latter and the Commission are 
advantageous for subnational actors. This might happen for some policy areas such as 
structural policy, but there are instances such as state aid, where subnational actors are 
more constrained rather than strengthened. This was proven, for example, by the 
relations between the German Land of Saxony and the Commission on state aid given 
to Volkswagen (Thielemann quoted in George (2004)). A second criticism is that MLG 




mistakes evidence of subnational authority mobilisation at European levels with 
evidence of influence. The existence of extra-state channels of access to the EU, such 
as the Committee of Regions, does not necessarily mean that subnational actors have 
an impact on EU policy. This might be true but lacks empirical evidence. 
In conclusion, the theoretical approaches reviewed so far can only partially address the 
research question of this thesis as each of them only satisfies one of the analytical 
criteria described earlier in this chapter. An exception is constituted by Rational 
Choice Institutionalism from which the PA stems. The PAM is therefore the main 
theoretical framework for this study.  
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on three main points. Firstly, the introductory section recalled 
the main aim of this research, which is to explain the behaviour of the European 
Commission in energy policy. This aim was expressed in the following research 
question: under what conditions does the European Commission deviate from Member 
States’ preferences in the external dimension of the EU internal energy market? 
Developing from this research question and the variables included in it, three analytical 
criteria were then outlined in order to identify a suitable theoretical framework. Firstly, 
the theoretical framework should be actor-centric to account for the role of the 
Commission as an actor pushing its interests forward. Secondly, it should take into 
account the role of the Member States as actors also seeking to push their interests 
forward. Finally, a theoretical framework should also account for the relation between 
these actors.  
In light of the aforementioned criteria, the PAM was identified as the most suitable 
theoretical framework for this research. Section 2.3. offered a review of the main 
assumptions of the model and the hypotheses developed in the literature so far. The 
section focused on the concepts of delegation and functions to be delegated, interests 
and preferences, agency losses, control mechanisms, discretion and agency behaviour. 
The review of the model suggested that PA can be particularly useful in addressing the 
research of this thesis for three reasons. Firstly, it looks at the Commission as the agent 
of the Member States to which specific tasks have been delegated. PA literature also 




argues that the Commission has its own interests and preferences and will try to pursue 
them. Secondly, the model accounts for the role of Member States as principals that, 
acting as rational actors, delegate functions to the Commission in order to reduce 
transaction costs; the Member States also control the Commission, making sure that 
its actions do not go against their preferences and interests. Finally, the model allows 
investigation of the relations between the Commission and the Member States and the 
dynamics of conflict and cooperation that may occur.  
The chapter has also shown that the choice of the PAM as theoretical framework was 
not conceived in a vacuum. Based on the three criteria mentioned earlier, other 
theoretical approaches were reviewed in section 2.4. Firstly, Neofunctionalism and the 
Rational Choice Institutionalisms were reviewed as actor-centric theories that – 
looking at the institutions as actors – may speak to the PAM for the purposes of the 
research. The review suggested that, although useful in explaining the role of the 
Commission, Neofunctionalism tell us little about the role of Member States, important 
actors in this research. Rational Choice Institutionalisms, from which the PAM stems, 
instead, seems more useful in addressing the research question of this thesis. Secondly, 
Intergovernmentalism and its variant Liberal Intergovernmentalism were reviewed as 
theories which focus on the role of national governments in the process of European 
integration. Although useful in accounting for Member States pushing their own 
preferences at European level, these theories do not aim to provide an account of the 
inter-institutional relation between the Commission and the Member States and, for 
this reason, fall short in meeting two of the criteria outlined for consideration. Finally, 
Multi-Level Governance (MLG) was reviewed as a theoretical approach able to take 
into account the multiple levels of government: subnational, national, and 
supranational. Despite this theoretical approach that has also made use of the principal-
agent model of delegations, several limitations in the way of looking at the subnational 
level do not make this approach the most suitable for this research.  
In light of the review of the PAM and other theoretical approaches deemed appropriate 
for addressing the research question therefore, the former is adopted as theoretical 
framework for this research.  The model seems to account for the role of the 
Commission, the role of the Member States and the relations that occur among them. 




In the next section, the model is translated into a concrete research design where the 
main concepts are operationalised into measurable variables. 




Chapter 3  Research Design  
Identifying preferences and their 





3.1.  Introduction 
In this chapter, the theoretical model outlined earlier in this thesis (Chapter 2) is 
operationalised in a concrete research design. The chapter begins by introducing the 
purpose of the research question: under what conditions does the European 
Commission deviate from Member States’ preferences in the external dimension of the 
EU internal energy market? (3.2.). The chapter then continues by looking at the 
dependent variable of this work: the Commission’s deviation from Member States 
preferences (DV), and how it is conceptualised and operationalised (3.3.). As outlined 
earlier, and building on PA literature, this research seeks to contribute to the 
knowledge of the concept of agent behaviour vis-à-vis their principals. This chapter 
therefore operationalises the Commission’s deviation from Member States’ 
preferences in terms of “deviation”, “compliance” or “responsive autonomy”.  
A further section turns to the factors deemed likely to affect the Commission in its 
deviation from Member States’ preferences (3.4.). It looks at two independent 
variables: the preferences alignment among the principals (IV1) and preferences 
alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2). In operationalising the 
independent variables, the section recalls the distinction between preferences and 
interests illustrated more in depth in the theoretical framework (2.3.2.) and its 
importance for this research. Interests are operationalised as given based on existing 
literature (see section 2.3.2.). As a result of this, the thesis focuses on the variety of 
preferences which will be operationalised on a case-by-case basis, relying on a wide 
range of sources.  




Section 3.5. presents four testable hypotheses as to how the independent variables are 
likely to affect the dependent variable. The hypotheses are drawn from the PA 
literature which has, so far, offered various hypotheses about the conditions under 
which supranational organizations are able to pursue their distinct preferences, within 
the limits of their statutory discretion. Finally, a section on methodology and research 
methods introduces the qualitative case study method used in this thesis. The section 
presents the criteria for the selection of the cases and an overview of the cases selected. 
Finally, the methodological choices on data collection and data analysis are also 
presented (3.6.).  
3.2. Research question and purposes 
The purpose of this research is to explain the conditions – the independent variables 
(IVs) – that affect the Commission in deviating from Member States’ preferences - the 
dependent variable (DV). The analysis is conducted in a specific policy area, the 
external dimension of the EU internal energy market, with the aim of deriving 
generalizable results about the effect of specific circumstances on the Commission’s 
behaviour. 
The external dimension of the EU internal energy market is defined by Herranz-
Surrallés (2014) as one of three main dimensions of the EU external energy policy.9 
The external dimension of the EU internal energy market “includes the EU’s activity 
aimed at the creation of a common energy regulatory space with third countries”.  The 
latter means to create a “liberalised and de-monopolised energy sector with producing, 
transit and consuming countries”. Liberalisation and de-monopolisation are indeed 
deemed the best guarantee for the EU to deal with its energy dependency (Ibid).  The 
same concept is conveyed in the European Commission’s documents where it is stated 
that “creating a ‘common regulatory space’ around Europe, would imply progressively 
developing common trade, transit and environmental rules, market harmonisation and 
integration” (European Commission 2006b: 16). In turn, a common regulatory space 
                                                 
9  Herranz-Surrallés (2014) identifies three dimensions of EU external energy policy: a) the 
external dimension of the internal energy market; b) energy security or foreign energy policy and c) 
the intersection between energy policy and other foreign policy aims.  




is expected to create “a predictable and transparent market to stimulate investment and 
growth, as well as security of supply, for the EU and its neighbours” (Ibid).  
This external dimension of the EU internal energy market, therefore, concerns the 
action of the EU with regard to promoting the rules of the internal energy market in 
third countries. This may include countries which produce energy or through which 
energy is transported (some of which might also be eligible for EU membership).  
Having third countries comply with the EU acquis on energy makes it easier for the 
EU to trade energy with those countries and thus to complete the internal EU energy 
market. Indeed, if third countries and their energy companies behave according to the 
EU acquis, there would be a common regulatory framework and the EU internal energy 
market would be strengthened. The following paragraphs will operationalise the 
external dimension of the EU internal energy market for the purpose of this research.   
Operationalising the external dimension of the EU internal energy 
market  
The Commission stressed the importance of “building up the external dimension of 
the EU internal energy market” in one of its most recent documents on energy policy 
and its external dimension (European Commission 2011b). According to the 
Commission, freedom and transparency of the energy markets are vital for the EU as 
the EU energy market itself depends on high levels of import (Ibid). Thus, “external 
energy policy needs to reflect the interconnectedness of the internal market and the 
interdependence of the EU Member States”. According to the Commission, the 
external dimension of the EU internal energy market entails actions such as 
coordination in the internal market, diversification of supply sources and routes, an 
integrated energy market with all neighbouring countries and the convergence of the 
EU and Russian markets (Ibid). Some of those actions will be revisited in the coming 
chapters as the Commission’s specific policy choices, or preferences. The external 
dimension of the EU internal energy policy therefore includes not only coordination 
within the internal energy market but also the creation of regulatory and legal 
convergence with neighbouring countries and Russia. This distinction will be revisited 
in the case selection section (3.6.1.).  




Academic literature on EU energy policy also seems to confirm that the external 
dimension of the EU internal energy market includes both the internal energy market 
and the relations between non-EU countries. Prange-Gstöhl (2009, 5297), for instance, 
argues that “one of the main pillars of the EU’s external energy policy is the objective 
of energy market integration […] with the EU’s Eastern and South-Eastern neighbours 
and the ‘neighbours of the neighbours’, some of them being […] countries without any 
EU membership perspective.” Other authors such as Belyi (2008) point out that when 
it comes to the external dimension of the energy policy, two aspects need to be taken 
into account. Firstly, the Commission’s effort towards the liberalisation and 
integration of the internal energy market and secondly, the Commission’s effort in 
“realising energy security and the internal market externally” (Ibid, 205). This latter 
aspect includes, in turn, the EU’s commitment in exporting its model of energy 
markets to the outside world, and the EU’s role in international organisations dealing 
with energy. Along the same lines, Baumann and Simmerl (2011) stress the 
interdependence of the internal and external dimension of the energy market.  
To summarise this section therefore, academic literature on energy policy (Belyi 2008, 
Baumann and Simmerl 2011) and EU official documents (European Commission 
2011) suggest that the external dimension of the EU internal energy market manifests 
itself in two main ways: a) coordination and integration of the internal energy market 
and b) measures contributing to the creation of a common regulatory area with third 
countries. In terms of specific outcomes, this translates into: 
 Internal EU legislation concerning the internal energy market and its external 
dimension (i.e. Directives and Decisions); 
 Initiatives aiming at the creation of an integrated energy market with third 
countries (i.e. Energy Community Treaty, Energy Charter Treaty) 
This thesis will come back to this twofold manifestation of the external dimension of 
the EU internal energy market in the case study section (3.6.1.) where two cases 
regarding internal EU legislation and two cases regarding relations with third countries 
will be discussed.  




Why look at the external dimension of the EU internal energy market? 
Having operationalised the external dimension of the EU internal energy market, this 
subsection will turn to justifying why investigating the external dimension of the EU 
internal energy market is important for generating generalizable insights. This 
research argues that analysing the external dimension of the EU internal energy market 
helps to shed light on the dynamics of the inter-institutional relationships between the 
Commission and the Member States.  
The external dimension of the EU internal energy market seems to reflect some of the 
main assumptions of the PAM. Firstly, PA assumes that principals and agent have 
different interests.  The literature often argues that the Commission is deemed to have 
an interest in further integration (Pollack 2003). As will be explained in more detail 
later, literature on energy policy suggests that the Commission and the Member States 
have different interests.  Secondly, PA also assumes that the agent will try to satisfy 
its own interest rather than those of the principals. Preliminary research has suggested 
that some conflict exists between the Commission and the Member States when it 
comes to the external dimension of energy policy. So far, however, the PA model has 
not been tested comprehensively on this policy area. Bocquillon and Dobbels (2013) 
looked at the climate and energy package (2007-2008), investigating whether a PA 
approach could explain patterns of interactions between the Commission and the 
European Council in a legislative agenda-setting in high profile cases. Proposing some 
provisional  conclusions, they suggest that the relationship between these two actors 
in the specific case analysed is one of “competitive co-operation” (a phrase coined by 
Smith (1998)) where tension and competition emerge, but cooperation seems to 
prevail. Taking the relationship between the Commission and the Member States 
seriously, this thesis looks at the external dimension of the EU internal energy market 
as a new policy area in which the explanatory power of the PA model can be tested in 
a more comprehensive way. Thus, consideration of the external dimension of the EU 
internal energy market also enables the development of general conclusions about the 
Commission’s behaviour and the conditions under which the Commission deviates 
from Member States’ preferences. In doing so, this research seeks to contribute to the 
broader PA literature as well.  




In summary therefore, this thesis seeks to explain under what conditions the European 
Commission tries to deviate from Member States’ preferences in the external 
dimension of the EU internal energy market. By investigating the external dimension 
of the EU internal energy market, which has not been covered comprehensively by PA 
literature so far, this research aims to contribute to the explanation of the 
Commission’s deviation from Member States’ preferences. The next section will turn 
to the Commission’s deviation from Member States’ preferences as the dependent 
variable of this research.  
3.3. Defining the dependent variable (DV): the 
Commission’s deviation from Member States’ 
preferences 
In this section, the concept of the agent’s behaviour will be operationalised as the 
dependent variable of this research: the Commission’s deviation from Member States’ 
preferences (DV). Operationalising the dependent variable in this way enables 
investigation of its variation and of the independent variables determining that 
variation. PA literature (Delreux 2011; Pollack 2003; Hawkins et al. 2006) has sought 
to explain agency behaviour in terms of discretion and autonomy of the agent vis-à-
vis its principals, starting with the assumption that “delegation […] entails side effects 
that are known […] as agency losses” (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). The literature 
refers to side effects of delegation using several terms  - agency slack, political and 
bureaucratic drift, shirking and slippage – providing often only  general definitions of 
these concepts (Dür and Elsig 2011; Delreux 2011; Elsig 2007; Franchino 2001).  
Hence, the aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the agent 
behaviour vis-à-vis its principals, operationalised as deviation from principal’s 
preferences. Can the agent’s behaviour merely be categorized as shirking/slippage – 
for which a clear distinction still has to be defined - or can a more precise 
categorization of the possible agent’s behaviours be offered? Such an endeavour needs 
to begin with a consideration of the responsibilities and powers of the Commission. In 
a context that does not focus on the PA literature specifically Nugent (2010) groups 
“the responsibilities and associated powers of the Commission” under six major 
headings : (1) Proposer and developer of policies and legislation; (2) Executive 




functions, (3) Guardian of the legal framework, (4) External representative and 
negotiator, (5) Mediator and conciliator, (6) Promoter of the general interest. This 
thesis will focus on points 1) proposer and developer of polices and legislation and 4) 
external representative and negotiator. More detailed information is included in box 
3.1 below.  
Box 3.1: Responsibilities and powers of the Commission based on Nugent 2010 
 
Nugent’s (2010) classification is very thorough but tells little about the role of the 
Commission as agent of the Member States and its deviation from Member States’ 
preferences. PA literature however, identifies some “key functions or powers” 
(Pollack 2003) of the agent: a) monitoring individual compliance with agreements 
between them, and providing information about compliance to all participants; b) 
solving problems of “incomplete contracting”; c) adoption of credible, expert 
regulation of economic activities in areas where the principals would be either ill-
informed or biased; and d) powers of formal agenda-setting. Another good overview 
of the “functions of the agent” is offered in the passage below: 
 “[agents] facilitate commitment problems, reduce information 
asymmetries, enhance the efficiency in coming to decisions, take the 
blame for unpopular decisions (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002), carry 
out third-party conflict resolution, create policy bias (Hawkins et al., 
2006), represent principals in negotiations with third parties (Meunier and 
1) Proposer and developer of policies and legislation  
 Policy initiation and development;  
 Legislative initiation and development;  
 Advisory committee networks;  
 Expert committees; 
 Consultative committees 
 Hybrid committees 
4) External representative and negotiator 
 Determining and conducting the EU’s external trade relations; 
 Negotiating and managing responsibilities in respect of the various special 
external agreements that the EU has with many countries and groups of 
countries;  
 Key point of contact between the EU and non-member states; 
 Responsibilities for applications for EU membership. 
 




Nicolaïdis, 1999) and implement policies (Pollack, 2006)” (Da Conceição 
2010, 1113).  
In looking at the “responsibilities”, “powers” (Nugent 2010) or “functions” (Pollack 
2003; Da Conceição 2010) exerted by the agent, this research looks at one particular 
aspect: the behaviour of the agent vis-à-vis its principals. Indeed, the agent can exert 
its function through satisfying Member States’ preferences or deviating from them. 
Depending on their behaviour vis-à-vis their principals, agents can be seen as “merely 
servants of the Member States” (Moravcsik 1993), trustees (Majone 2001), own actors 
(Da Conceição 2010; Pollack 2006) or something in between (Baldwin 2006; Elsig 
2007) (in Da Conceição (2010, 1113). Hence, building on PA literature, this research 
defines deviation as any behaviour that differs or departs from Member States’ 
preferences, and operationalises deviation as follows: 
Full compliance (absence of deviation)  
The Commission behaves as “merely [a] servant of the Member States” (Moravcsik 
1993); simply performing the “responsibilities and related powers” (Nugent 2010) or 
agents’ “function” (Pollack 2003). This case can be described as absence of deviation. 
When the Commission behaves as a faithful agent, no conflict situation is expected to 
arise between the Commission and the Member States.  
Responsive autonomy 
The Commission behaves somewhere between full compliance and full deviation 
when it tries to take advantage of its autonomy or discretion but is still responsive to 
Member States’ demands. Writing about negotiations in trade policy, Baldwin (2006, 
930) depicts the Commission as “in the driving seat, but forced to be responsive to 
Member State demands”. In a similar manner, writing about the choice of regulatory 
venues for trade negotiations Elsig (2007, 944) argues that the Commission has 
“substantial autonomy to act” as is allowed by “existing delegation design (e.g. agenda 
setting power), high thresholds for Member States to sanction the Commission, and 
the multi-level system” (Ibid: 928). For the purpose of this thesis, when the 
Commission tries to take advantage of its autonomy or discretion but is still responsive 
to the preferences of the Member States, its behaviour is categorized as “responsive 




autonomy,” as the Commission does not behave as “merely [a] servant of the Member 
States” neither does it behave as an “own actor”.  
Deviation 
The Commission behaves as an “own actor” (Eugénia Da Conceição-Heldt 2006; 
Pollack 2003) acting opportunistically and pursuing its own interest and preferences 
rather than those of the principals. When the Commission behaves as an “own actor” 
it triggers an opposition from the Member States and this state of affairs might lead to 
conflict situations (Da Conceição 2010). A situation of conflict is characterised by the 
opposition of the Member States vis-à-vis the Commission and by the attempt of both 
actors to pursue their divergent preferences.  
Proposing the categorization of the agent behaviour as illustrated above then, this 
thesis distinguishes itself from the PA literature which simply accounts for deviation 
or lack of deviation using terms such as agency losses, shirking and slippage, 
bureaucratic and political drift. Moreover, a clear distinction between shirking and 
slippage is hard to be proven empirically (Kerremans 2006).  The contribution of the 
categorization offered in this thesis, therefore, is that it moves from the mere 
distinction between deviation/not deviation used in PA literature and allows for some 
behaviours in between these two extreme behaviour. The main difference with existing 
literature consists in the distinction between interests and preferences. In the new 
categorization proposed in this thesis, therefore, the terms “deviation” indicates a 
situation in which the agent behaves as own actor pursuing its own preferences and 
interests. This situation is different from “responsive autonomy” in which the agent 
pursue its own interest but is still responsive to Member States’ demands or 
preferences. 
This categorization of deviation drawn from the PA literature will be revisited in the 
conclusion of this thesis in light of the analysis conducted in the empirical chapters. 
The analysis of concrete case studies is expected to contribute to the understanding of 
the Commission’s behaviour vis-à-vis its principals and provide some empirical 
evidence of the Commission’s deviation from Member States’ preferences. Empirical 
data is expected then to contribute to the theoretical debate about agency behaviour 




which, so far, has been limited to shirking and slippage. The next section will turn to 
the operationalisation of the conditions – the independent variables – expected to affect 
the Commission’s deviation from member States’ preferences: the preference 
alignment among the principals (IV1) and the preference alignment between the 
principals and the agent (IV2).  
3.4. Defining the independent variables (IVs): the role 
of preferences and interests 
What affects the Commission in its deviation from Member States’ preferences in the 
external dimension of the EU Internal Energy Market? Or, to put it differently, which 
are the conditions that make the dependent variable change? This section describes the 
independent variables that condition the Commission’s deviation from Member States’ 
preferences. As for the dependent variable, the independent variables are also derived 
from the literature on PA and can be operationalised as follows: 
- Preference alignment among the principals (IV1); 
- Preference alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2). 
Each independent variable can take two values. When the preferences are similar, they 
are defined as homogeneous; when different, they are defined as heterogeneous. As 
illustrated in the theoretical framework of this thesis (2.3.2.), preferences are a key 
concept in this research. It is worth remembering some important aspects of that 
section here. This research follows Milner's (1997) distinction between interests and 
preferences. Interests are defined as “fundamental goals which change little”. In 
particular, “actors are assumed to have certain fundamental interests, captured by their 
utility functions, which they attempt to maximize” (Ibid, 33). Preferences, on the other 
hand, refer to the “specific policy choice” that actors believe will maximize their 
interests. Preferences, therefore, derive from basic interests (Ibid 15; 22). The 
distinction between preferences and interests is important as it allows a comprehensive 
picture to be drawn about what drives the actors involved, in this case, the Commission 
and the Member States.  
How then will the interests and the preferences of the Commission and those of the 
Member States operationalised? Using Milner’s (1997) distinction, interests are taken 




as given and deduced from existing literature.  Preferences, on the other hand, cannot 
be operationalised once and for all and therefore will be defined on a case-by-case 
basis with regard to a particular “initiative”- or case study for the purpose of this thesis. 
Preferences will be inferred inductively from a wide range of sources, as it is typical 
in qualitative research. 
Identifying the interest of the Commission and of the Member States 
As far as interests are concerned, this research takes the simplifying assumption that 
the Commission has an interest for competence maximization while the Member 
States have an interest for control over energy policy. In this subsection these 
assumptions are explored using PA literature and energy policy literature.  
There seems to be broad agreement in the PA literature that the Commission has an 
interest for competence maximization (Tallberg 2002; Ellinas and Suleiman 2012; 
Schafer 2014; Hooghe 2002; Franchino 2007). This thesis, then, shares Pollack’s 
argument that the Commission is a “unitary, rational, competence-maximizer” actor 
(2003, 36). The Commission is seen as “a preference outlier with a strong preference10 
for further integration, and can be expected to use its powers to pursue those aims” 
(Ibid). As stressed by Pollack, there are several reasons why the Commission might 
have an interest for competence-maximization: “self-selection for integrationist 
personnel in European organisations (Bonham 1978); socialization of personnel once 
they arrive at the organization (Mancini 1991); or simply bureaucratic politics (Peters 
1992)” (quoted in Pollack 2003, 35-36). This research, however, does not focus on the 
reasons for the interest of the Commission. Rather, it shares the simplifying 
assumption of the Commission as unitary, rational, competence-maximizer actor with 
an interest for further integration (see also 2.3.2).11 Taking interests as given, allows 
focusing on the variety of preferences or “policy choices” as defined by Milner (1997). 
As acknowledged by Pollack himself however, this simplification is problematic 
                                                 
10 Pollack (2003) and Milner (1997) use the word “preference” in different ways and this might lead to 
confusion. Pollack (2003, 85-6) uses the word “preference” to indicate “aims” rather than “policy 
choices” which is used by Milner (1997). 
11 There is debate in PA literature about the assumption of the Commission as competence- maximizer. 
See, inter alia, Norman 2015; Randour, Janssens, and Delreux 2014; Dijkstra 2013 who argue that the 
aforementioned assumption can be misleading. 




because the Commission is composed of several sub-units with distinct policy 
preferences. Taking the simplifying assumption above is thus useful in order to focus 
on the behaviour of the Commission vis-à-vis the Member States. For the purpose of 
the analysis therefore, the Commission is depicted as unitary actor with an interest for 
further integration.   
Literature on energy policy also seems to suggest that the Commission has been trying 
to expand its competence in this policy area.  Scholars argue that the European 
Commission is playing an “active role” in the external dimension of energy policy 
(McGowan 2008; Mayer 2008) “constantly speeding up its output […] in order to push 
the project of a common energy policy forward” (Baumann and Simmerl 2011).  Other 
authors have stressed how the Commission is also trying to expand its competence in 
the external dimension of EU energy policy by extending internal energy market 
principles in neighbouring countries (Prange-Gstöhl 2009; Riley 2012). The 
assumption of the Commission as unitary actor has also been put forward in energy 
policy literature. Despite comprising several DGs, the Commission (notably DG 
Energy), it has been argued, can be considered as a single agent because when the 
Commission relates to other actors such as the Parliament or Member States, it is 
expected to assume a common and coherent position.  In other words,  “internal 
differences between directorates have to be resolved before a proposal can be sent on 
to the Parliament” (Matlary 1997, 107). 
As far as the interest of the Member States is concerned, this research starts from the 
PA assumption that principals delegate power to supranational institutions to reduce 
transaction costs, which can be informational or of credible commitment (Pollack 
2003). Principals, however, do not aim to lose control over the policy area in which 
they are delegating some tasks or power. As illustrated in more detail in chapter 2, 
principals use a variety of control mechanisms to make sure that the agent perform the 
tasks delegated. Illustrating the interest of political actors, Milner (1997: 34) argues 
that their fundamental goal is to maximize their utility, “which is assumed above all to 
depend on re-election”. Although acknowledging that “re-election is not the only goal 
attributed to political actors”, for the sake of simplification, Milner assumes that 
“staying in office is ‘the fundamental goal’ of political actors.  




Applying Milner’s rationale to this thesis requires two main clarifications. Firstly, this 
research argues that Member States are represented in the European Council and in the 
Council of Ministers as “political actors” or “executive” (Milner 1997). As far as the 
EU is concerned, Member States are represented by Heads of State or Government of 
the Member States in the European Council and Ministers in the Council of Ministers. 
More specifically this research looks at the Council of Ministers in its configuration of 
Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council (TTE), members of which are 
Energy Ministers. As far as Energy Ministers in the Council are concerned, rules for 
their appointment may vary across Member States but it seems safe to argue that they 
are expression of the government in power in their own country (Bomberg, Peterson, 
and Corbett 2011).  
Secondly, in this research, it is assumed that the interest of the Member States can be 
operationalized as maintaining control over energy policy. Literature on energy policy 
seems to suggest that national governments have always guarded their national energy 
policy jealously (Padgett 1992; Belyi 2008). Energy has normally been located in the 
sphere of high-priority national politics (Braun 2009, 430; Eikeland 2011, 245), 
interpreted in terms of national security (Kirchner and Berk 2010, 868) and 
sovereignty (Baumann and Simmerl 2011; McGowan 2008). For this reason, Member 
States are intent on “maintaining national control over energy resources and national 
preferences as a matter of national policy” (Andoura, Hancher, and Van Der Woude 
2011, IV–V). For the purposes of this research then, Milner’s interest for re-election 
is translated into control over energy policy.  
To conclude this reflection on the definition of the interests, this subsection has argued 
that sharing the Rational Choice assumption that interests are given, the Commission 
is assumed to have an interest for competence-maximisation and the Member States 
are assumed to have an interest for control over energy policy. This definition of 
interests satisfies one of the main assumptions of the PAM:  that the principal and the 
agent have different interests. Taking these interests as given therefore enables the 
discussion to move to preferences, the main focus of this research.   




Identifying the preferences of the Commission and of the Member 
States 
Having deduced interests, or fundamental goals, from existing literature, this research 
will now turn to preferences.  Preferences can be defined as “specific policy choice[s]” 
that actors believe will maximize their interests (Milner 1997, 15). As for interests, 
preferences are “notoriously difficult to measure” (Häge and Toshkov 2011). On a 
similar note, Hooghe (2002, 10) has argued that “preferences pose a serious research 
challenge to social scientists” as they “cannot be observed objectively, unless one 
engages in in-depth structured interviewing”.  For the purpose of this research 
therefore, preferences are inferred from a wide range of sources including documents 
produced by EU institutions, journalistic reports, quantitative data issued by major 
energy companies, agencies or NGOs and interviews (see section 3.6.2. on Data 
Collection). 
The Commission’s preferences are assumed to serve the fundamental interest of 
competence-maximization. As preferences are “specific policy choices” they cannot 
be operationalised once and for all. Preferences are operationalised with regard to a 
particular initiative on energy policy. For this reason, the Commission’s preferences 
will be analysed in detail in the empirical chapters of this thesis. To provide general 
guidance at this stage however, some preferences can be derived from the fundamental 
goal of competence-maximization: coordination of the internal energy market; 
diversification of supply sources and routes, an integrated energy market with all 
countries of its neighbourhood, convergence of the EU and the Russian energy markets 
(European Commission 2011b). These general guidelines will be tested in the 
empirical chapters where the preferences will be operationalised for each case study.  
As far as Member States’ preferences are concerned, the same conditions stated for 
the Commission applies. Member States’ preferences are supposed to serve the interest 
of maintaining control over energy policy. When it comes to the external dimension of 
the EU internal energy market, this interest is served by policy choices – preferences 
– such as strengthening energy security, protecting bilateral contracts with third 
countries’ energy suppliers, expanding the energy market beyond EU borders and so 




forth (Buchan 2010a). Member States’ preferences will also be analysed in more detail 
in the empirical chapters of this thesis, as outlined above for the Commission.   
3.4.1. Preference alignment among the principals (IV1) 
This thesis argues that the preference alignment among the Member States can affect 
the Commission’s deviation from Member States’ preferences (DV) in the external 
dimension of the EU internal energy market. PA scholars use several expressions to 
operationalise the preference alignment among the Member States. Delreux (2011, 55) 
for example, writes about “preference homogeneity among the principals” while Da 
Conceição (2010) uses the term “degree of interest alignment among Member States.” 
Elsig (2007, 931) also writes about the “interest constellation among the principals.”   
Regardless of these distinctions in the terminology, there is broad agreement in the PA 
literature that the preferences of the principals can affect the agent’s behaviour. More 
precisely, when principals share preferences, the agent’s discretion is expected to 
decrease (Pollack 2003; Hawkins et al. 2006; as quoted in Delreux (2011, 54).12 The 
literature argues that when the discretion of the agent decreases, its deviation from 
Member States’ preferences may also be expected to decrease as the agent has less 
opportunity to pursue their own preferences. By contrast, when principals have 
different preferences, the agent can “operate creatively” and “act autonomously” 
(Pollack 1997). The Commission can exploit the fact that Member States have 
different preferences “to shirk within certain limits, exploiting cleavages among the 
Member States to avoid sanctions, Council overruling of decisions, or alteration of the 
agent’s mandate” (Ibid). Moreover, having agenda-setting powers, the Commission 
may also “push through those proposals closest to its own preferred policy that can 
also garner a qualified majority in the Council” (Ibid.). The PA literature therefore 
seems to suggest that whether principals have the same or different preferences is a 
potential explanatory factor for the agent’s behaviour.  
                                                 
12 In PA literature, “discretion is a dimension of the contract between a principal and an agent” (Hawkins 
et al. 2006) and is not to be confused with autonomy: “where discretion gives the agent leeway the 
principal deems necessary to accomplish the delegated task, autonomy is the range of independent 
action available to the agent” (Ibid). See also, inter alia, Pollack 2003; Niemann and Huigens 2011. 
These terms are however often used interchangeably. See also Chapter 2 of this thesis.  




Operationalising the preferences of the principals is particularly difficult for at least 
two reasons. Firstly, the number of Member States (i.e. principals) has changed over 
time, from 6 Member States in 1951 to 28 Member States in 2013. Taking into account 
the preferences of a wide and increasing number of actors is particularly challenging. 
Secondly, in both the EU institutions where the principals are supposed to express their 
preferences, the Council of Ministers and the European Council, the vote is secret. 
Thus, consensus is used in the energy Working Group within the Council of Ministers. 
Inevitably then, a problem of indicators arises when it comes to operationalising 
preferences. For this reason, when available, this research will make the best use of 
the Conclusions of the European Council and the Note of the Presidency of the Council 
of Ministers to obtain as much information as possible.  
Moreover, to overcome these challenges, this thesis will use a wide range of sources 
such as documents produced by EU institutions, journalistic reports, quantitative data 
issued by major energy companies, agencies or NGOs and interviews (see section 
3.6.2. on Data Collection). Using a wide range of sources allows collecting a large 
amount of data and, consequently, confidence in inferring preferences from the data. 
The wider the range of sources, the better will be the reconstruction of the variety of 
preferences that exist across the actors and across the case studies. This point will also 
be revisited in the data collection section of this chapter (3.6.2.). 
As outlined above therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, preferences will be 
identified by conducting a careful and detailed qualitative analysis of the wide range 
of sources mentioned above, and then operationalised as either heterogeneous or 
homogenous. When data provides information about specific preferences of individual 
Member States on a particular initiative and those preferences are different across 
Member States, preferences among the Member States have to be operationalised as 
heterogeneous. Preferences also have to be operationalised as heterogeneous when 
data highlights the existence of some tension within the Council of Ministers or the 
European Council or amongst Member States in general on a particular file. Preference 
heterogeneity may be indicated by terms such as “different opinions” or “rival 
factions”.  




By contrast, preferences have to be operationalised as homogenous when data does 
not suggest any relevant differences across the Member States in terms of preferences. 
Preferences homogeneity may be inferred from terms such as “Coreper13 reached 
agreement on” or “the majority of Member States”. It has to be borne in mind, 
however, that the term majority as used for example in the Notes of the Presidency of 
the Council of Ministers, is not a formal indication of vote. These kinds of terms are 
therefore interpreted as homogeneity of preferences among the Member States but 
should not be read as a formal indication of vote strict sense.  The importance of relying 
on several sources then is apparent: EU official documents may be more or less explicit 
about the existence of preference homogeneity or heterogeneity among the Member 
States. Other sources, such as Member States’ official documents, press releases and 
reports need to be taken into account as to explore preferences. Finally, interview data 
may also contribute to identifying the preferences that exist among the Member States.  
To sum up, whenever data suggests the existence of different preferences that 
prevented the Council from adopting a common position or reaching an agreement, 
preferences among the Member States will be operationalised as heterogeneous.  
3.4.2. Preference alignment between the principals and the 
agent (IV2) 
The second independent variable is meant to compare the preferences of the agent with 
those of the principals. PA literature assumes that principals and agents have different 
preferences or interests and that, as a consequence, every delegation entails some side-
effects known as agency losses (Pollack 2003). This thesis, however, argues that there 
is a difference between preferences and interests, and that principals and agent may 
share some preferences even when keeping different interests. The preferences 
between the principals and the agent therefore can be homogenous or heterogeneous. 
Based on this assumption, the preference alignment between the principals and the 
agent is also a potential explanatory factor of the agent’s behaviour.  
                                                 
13 Coreper stands for the 'Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States to the European Union'. It is the Council's main preparatory body which examines all 
items to be included into the Council's agenda. 




As effectively presented by Da Conceição (2010, 1110) “in a classical delegation 
situation, the agent might have preferences that are systematically different from those 
of the principals, which might lead to conflict situations between principals and 
agents”. On the other hand, the agent and the principals, or some of the principals, 
might also share preferences (Delreux 2011) i.e. agreement on a specific policy choice. 
Preference alignment between principals and agent is measured by comparing the 
perceived agent’s preference to those of the principals (Delreux 2011: 55). When the 
principals and the agent do not share the same preferences, preferences have to be 
operationalised as heterogeneous. As the first independent variable, the 
operationalisation of the second independent variable needs to be built upon a wide 
range of sources so as to rely on as much information as possible in detecting the 
preferences of the main actors. Heterogeneity of preferences can be inferred from the 
sources when terms such as “opposition”, “resistance”, and “reluctance” are used to 
describe the attitude of Member States towards the Commission’s proposals. By 
contrast, when none of the sources available provide any evidence about a tension 
existing between the Commission and the Member States, then preferences are 
operationalised as homogenous. These indicators will be revised in the conclusion of 
this thesis.  
Comparing the perceived agent’s preference to those of the principals can be 
particularly difficult in a situation characterized by heterogeneous preferences among 
the principals (Delreux 2011: 55). Delreux uses the pivotal player preference within 
the collective principal as a benchmark for “the preference of the principals” in order 
to compare them to those of the agent. If the preferences of the agent fall within the 
majority group of the Member States’ preferences, they are considered homogenous 
with those of the principals. By contrast, if the preferences of the agent fall outside the 
scope of the majority of the Member States, they are considered heterogeneous with 
those of the principals. As a result, Delreux argues, “the preference of outlier principals 
are not taken into account when the degree of preference homogeneity between agent 
and principals is determined” (Ibid).  




Sometimes, however, applying this system in a strict way could be misleading or not 
even possible. It could be misleading as, at times, it is indeed the preferences of the 
outlier that establish the character of the relationship between the Commission and the 
Member States, as the former could try to align with a small group of Member States 
to push its own preferences further. Secondly, it is not always possible to understand 
whether preferences fall inside or outside the scope of the majority of the Member 
States as data about the preferences of each of the 28 Member States is not always 
available. How then is the second independent variable operationalised when Member 
States have heterogeneous preferences?  
This research will use an analytical device to compare the heterogeneous preferences 
of the principals with those of the agent. When the preferences among the principals 
are heterogeneous, a small subset of Member States sharing homogenous preferences 
will be identified. The small subset will be identified through preliminary research 
which reveals which Member States are the most relevant and active in a particular 
case.  The use of an empirically informed small subset of active Member States with 
homogenous preferences will overcome the analytical limitation of relying on a simple 
majority benchmark. This will be tested in the data chapters, and its value as an 
analytical device will be revisited in the conclusion of this work, particularly when 
outlining the contribution to PA literature. Member States are to be defined as “active” 
when they are particularly involved in an initiative in the field of energy or are 
particularly vocal about their preferences and try to push these preferences further.  
This point will also be revisited in the conclusion of this thesis.  
To summarise this section therefore, two independent variables – the preference 
alignment among the principals (IV1) and the preference alignment between the 
principals and the agent (IV2) are assumed to affect the Commission’s deviation from 
Member States’ preferences (DV). In both cases, the role of preferences is key. Given 
that preferences are specific policy choices they will be identified on a case-by-case 
basis in the empirical chapters of this thesis. In the next section, four hypotheses are 
formulated to test the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable.  





The previous section has illustrated the independent variables – the preference 
alignment among the principals (IV1) and the preference alignment between the 
principals and the agent (IV2) – which are deemed potentially helpful in explaining 
the Commission’s deviation from Member States’ preferences (DV). This section now 
turns to presenting four hypotheses intended for testing the effect of each independent 
variable on the dependent variable. The hypotheses stem from the literature on 
delegation and post-delegation dynamics in the European Union (Pollack 2003).  
PA has offered several testable hypotheses about delegation of power to supranational 
institutions. In what is so far probably the most comprehensive work on delegation and 
agency behaviour in the EU, Pollack (2003) offers two sets of hypotheses. The first set 
of hypotheses looks at the specific functions delegated to an agent and the conditions 
under which Member State principals delegate greater or lesser discretion to their 
agents. The second set focuses on the conditions under which supranational institutions 
such as the Commission are able to “pursue their distinct preferences, within the limits 
of their statutory discretion” (Ibid, 19).  
This research fits into the second group of hypotheses as it investigates the 
Commission’s ability to pursue their own preferences in the external dimension of the 
EU internal energy market. This thesis aims to test whether the preference alignment 
among the principals (IV1) and the preference alignment between the principals and 
the agent (IV2) affect the probabilities of deviation of the agent from the preferences 
of the principals. That is to say that, depending on the different values of the 
independent variables (homogenous or heterogeneous), this research expects different 
probabilities of deviation or other possible agent’s behaviour, in particular deviation, 
responsive autonomy or full compliance. This work therefore falls in line with the PA 
literature that looks at the probabilistic character of the action of the agent and the 
principals (Delreux et al. 2012; Delreux and Kerremans 2010). Table 3.1 at the end of 
this section, offers a visual representation of the four different hypotheses stemming 
from the different possible values of the independent variables. The table also offers 
the expected outcomes for each hypothesis. This table will be revisited and completed 
in the conclusion, in light of the results and findings of the case studies.    




Hypothesis 1 (H1): 
When the preferences among the principals are homogenous, the agent is less likely to 
try to deviate from the preferences of the principals.  
The PA literature argues that “when principals share preferences, the agent’s discretion 
is expected to decrease” (Pollack 2003; Hawkins et al. 2006; Delreux 2011). Following 
this rationale, this thesis suggests that when its discretion decreases, the agent is less 
likely to try to deviate from the preferences of the principals. Deviation would be 
hazardous for at least two reasons.  
Firstly, Member States sharing the same preferences would be able to better control 
the agent as they would make effective use of control instruments. Control 
mechanisms are costly to the principals. If Member States share the same preferences 
it is likely that they would work together to control the agent making the use of control 
mechanisms effective.14  
Secondly, Member States sharing the same preferences would be able to find the 
necessary agreement to apply some sort of ex-post sanction to the agent such as cutting 
the agency’s budget, dismissing or reappointing agency personnel, adopting new 
legislation that overrules a Commission decision through Council legislation, and 
unilaterally refusing to comply with an agency decision (Pollack 1997). For these 
reasons, the homogeneity of preferences among the Member States is therefore 
expected to reduce the probability of deviation.  
Other possible types of agent behaviour are more likely to occur, i.e. responsive 
autonomy and full compliance. The agent might try to take advantage of its autonomy 
or discretion but be still responsive to principals’ demands (responsive autonomy). 
Another likely scenario would be full compliance, where the agent behaves performs 
its tasks without deviating from the preferences of the principals (see section 3.3.). 
                                                 
14 As mentioned in section 2.3.4. of this thesis Member States can control the agent ex ante – through 
administrative procedures defining the scope, the legal instruments available and the procedure to be 
followed by the agent during the agency activity –, ex post - monitoring agency behaviour – and ad 
locum when the Commission negotiates at the international level 




Hypothesis 2 (H2): 
When the preferences among the principals are heterogeneous, the agent is more likely 
to try to deviate from the preferences of the principals. 
By contrast, the Commission might exploit the situation when Member States have 
heterogeneous preferences to deviate from Member States’ preferences. As effectively 
put by Pollack (1997: 129), the Commission can exploit such a situation “to shirk 
within certain limits, exploiting cleavages among the member states to avoid sanctions, 
Council overruling of decisions, or alteration of the agent’s mandate”. Moreover, 
having agenda-setting powers, the Commission may also “push through those 
proposals closest to its own preferred policy that also can garner a qualified majority 
in the Council” (Ibid).   
This thesis suggests that when the Commission behaves as described above, it tries to 
satisfy its own preferences rather than those of the Member States and therefore 
deviates from Member States’ preferences. This kind of scenario might occur because 
when the Member States have different preferences, the use of control mechanisms 
and sanctions is more costly and more complicated. As argued previously in this 
section, sanctions require agreement among the Member States before they can be put 
in place. The same can be argued for control mechanisms, as the latter require also 
some sort of cooperation among the Member States before they can be implemented.  
The heterogeneity of preferences among the Member States therefore is expected to 
increase the probability of deviation. As mentioned earlier in this chapter (3.3.), in this 
kind of situation, the agent is more likely to behave opportunistically and in doing so, 
to create a conflict situation with the principals. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): 
When the preferences between the principals and the agent are heterogeneous, the 
agent is more likely to try to deviate from the preferences of the principals. 
The PA literature also suggests that “in a classical delegation situation, the agent might 
have preferences that are systematically different from those of the principals, which 
might lead to conflict situations between principals and agents” (Da Conceição 2010, 




1110). In other words, when the Commission and the Member States have different 
preferences, the former is expected to satisfy its own preferences rather than those of 
the principals (Pollack 2003) generating a conflict with the Member States.  
This hypothesis therefore suggests that when the preferences between the agent and 
the principals are heterogeneous, it is likely that the Commission would try to pursue 
policy choices that serve its fundamental goal of competence-maximization and 
deviating from the preferences of the Member States. As a consequence, a situation of 
“conflict” or tension between the Commission and the Member States is likely to arise, 
as both actors would try to satisfy their own, divergent, preferences. Hypothesis 3, 
therefore, suggests a scenario of deviation as more likely than other agent behaviours, 
such as responsive autonomy and full compliance.  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): 
When the preferences between the principals and the agent are homogenous, the agent 
is less likely to try to deviate from the preferences of the principals. 
It may also be the case that the agent and the principals, or some of the principals, 
(even if they keep different interests) share homogeneous preferences. If this is the 
case, the Commission is less likely to deviate from the preference of the Member 
States. This is because the homogeneity of preferences between the principals and the 
agent might open the way for some scenario of cooperation in order to achieve 
common preferences.  
The PA literature does not offer many testable hypotheses on cooperation between the 
agent and the principals, as it assumes that principals and agents always have different 
preferences. Looking at both preferences as policy choices and interests as 
fundamental goals, this research expects that, even if Member States have different 
interests, (as assumed by PA literature) they can share some similar preferences. In 
that case, the scenario of deviation is less likely to occur.  
With regard to hypothesis 4 above, other outcomes, such as responsive autonomy and 
full compliance, are more likely to happen. Indeed, it is likely that the agent will try to 
pursue its own preferences and to be, at the same time, responsive to the demands of 




the principals (responsive autonomy). It is also likely that the agent performs its tasks 
without deviating from the preferences of the principals (full compliance).  
To summarise therefore, a model is offered that can test the explanatory power of the 
PAM in explaining under what conditions the Commission tries to deviate from 
Member States’ preferences in the external dimension of the EU internal energy 
market. The preference alignment among the principals (IV1) and the preference 
alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2) are expected to potentially affect 
the probability of the Commission’s deviation (DV).  Four testable hypotheses have 
been formulated about the relation between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables of this research. These hypotheses will be tested in four 
empirical case study chapters. The next section turns to the qualitative case study 
method driving this research. The section will also outline the main methodological 
choices in data collection and data analysis. 
















































































3.6. Methodology and Research Methods 
3.6.1. Qualitative case study method 
A qualitative case study method seems most suitable for the purpose of this thesis 
because it allows investigation of the variety of preferences that are likely to drive the 
behaviour of the Member States and the Commission in the external dimension of the 




EU internal energy market. Qualitative methods reflect diversity and allow the 
development of comprehensive insights into the actions of the actors involved in this 
research. Although quantitative methods and statistical analysis have also been applied 
in research based on the PAM (see for example Franchino 2001; 2007), qualitative 
research designs have been used more extensively in EU studies (e.g. Billiet 2009; 
Damro 2006; Damro 2007; Keleman 2002; Kostanyan 2014; Eugénia Da Conceição-
Heldt 2006; Da Conceição 2010; Eugenia Da Conceição-Heldt 2011; Eugénia Da 
Conceição-Heldt 2011; Delreux 2011; Delreux and Kerremans 2010).   
Although building on some statistical analysis carried out by Franchino (2001), 
Pollack (2003) warns against the use of quantitative methods, as a reliance on proxy 
indicators for statistical analysis might produce some proxy problems. Proxy 
indicators provide precise numbers for statistical analysis but can also lead scholars to 
measure something other than what they intended to measure. Franchino (2001), for 
instance, uses the word count as an indicator of informational intensity, while other 
studies of delegation employ the same measure as an indicator of discretion (Ibid). 
Qualitative methods on the other hand, do not provide precise numbers for statistical 
analysis and are more suitable to appreciate the variety of preferences of the actors 
involved and to provide a means to study the various shades of the agent’s behaviour. 
For this reason, four case studies have been selected following the criteria illustrated 
in the next subsection.  
Case selection 
A case study is here defined as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of 
understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring 2004, 342). For the purpose 
of this research, “units” are operationalised as “initiatives” of the Commission in the 
external dimension of the EU internal energy market. Initiatives are defined as “events 
taking place at the European level to help the European Union towards its […] energy 
[…] goals” (Buchan 2011b). “Initiative” is therefore used here as a broad concept that 
allows the inclusion of several events, such as a legislative process leading to a 
Decision or a Directive, as well as the conclusion of a multilateral treaty in the field of 
energy policy.  




Looking at four “initiatives” as case studies, this thesis aims at “understanding a larger 
class of (similar) units”. More precisely, the intention of this research is to obtain some 
generalizable results about the interests and preferences of the European Commission 
and the Member States in the external dimension of the EU internal energy market. 
This thesis intends therefore to draw some general conclusion about the conditions 
under which the Commission deviates from the preferences of the Member States.  
Cases have been selected according to their relevance to the research question 
(Burnham 2004). Qualitative sampling has been carried out with the aim of reflecting 
diversity (Kuzel, 1992; Mays and Pope, 1995 quoted in Barbour (2008) and providing 
as much potential for comparison as possible. More precisely, following exploratory 
research, three selection rules have been applied. Firstly, cases have been selected on 
the basis of the involvement of the European Commission. As the aim of this thesis is 
to understand under what conditions the European Commission tries to deviates from 
Member States’ preferences in the external dimension of the EU internal energy 
market, cases have been selected where the Commission as an actor is involved. The 
involvement of the Commission in EU energy policy should not be taken for granted. 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the Commission has relied on legal bases stemming 
from policy areas such as competition or the internal market to act in the field of EU 
energy policy. Member States, on the other hand, have been determined “to sustain 
their independence in the sense of an own and national energy (supply) policy and to 
consider this area as part of their sovereignty” (Pielow and Lewendel 2012, 265). The 
latter means that, for instance, the Commission does not have any competence on the 
national energy mix of Member States, and is not expected to play any role on this area 
of energy policy. As such, energy policy is an area where the distribution of 
competence between the Commission and the Member States is not always clear-cut. 
For the purpose of this thesis therefore, only cases where the Commission may be 
expected to play a role are taken into account.  
The second selection criterion builds on the aim to look at the conditions that may 
affect the Commission in its ability to deviate from Member States’ preferences. Cases 
have therefore, been chosen where such conditions are expected to be in place. As 
stated earlier in this chapter, two conditions are expected to affect the Commission’s 




deviation from Member States’ preferences: the preference alignment among the 
principals (IV1) and the preference alignment between the principals and the agent 
(IV2). A review of, and preliminary research on, the literature on energy policy, and 
press dedicated to European affairs, suggested several cases for consideration. In these 
cases, the alignment of the preferences of the Member States and the homogeneity or 
heterogeneity of those preferences with those of the Commission, may have affected 
the behaviour of the Commission as an agent and, more precisely, its deviation from 
Member States preferences. The cases therefore, have been selected on the expected 
variation of the independent variables (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).  
Finally, a third selection criterion used is the external dimension of the EU internal 
energy market. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the external dimension of energy 
policy is a broad field, which is difficult to define or operationalise. For the purpose 
of this thesis, the external dimension of the internal energy market is operationalised 
as “the EU’s activity aimed at the creation of a common energy regulatory space with 
third countries” (Herranz-Surrallés 2014). More specifically, the external dimension 
of the internal energy market includes two aspects: a) internal EU legislation 
concerning the internal energy market and its external dimension; b) initiatives aiming 
at the creation of an integrated energy market with third countries (i.e. Energy 
Community Treaty, Energy Charter Treaty).  
As far as internal legislation is concerned (a), only cases where relations between the 
Member States and third countries were concerned have been selected. Other pieces 
of legislation, such as legislation on biofuels or renewables, have not been selected as 
they are not likely to affect relations between the Member States and third countries. 
On the other hand, with regard to initiatives aiming at the creation of an integrated 
energy market with third countries (b), preliminary research has been conducted on 
the Treaties Office Database of the European Commission.15 A search for “energy” as 
sub-activity returned 43 agreements. Among those 43 agreements, only treaties signed 
by the European Commission and third countries have been selected (the Energy 
                                                 
15 The Database contains all the bilateral and multilateral international treaties or agreements concluded 
by the European Union (EU), the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) and the former 
European Communities (EC, EEC, ECSC);  
(see http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do) 




Charter Treaty and the Energy Community Treaty).16 This means that international 
agreements such as Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) and Cooperation 
Agreements (CA) with third countries have not been considered. The reason behind 
this choice is that multilateral treaties are binding and require greater commitment 
from EU Member States than MoUs and CAs.  
The case-studies for this research have thus been selected according to three criteria: 
a) involvement of the European Commission, b) variation on the independent variables 
and c) external dimension of the EU internal energy market. The next subsection offers 
an overview of the four case studies selected for this research. At the end of the 
subsection, table 3.2 summarises which hypotheses are tested in each chapter.  
Overview of the cases 
Decision 994/2012 on establishing an information exchange mechanism 
with regard to intergovernmental agreements between Member States 
and third countries in the field of energy  
Decision 994/2012 introduces a mechanism for the exchange of information among 
the Member States and between the Member States and the Commission as far as 
intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) signed between Member States and third 
countries are concerned. In the absence of a mechanism of information, the 
Commission and the Member States themselves are not fully aware of the number of 
IGAs signed, nor are they aware of their content. In this context, the European Council 
(2011) called for a “better coordination of EU and Member States’ activities with a 
view to ensuring consistency and coherence in the EU’s external relations”.  The 
Commission reacted to this request with a very ambitious proposal that triggered some 
strong reactions among Member States. 
Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market 
in natural gas  
The Directive was proposed by the Commission in September 2007. For the purpose 
of this thesis, the most relevant aspect of the proposal is Ownership Unbundling (OU), 
which requires the separation of supply and production activities from network 
                                                 
16http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/searchByActivity.do?parent=8512&xmlname=751&actName=
Energy&printAcrivity= 




operation.  The Commission’s proposal was expected to have important consequences 
for the relations between Member States and non-EU countries. Thus, Member States 
had different preferences on unbundling, reflecting the different levels of liberalisation 
of their national gas markets. The Commission’s preference for the liberalisation of 
the internal energy market has been apparent since its genesis. This case therefore 
allows investigation of the dynamics of the relationships between the Commission and 
the Member States in concluding the Directive in a scenario where different 
preferences are at stake.  
The Energy Community Treaty (EnCT) 
The Energy Community Treaty (EnCT) was signed by the European Community and 
nine Contracting Parties of South-East Europe in 2005 with the aim of extending EU 
internal energy policy to the other Contracting Parties on the grounds of a legally 
binding framework. One of the most important features of the EnCT is that the EU, 
including its Member States, is Party of the Treaty while Member States are not parties 
of the Treaty on their own. The case, therefore, allows consideration of the external 
representation of the EU in international organisations, and analysis of the behaviour 
of the Commission as an agent in an international organisation. The intention of the 
EnCT is to export existing EU legislation on energy to the nine Contracting Parties of 
South East-Europe. It can be expected, therefore, that Member States as well as the 
Commission would benefit from the achievement of the objectives of the EnCT, as 
both would gain from a common regulatory area with South-Eastern European 
countries.  
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) was signed by some fifty states and the European 
Community in 1994 to provide a multilateral framework for energy cooperation 
concerned with the promotion and protection of investment, trade and the transit of 
energy goods (Cameron 2002). The ECT is also a case of external representation in 
the energy sector. However, distinct from the Energy Community Treaty (EnCT), 
Member States take part in the Energy Charter Conference, the decision making and 
governing body established by the ECT. The Treaty is a sort of revolutionary 
instrument as it brought together energy consumers and energy producers. As far as 




EU Member States are concerned, preliminary research suggests that they had different 
preferences when it comes to the ECT. Thus, similar to the EnCT, the ECT was also 
expected to create some sort of benefit for the Member States and for the Commission 
as well. Homogeneity of preferences between the principals and the agent is therefore 
expected for this case.  


















































































































3.6.2. Data collection and data analysis  
One of the main strengths of qualitative research is that it allows the exploration of a 
wide array of dimensions of the social world (Mason 2002). In assessing the conditions 
under which the Commission deviates from Member States’ preferences in the 
external dimension of the EU internal energy market, the wide array of preferences of 
both the Commission and Member States needs to be taken into account. Hence, this 
research relies on a wide range of sources, primary and secondary, to reflect the variety 
of preferences of the actors involved in this study.  
Primary sources used for this research include direct evidence of decision-making such 
as official documents produced by the actors studied in this research: the European 
Commission and the Member States. For the Member States, documents produced by 




the European Council and the Council of the European Union are analysed together 
with documents produced by individual Member States. Official documents include 
Communications from the Commission to the Council, Conclusions of the European 
Council, Common positions of the Council, and Reports of the European Parliament.17  
Since official documents do not always provide an accurate indication of actor’s 
sincere preferences, and these sometimes go unrecorded or distorted by strategic 
considerations in the formulation of official negotiating positions (Moravcsik 1998) 
they will be supplemented through the use of interviews with key officials from EU’s 
supranational organisations and member governments. Interviews are a rich source of 
behind-the-scene information about actor preferences and principal- agent interactions 
that are not captured on the official records (Ibid). Twenty-nine semi-structured expert 
interviews have been conducted in Brussels in June and July 2013 with three different 
kinds of interviewees (See Appendix I): 
- Interviewees working within the Directorate General for Energy (DG 
ENERGY) ; 
- Interviewees working within the Permanent Representation and the Council 
Secretariat;   
- Other interviewees: European External Action Service (EEAS),18 Think tanks, 
sector association, researchers.19  
Interviewees were selected through purposive sampling and snowball/chain referral. 
Purposive sampling was used to identify the particular respondents of interest and the 
sample deemed most appropriate (Judd, Smith, and Kidder 1991). Snowballing 
allowed the identification of an initial set of relevant respondents, and then by asking 
for suggestions of other potential interviewees who might be relevant for the study, 
enabled an appropriate sample size for the purpose of this study.  
In selecting the respondents, positional and reputational criteria were also applied. The 
former allows the identification of a set of positions of key elites which are the focus 
                                                 
17 For the purpose of this thesis, the European Parliament is treated as a source of information.  
18 As for the European Parliament, the EEAS is also treated as a source of information in this thesis. 
19 Interviewees belonging to this subgroup are not cited in this thesis. Their insights, however, have 
been useful in enabling the author to get a good understanding of the broad picture of energy policy.  




of the study; this was based on their areas of interest and on the political structures of 
relevance acquired in the previous phases of the data collection. In addition, the 
reputational criterion allowed selection of respondents according to the extent to which 
they were deemed influential in the political arena by their own peers. As expected, 
the snowball sampling method allowed the establishment of a list of people who are 
considered to be influential in energy policy. Indeed, this method was useful in 
identifying influential actors who might otherwise have been ignored, as elites often 
suggest influential players who were initially not presumed relevant to the study 
(Farquharson 2005). 
Thirdly, this research also utilizes secondary sources such as press releases and reports 
issued by the European Commission, journalistic reports (Euractiv, EUobsever, and 
Economist), and quantitative data issued by Commission or international agencies. 
Secondary sources were expected to supplement official documents which sometimes 
say little about the concrete preferences of the actors involved.  
Using this wide range of primary and secondary sources, this research aims to 
contribute to the operationalisation of the preferences of the Commission and the 
Member States in the external dimension of the EU internal energy market. Using a 
wide range of sources enables a good level of confidence in operationalising 
preferences: primary and secondary sources are expected to mutually supplement and 
support each other. While relying on a single source, or on a smaller number of 
sources, may lead to imprecise or even misleading conclusions about preferences, 
using a wide range of sources and comparing those sources increases the strength of 
the research in terms of reliability and validity. Data was selected for its relevance to 
the research question and with recourse to a wide range of sources.  
Data collected was analysed through a process-tracing method. This method has been 
extensively used in PA studies “in order to multiply the observable implications of 
theory and observe hypothesized causal mechanisms at work” (Pollack 2003, 68). 
According to George and Bennett (2005), process-tracing attempts to identify the 
intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism(s) – between an 
independent variable – or variables – and the outcome of the dependent variable.  




Rather than establishing causation in a strict sense, this thesis aims to establish and 
evaluate the link (or the absence of a link) between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable (Heritier 2008; Vennesson 2008). Hence, the method is deemed 
useful for observation of the effect of the preference alignment among the principals 
(IV1) and the preference alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2) on the 
Commission’s deviation from Member States’ preferences (DV) in the external 
dimension of the EU internal energy market.  
Process-tracing is also deemed an indispensable tool for theory-testing and theory-
development (Falleti 2006), not only because it generates numerous observations 
within a case, but also because these observations must be linked in particular ways to 
constitute an explanation of the case. Investigation of the ways in which the 
independent variables affect the dependent variable is expected to offer an explanation 
for the Commission’s behaviour. In doing so, this research aims to contribute to the 
development of PA theory.  
In summary, this thesis applies a qualitative case study method to take into account the 
variety of preferences of the Commission and the Member States in the external 
dimension of the EU internal energy market.  Four cases have been selected for this 
research, based on three selection criteria: a) the involvement of the Commission, b) 
the variation across the independent variables and c) the external dimension of the EU 
internal energy market. Data has been collected using a wide range of sources, and 
analysed through the process tracing method. 
3.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the research design of this thesis. Firstly the research 
question was introduced: under what conditions does the European Commission try to 
deviate from Member States’ preferences in the external dimension of the EU internal 
energy market? It was argued that the answer to this research question is expected to 
produce some generalizable results about the preferences of the Commission and its 
deviation from Member States’ preferences (3.2.).  




Secondly, the concept of agency behaviour has been operationalised in the dependent 
variable Commission’s deviation from Member States’ preferences (3.3). In looking 
for a categorization of possible agent’s behaviour, this chapter has argued that the 
Commission’s deviation can be operationalised as full compliance, responsive 
autonomy or deviation. This categorization will be revisited in the conclusion of this 
thesis, after the analysis that will be presented in four empirical chapters.  
A third section looked at the dependent variables likely to affect the Commission in 
deviating from Member State preferences: preference alignment among the principals 
(IV1) and preference alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2) (3.4.). The 
section recalled the difference between interests and preferences and the challenges 
related to their operationalisation. The operationalisation will also be revisited after 
the analysis of the case studies. The chapter has also provided four testable hypotheses 
derived from the PA literature. In the methodology section, the qualitative case study 
approach was illustrated, together with methods of data collection and data analysis 
(3.6.). An overview of the cases has also been provided.  
In the following chapters therefore, the four hypotheses of this research will be tested 
on four different case studies:  
- Decision 994/2012 on establishing an information exchange mechanism with 
regard to intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third 
countries in the field of energy (Chapter 4);  
- Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in 
natural gas (Chapter 5);  
- The Energy Community Treaty (EnCT) (Chapter 6) and  
- The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) (Chapter 7).
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4.1.  Introduction 
This chapter is a case study on Decision 994/2012 on establishing an information 
exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements between Member 
States and third countries in the field of energy (hereinafter: the Decision). The 
Decision introduced an information exchange mechanism not only between the 
Member States and the Commission but also among the Member States themselves. 
The Decision requires Member States to submit to the Commission all existing 
Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) that have an impact on the operation or 
functioning of the internal energy market or on the security of energy supply. The 
Mechanism is therefore meant to make the external relations of the EU and its Member 
States more transparent and coordinated. The Commission proposal was met with 
strong opposition from the Member States, and the legislative process was relatively 
complicated.   




This case will address the research question as it will investigate the role of the 
Commission in the legislative process leading to the Decision. The chapter defines the 
preference alignment among the principals as homogenous (IV1) because the Member 
States had a similar preference for a sharing of information about IGAs. The 
preference alignment between the principals and the agent, however, is defined as 
heterogeneous (IV2) because the Commission had preferences different from those of 
the Member States (4.3.).   
Consequently, the chapter investigates the following hypotheses: when the preferences 
among the principals are homogenous, the agent is less likely to try to deviate from 
the preferences of the principals (H1) and when the preferences between the principals 
and the agent are heterogeneous, the agent is more likely to try to deviate from the 
preferences of the principals (H3) (4.4.).  These two hypotheses predict different 
outcomes. The chapter, therefore, aims to assess which of the two independent 
variables has a major effect on the dependent variable.  
4.2. Context: the EU internal energy market and 
Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs)  
This section recalls some information about the EU internal energy market and 
provides some background about the context in which Decision 994/2012 emerged. 
The EU internal energy market has three main features. Firstly, it is heavily dependent 
on energy coming from abroad, with imports of over 60% for gas and over 80% for oil 
(European Commission 2011d, 2). This dependency is particularly important for 
Member States such as those in Central and Eastern Europe for example,  which are 
“highly dependent on one single source, at times up to 100 per cent” (Beyer 2012, 
114). Secondly, the high energy dependency is worsened by the lack of homogeneous 
integration of the EU internal energy market. While western European countries have 
a relatively well-integrated energy market, the eastern European countries are quite 
isolated. This current situation is the result of what Nies (2008) effectively calls 
“legacies of past discoveries and the successive creation of European linkages”. 
Indeed, most of the gas and oil pipelines were built during the fifties and sixties, and 
were the result of two different approaches coming from the two different sides of 
what, at the time, was a bipolar world. Certainly, those differences are still visible 




today and explain why Eastern European Member States are heavily dependent on 
Russia (Ibid).  Finally, another core feature of the EU energy market is that energy has 
traditionally been dealt with through bilateral agreements between the companies of 
the individual Member States on the one hand and non-EU energy producers on the 
other. In addition, negotiations with powerful energy suppliers in third countries have 
been supported politically with intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) between 
Member States and third countries. According to a rough evaluation of the 
Commission, there could be around 30 IGAs between Member States and third 
countries on oil and around 60 on gas in existence today (European Commission 
2011e). IGAs are defined as “legally binding agreements between Member States and 
third countries which are likely to have an impact on the operation or the functioning 
of the internal market for energy or on the security of energy supply in the Union” 
(Ibid, 1). Their content might relate to the volumes of oil and gas imported into the EU 
from third countries, or to the conditions for the supply of these volumes through fixed 
infrastructure. The EU internal energy market can thus be described as a variously 
integrated one, highly dependent on energy coming from outside the EU, and 
dominated by IGAs.  
The features described so far make the EU internal energy market extremely 
vulnerable to security of supply risks. The vulnerability of the EU internal energy 
market became apparent during the crisis between Ukraine and Russia in January 
2009. After many years of gas disputes with neighbouring transit countries, Russia 
disrupted gas supplies through Ukraine, causing significant economic damage to the 
Member States who relied on supplies through these pipelines. It was in this context 
that a first step towards a sharing of information on IGAs was made with Regulation 
No 994/2010.20 The Regulation was the first legal instrument under the new Energy 
Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)21 and it 
complemented the rules of the Third Internal Energy Market Package which aims at 
                                                 
20 Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 October 2010 
concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive 
2004/67/EC (Security of Gas Supply Regulation), OJ 295, 12.11.2010, p. 1-22.  
21 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, 13 December 2007 (2007/C 306/01). Available from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML. 




curbing the monopolies of the gas and power networks (Buchan 2010a, 361).22 
Regulation 994/2010 stipulated that information about gas contracts and international 
gas or pipeline agreements of the Member States and companies with third countries 
are to be sent to the Commission in an aggregated way. More precisely, under Article 
1(6 a), Member States had to communicate existing IGAs by 3rd December 2011 and 
details of any new ones on conclusion (Beyer 2012).The regulation, however, did not 
foresee any exchange of information among the Member States. As a result, the 
problem of lack of information and transparency on IGAs was not solved by the 
Regulation.  Originally, the Commission proposal for Regulation 994/2010 had 
foreseen the ex-ante notification of IGAs. Moreover, during the negotiations, some 
Member States, notably Italy, Greece, France and Germany, “were strictly opposed to 
giving the Commission a role to verify the compliance of intergovernmental agreement 
with internal market legislation” (Ibid). In September 2011, one year after the 
Regulation came into force, the coherence of the EU’s external energy relations were 
again the centre of the debate between the Commission and the Member States. The 
European Council of 4 February 2011 not only “invited” Member States to inform the 
Commission of all their new and existing bilateral energy agreements, but also 
“invited” the Commission to submit a “communication on security of supply and 
international cooperation aimed at further improving the consistency and coherence of 
the EU's external action in the field of energy” (European Council 2011).  
To summarise this section therefore, Decision 994/2012 emerged in a context where 
more transparency and coordination in the EU internal energy market was needed: the 
Decision was not created in a vacuum. Rather, it was the result of a long-term effort to 
address a problem that became more urgent after the Russia-Ukraine crisis of 2009: 
the coordination of the EU internal energy market. Prior to negotiations for the 
Decision getting started, the Member States had tried to improve the coordination of 
the EU internal energy market through Regulation 994/2010. This last instrument, 
                                                 
22 The Third Energy Package is part of a broader liberalization process started in the 1990s with the aim 
of curbing the natural monopolies of gas and electricity and, in doing so, building an internal market for 
energy. The Package - in particular Directive 2009/73/EC – will be analysed as a case-study in the next 
chapter of this thesis.  




however, proved insufficient and IGAs were addressed with a new Commission 
proposal in September 2009.  
Before moving to the analysis of the legislative process leading up to the Decision, the 
next section operationalises the two conditions expected to affect the Commission’s 
behaviour: the preference alignment among the principals (IV1) and the preference 
alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2). The preferences of the 
Commission and the Member States are then operationalised with regard to the 
Decision.  
4.3. Identifying the Independent Variables 
This section identifies the independent variables of this research. The concept of 
preferences – together with the concept of interests – is a core part of the argument of 
this research and has been discussed in depth in the theoretical framework section 
(Chapter 2). It is worth recalling here that this research uses Milner’s (1997) definition 
of preferences as “specific policy choices” and interests as “fundamental goals”. For 
the purpose of this research, the preferences of the Commission are assumed to serve 
the interest of competence maximization, while the preferences of the Member States 
are expected to serve the interest of maintaining control over energy policy (2.3.2.). 
While this research looks at interests as given, deducing them from existing literature, 
the same cannot be stated for preferences. Preferences are specific and need to be 
defined on a case-by-case basis with regard to each case study of this thesis. This 
section therefore operationalises the preferences of the Commission and those of the 
Member States with regard to Decision 994/2012. Preferences are inferred inductively 
from a wide range of sources, as it is typical in qualitative research (3.5.2.). 
4.3.1. Preference alignment among the principals (IV1): 
sharing information and protecting commercial 
interests 
The aim of this section is to look at preference alignment among the Member States 
and assess whether they had homogenous or heterogeneous preferences on the 
information exchange mechanism.  




A first expression of Member States’ preferences can be found in the Conclusions of 
the European Council (2011, 4) where it is stated that  
“The Member States are invited to inform […] the Commission on all their 
new and existing bilateral energy agreements with third countries; the 
Commission will make this information available to all other Member 
States in an appropriate form, having regard to the need for protection of 
commercially sensitive information.” 
The phrasing of the Conclusions suggests that Member States have a preference for 
sharing of information about new and existing bilateral energy agreements with third 
countries. The sharing of information would have to be managed by the Commission 
with regard for the need for the protection of commercially sensitive information. 
Although useful, the Conclusions of the European Council only present the common 
position of the Member States and say little about the preferences of the individual 
Member States. The rather general wording of the Conclusion, therefore, needs to be 
supplemented with other sources.  
A public consultation held by the Commission between 21 December 2010 and 7 
March 2011, i.e. before the Commission issued the proposal for the Decision, is 
extremely helpful in tracing the preferences of some Member States, in particular the 
Czech Republic, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland and Portugal 
(European Commission 2011a). One of the questions asked by the Commission in the 
consultation refers explicitly to “the compliance with EU internal market rules and the 
EU energy security objectives of Member States' bilateral agreements with third 
countries”.23 The question asks whether Member States see any issue on the topic and 
whether and how should the EU take action to ensure compliance (Ibid).  
Most of the Member States that replied to the consultation did so with general 
statements about the need of a coherent and focused EU energy policy suggesting that 
                                                 
23 The Commission initiated on 21 December 2010 a public consultation on the external dimension of 
the EU energy policy in order to seek stakeholders' views on possible priorities and initiatives in this 
field. 7 Member States responded sending written contributions. The consultation was composed by 10 
question. For the purpose of this chapter, the most relevant question is question 9:  “Do you consider 
that the compliance with EU internal market rules and the EU energy security objectives of Member 
States' bilateral agreements with third countries can be an issue? Should the EU take action to ensure 
compliance? How?” (European Commission 2011a) 




the “EU could take part in these bilateral cooperation by strengthening and improving 
cooperation with third countries” (Latvia 2011) , or stressing that the EU should ensure 
harmonisation between bilateral agreements with third countries (Ministério Dos 
Negócios Estrangeiros 2011).  
Two Member States however stressed the need for more concrete approaches. 
Lithuania called for “concrete actions and mechanisms” to be “proposed in order to 
find the right balance between respect for Member States’ right to choose their energy 
mix and energy security objectives of the EU as a whole” (Lithuania 2011). The 
Lithuanian contribution also stated that in this respect, the “exchanging of information 
on existing or new bilateral agreements is the first step” (Ibid). By the same token, the 
Poland’s contribution suggested that “the EU should develop a coherent catalogue of 
its energy policy objectives towards individual geographical regions and individual 
countries” (Polish Minister of Economy 2011). This catalogue should then be “a 
foundation for a development of a catalogue of types of framework agreements in the 
field of energy, which would be concluded between EU and individual third 
countries”. Finally, the Polish response stated that “transparency in the area of external 
energy policies of Member States should be improved in the near future” and that 
“compliance with the Community legislation should be a fundamental paradigm of 
international agreements concluded by Member States” (Ibid).  
Distinct from the general statements about the need for a coherent EU energy policy 
Czech Republic, Latvia and Portugal, the contributions of Poland and Lithuania then, 
seemed to call for specific measures to be taken at European level in the near future. 
In contrast however, the contribution by the Netherlands was very clear in stating that 
“the Netherlands does not see any need for new mechanisms to ensure compliance 
with EU internal market rules and the EU energy security objectives of Member States’ 
bilateral agreements with third countries” (The Netherlands 2011). Rather, it was 
argued, market infringements should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis according 
to existing legislation. The French contribution was closer to the Netherlands than to 
Poland and Lithuania, and argued that it was up to the Member States to transform 
European legislation in internal law, and make sure that bilateral agreement are 




conform to European legislation (Représentation Permanente de la France auprès de 
l’Union Européenne 2011).  
In summary, data collected through the consultation held by the Commission offered 
information about the position of seven Member States. Out of seven, only two 
Member States, Poland and Lithuania, stressed the need for more concrete measures, 
such as an information exchange mechanism and a catalogue of the types of framework 
agreements in existence. By contrast, the Netherlands stressed that no new mechanism 
was needed. What about the position of the other twenty Member States? Their silence 
leaves room for many interpretations: they might not have considered the consultation 
a matter of priority, for example, or they might have not wanted to make their position 
clear before the Commission had issued a proposal. The Conclusions of the European 
Council of 4th February 2011 suggest that Member States had a preference for a 
sharing of information about the IGA managed by the Commission with regard to the 
protection of commercial interests. These different sources seems to suggest that while 
only Poland and Lithuania stood up for “concrete actions and mechanisms”, all the 
other Member States had a rather more general preference as expressed in the above 
conclusion of the European Council of 4 February 2011. Moreover, the fact that only 
Poland and Lithuania welcomed “concrete actions”, suggests that, for the purpose of 
this chapter, the preferences among the Member States can be defined as homogenous. 
More precisely, the preferences of the Member States can be illustrated on a 
continuum. At one end of the continuum, Poland and Lithuania called for concrete 
measures while, at the other end, the Netherlands stated that no new mechanism was 
needed. The bulk of the Member States, however, were in the middle of this continuum 
having the following preference, as stated in the conclusion of the European Council 
of 4 February 2011: 
a) an information from the Member States to the Commission on all their new and 
existing bilateral energy agreements with third countries; 
b)  making this information available to all other Member States by the 
Commission in an appropriate form, having regard to the need for protection 
of commercially sensitive information.  




How is the above preference intended to serve the Member States’ interest of 
maintaining control over energy policy therefore? The data analysed in this section 
suggests that Member States simply wanted the Commission to merely coordinate an 
exchange of information in the field of intergovernmental agreements. Stressing the 
need for an “appropriate form” and “protection of commercially sensitive information” 
in sharing information on IGAs, Member States made it clear that they did not want 
any interference from the Commission in their relations with third countries.  
4.3.2. Preference alignment between the principals and the 
agent (IV2): united against the Commission’s proposal 
Having looked at the preferences alignment among the principals (4.3.1.), this section 
will assess the preference alignment between the principals and the agent. In order to 
do so, the preferences of the agent need to be identified. The proposal for an 
information exchange mechanism (hereinafter the proposal)24 is particularly helpful in 
order to infer the preferences of the Commission. The proposal “transforms the 
conclusions of the European Council into a mechanism with detailed procedures for 
the exchange of information between Member States and the Commission with regard 
to intergovernmental agreements” (European Commission 2011d). The proposal 
suggests that the Commission had a preference for an information exchange 
mechanism with three main features: 
a) Legal instrument for a mandatory exchange of information.   
According to the Commission, only “clear obligations […] are capable of ensuring 
transparency” (Ibid, 3). Therefore, the proposal stressed that “a legal instrument for 
mandatory exchange of information” was “the only option” able to meet the policy 
objectives outlined in the proposal. In addition, the Commission deemed a Decision as 
more appropriate than a Regulation. With a Decision, the legal instrument would have 
no direct effect on individuals but would exclusively be addressed to Member States 
(Ibid: 3, footnote 8). 
                                                 
24 Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council setting up an information 
exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third 
countries in the field of energy COM (2011) 540 final.  




b) Ex-ante control compatibility of the agreements with Union law  
The Commission proposed a “flexible compatibility control mechanism” where the 
Commission – at its own request or on request of the Member State that is negotiating 
the IGA – could assess the compatibility of the negotiated agreement with Union law 
before the agreement is signed (Ibid, 5). 
c) Participation as an observer in the negotiations with third countries  
The proposal stated that “on request of the Commission or the Member State 
concerned, the Commission may participate as an observer in the negotiations” (Art. 
3.2).  
How is the preference for a legal instrument for a mandatory exchange of information, 
with the features described so far, expected to serve the Commission’s interest for 
competence-maximization? By issuing a proposal with the features mentioned above, 
the Commission tried to grant itself additional competences in the field of IGAs, such 
as an ex-ante assessment of the compatibility of IGAs with the EU law and the right 
to participate in negotiations between Member States and third countries: a role for 
which Member States never asked. In other words, the proposal seems to suggest that 
the rationale underlying the Commission’s preferences was one of competence 
maximisation. 
Having identified the preferences of the Commission for this case, this section can now 
turn to a comparison between the preferences of the principals and those of the agent. 
Were those preferences homogenous or heterogeneous? The analysis of several 
primary and secondary sources suggest that the preferences between the principals and 
the agent were heterogeneous. Firstly, an Information Note from the General 
Secretariat of the Council effectively stated that there was “strong opposition from a 
large number of Member States” to the obligatory nature of some of the propositions 
in the Commission proposals (Council of the European Union 2012a, 2). The term 
“strong opposition” suggests that the preferences between the Member States and the 
Commission were heterogeneous. Furthermore, the wording “a large number of 
Member States” seems to confirm the point made earlier in this chapter about the 
homogeneity of preferences among the Member States (IV1): while only few Member 




States had a preference for concrete measures, the majority of them did not welcome 
any mandatory mechanism. Secondary sources also seem to support what has been 
stated so far. In an interview with EurActiv (2012) Mr Krišjānis Kariņš, the rapporteur 
for the proposal stated that “the only large country that was really pushing for this 
legislation was Poland. The other countries supporting this were smaller countries”. 
Additional interview data collected for this research also supports this statement. 
Firstly, a Commission official stated that “the majority of Member States” did not want 
a mechanism and assumed a very strong position against the proposal (Interview No 
2). The same was confirmed by several officials working in a number of Permanent 
Representations: only few Member States found the Commission’s proposal to be a 
good one there was no backing and a lot needed to be changed (Interview No 18); the 
opposition in the Council was strong (Interview No 11); and the legislative procedure 
was an “arm wrestling between the Commission and the Member States” (Interview 
No 7).  
In conclusion therefore, both primary and secondary sources suggest that the Member 
States and the Commission had different preferences on Decision 994/2012. As has 
been argued earlier in this thesis, the preference alignment among the principals (IV1) 
and the preference alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2) are expected 
to affect the probability of Commission’s deviation from Member States’ preferences 
(DV). In the next section, a process-tracing method is applied to assess how the 
independent variables are likely to affect the dependent variable in this case study. As 
a reminder, this chapter is testing the following two hypotheses:  
H1: when the preferences among the principals are homogenous, the agent is more 
likely to try to deviate from preferences of the principals.  
H3: when the preferences between the principals and the agent are heterogeneous, the 
agent is less likely to try to deviate from the preferences of the principals. 
These hypotheses aim to test the probability of deviation as agent’s behaviour. They 
foresee different outcomes: H1 expects the Commission’s attempted deviation to be 
less likely while H3 expects a Commission’s attempted deviation to be more likely. 




Hence, this chapter aims to assess which scenario is most likely to occur and which 
independent variable has a stronger effect on the dependent variable.  
4.4. A Principal-Agent analysis of the legislative 
process leading to Decision 994/2012 
This section analyses the decision-making process that began with the Council 
Conclusions of 4 February 2011 and concluded with the publication of Decision 
994/2012 in the Official Journal on 27 October 2013. By applying the process-tracing 
method (George and Bennett 2005), this section will analyse the effect of the 
independent variables – the homogeneity of preferences among the principals (IV1) 
and the heterogeneity of preferences between the principals and the agent (IV2) on the 
Commission’s deviation from Member States’ preferences (DV). This section 
primarily builds on the investigation of documents related to legislative procedure such 
as Council Conclusions, Committee Reports and Opinions of the European Parliament. 
This data is then supplemented with secondary sources and interview data. This section 
is divided in five parts according to the main phases of the legislative procedure: the 
act of delegation, the Commission’s behaviour when issuing the proposal, the reaction 
of the Member States, trialogues and the final outcome.  Each subsection stresses the 
link between the legislative process and the theoretical framework of this research. 
The next section (4.5.) draws some conclusions from this case study. By way of 
conclusion, hypotheses 1 and 3 are confirmed or rejected.  
4.4.1. The act of delegation and functions to be delegated 
This case about the legislative process leading to Decision 994/2012 begins with the 
European Council Conclusions of 4 February 2011. These Conclusions invited the 
Commission to submit a communication on the security of supply and international 
cooperation, aimed at further improving the consistency and coherence of the EU’s 
external action in the field of energy (European Council 2011). The Commission was 
also invited to make information about Member States’ energy agreements with third 
countries available to all the Member States themselves.  
This chapter argues that the aforementioned Council Conclusions are an act of 
delegation from the Member States as principals to the agent Commission (Bocquillon 




and Dobbels 2013). Member States delegated the task of further improving the 
consistency and coherence of the EU’s external action in the field of energy to the 
Commission. They also delegated the task to coordinate and ensure exchange of 
information as far as new and existing bilateral energy agreements with third countries 
were concerned. On a practical level, this also meant the management of making 
information on IGAs available to all the Member States. 
Delegation through Council Conclusions is a targeted and specific delegation which 
reflects a broader delegation of legislative powers to the Commission in the Treaties.  
Decision 994/2012 has its legal basis on Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) which establishes that the Ordinary Legislative 
Procedure is the method to be used to reach the aims of the “Union Policy on 
Energy”.25 In the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, the Commission has the sole power 
of initiative; this case is therefore useful in looking at the Commission as an initiator 
of new legislation. 
Overall, Article 194 TFEU is a compromise between the Member States and the 
Commission. The Article states the aim of a Union Policy for Energy but also restates 
Member States’ role in energy policy: “such measures shall not affect a Member State's 
right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between 
different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply.” This means 
that Member States retain the right to conduct their bilateral energy relations with non 
EU countries (Braun 2011: 2). As effectively put by Andoura (2010: III) “the Energy 
Title is a carefully crafted compromise between national sovereignty over natural 
resources and energy taxation on the one hand and shared EU competence for other 
areas on the other”. 
Indeed the phrasing of Article 194 TFEU itself suggests that the Article is meant to 
guarantee a balance between a European approach to energy policy and Member 
States’ sovereignty. Despite its ambiguous wording, the TFEU provides, for the first 
time, a clear legal basis in the energy field (Buchan 2010a; Buchan 2011a; Buchan 
                                                 
25 According to Article 194 TFEU the aims of the “Union Policy on Energy”  are the following: (a) 
ensure the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; (c) 
promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of 
energy; and (d) promote the interconnection of energy networks. 




2011b; Braun 2011). This is seen by some authors as a delegation of power to the 
European Commission (Egenhofer and Behrens 2011). As such, while a first 
delegation of legislative power happens in the Treaty, a more targeted delegation is 
established through the European Council Conclusions.  
This was also the understanding of the Commission. One Commission official stated 
clearly that the Commission was deemed the only actor able to ensure consistency and 
coherence: “Nobody else, if not the European Commission, can have this global vision 
on the security of supply” (Interview No 4). Indeed, both the Communication On 
security of energy supply and international cooperation26 and the proposal27 make 
clear reference to the Council Conclusions of 4 February 2011. Indeed, the 
Communication recalls that the Council Conclusions reemphasized “strengthening the 
external dimension of the EU energy policy as one of the key priorities” (European 
Commission 2011b). As far as the proposal is concerned, the Commission stressed that 
it “transforms the conclusions of the European Council into a mechanism with detailed 
procedures for the exchange of information between Member States and the 
Commission with regard to intergovernmental agreement” (European Commission 
2011c, 1). That the Commission felt it was delegated a clear task is apparent in data 
collected through interviews: the Commission came up with a strategy “following the 
request of the European Council” and the proposal came together with the strategy 
(Interview No 3).  For the purposes of this case study therefore, the Council’s request 
is considered an act of delegation. 
As explained in the theoretical framework section (2.3.1.), in PA literature, there are 
four key functions or powers that principals may or should delegate to their agents 
(Pollack 2003).28  In this case, Member States (principals) delegated the function of 
“monitoring compliance with agreements among the principals” (Ibid) to the agent 
                                                 
26 Communication on security of energy supply and international cooperation - The EU Energy Policy: 
Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders (COM (2011) 539 final 
27 Proposal setting up an information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements 
between Member States and third countries in the field of energy (COM (2011) 540 final) 
28 Pollack states that Member States principals delegate four key functions to their supranational agents, 
namely: (1) monitoring compliance; (2) solving problems of ‘incomplete contracting’ among principals; 
(3) adopting credible, expert regulation of economic activities in areas where the principals would be 
either ill‐informed or biased; and (4) setting the legislative agenda so as to avoid the endless ‘cycling’ 
that might otherwise result if the principals retained that power for themselves (Pollack 2003: 22). 




Commission. According to the PA literature, concerns about non-compliance by other 
principals can prevent mutual benefit from cooperation. Because principals have 
incomplete information about the compliance of other actors, a significant transaction 
cost inhibiting cooperation may arise: “actors may find themselves unable to commit 
credibly to the mutually advantageous agreements because of their incentive for non-
compliance and the lack of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms” (Ibid).  
In this particular case, there is both incomplete information and the need for 
monitoring of compliance. Several sources need to be read in conjunction with the 
European Council Conclusions in order to understand the whole picture. It has already 
been stated that the European energy market is characterised by bilateral agreements 
in the field of energy. Bilateral agreements may be of two different types.  Some 
bilateral agreements might be concluded by energy companies (commercial 
agreements). These bilateral agreements are often accompanied by a second form of 
agreement: IGAs signed by the governments of the importer, transit and consumer 
countries. IGAs can be very sensitive and are often treated as confidential, one reason 
as to why other Member States do not have complete information on them.  
Consequently, a second point arises: the need for an agent in charge of monitoring for 
compliance. Member States are expected to comply with European law on energy. On 
several occasions both the Commission and some Member States have pointed out that 
not all IGAs comply with European Union law. The Commission stressed that 
“Member States are under increasing pressure to accept regulatory concessions in their 
intergovernmental agreements with third countries which are incompatible with Union 
energy law” (European Commission 2011, 1). Indeed, noncompliance may arise as 
complying with the changes introduced with the liberalisation of the electricity and 
gas market in the EU “is not always in the commercial interests of third countries 
suppliers” (Ibid).  To summarise this subsection, Member States delegated the task of 
improving the consistency and coherence of the EU’s external action in the field of 
energy, and of managing and making information on IGAs, to the Commission. 




4.4.2. The Commission’s behaviour: issuing an ambitious 
proposal  
Following the “request” – or “delegation” in PA terms – of the European Council, the 
Commission issued a Communication on Security of Supply (COM (2011) 539 final) 
and a Proposal (COM (2011) 540 final). The proposal “transforms the conclusions of 
the European Council into a mechanism with detailed procedures for the exchange of 
information between Member States and the Commission with regard to 
intergovernmental agreements” (COM (2011) 540 final, p. 1). According to the 
Commission, an information exchange mechanism was needed as the status quo at the 
time the proposal was issued was “unsatisfactory” for many reasons. First of all, the 
Commission was not aware of most IGAs between Member States and third countries. 
Moreover, the Member States themselves lacked a mechanism to “keep abreast of 
developments” in the energy field. Indeed, the only transparency requirements adopted 
related only to the gas sector (see Regulation 994/2010).  The Commission stated that 
“a legal instrument for mandatory exchange of information” was the “only option” to 
reach the policy objectives stated in the proposal, as voluntary information exchange 
on its own was proven not to be sufficient (Ibid). 
With regard to existing IGAs, the proposal foresaw that Member States would send 
those agreements to the Commission “on at the latest three months after the entry into 
force of the proposed Decision” (Ibid, 6).  The Commission then, would have made all 
the information available to the Member States via a database. Member States could 
have indicated whether any part of the information in the agreements submitted was 
to be kept confidential. The Commission, however, would have also been granted 
access to all the information.  
What is remarkable in the proposal, however, are the provisions related to the IGAs 
which Member States may sign in the future. The proposal required that “Member 
States should already notify the intention to open negotiations to the Commission with 
regard to new intergovernmental agreements or amendments to existing 
intergovernmental agreements”. In addition, not only should the Commission be kept 
informed about the ongoing negotiations, but it should also have the right to participate 
as an observer in the negotiations (Ibid, Art. 9). The rationale behind this provision 




was that “without exchange of information already during the course of negotiation, it 
would be difficult to influence future intergovernmental agreements towards 
conformity with EU energy legislation” (Ibid, 4). The Commission also expected that, 
because Member States were given the opportunity to request the assistance of the 
Commission during the negotiations, the experience gained through this exchange 
mechanism would enable the joint development of voluntary standard clauses to be 
used in future intergovernmental agreements. The Commission’s proposal also 
established that the Commission shall have the right to assess the compatibility of the 
negotiated agreement with EU law, in order to ensure that the agreement is lawful. In 
order to reach this objective, Member States have to submit any fully negotiated 
agreement to the Commission before the agreement is signed (Ibid, 6). The 
Commission then has a period of four months to assess the compatibility of the 
agreement. In short, the Commission proposed a legal instrument for a mandatory 
exchange of information, with an ex-ante control on the compatibility of the 
intergovernmental agreements with the EU energy law, and with a direct involvement 
as observer in the negotiations with third countries. 
Did the proposal reflect the preferences of the Member States? In other words, did the 
Commission deviate from Member States’ preferences? Data suggests that the 
proposal did deviate from Member States’ preferences. The Commission proposed that 
Member States notify the Commission about their intention to open negotiations with 
regard to IGAs. This request is in apparent contradiction of the Member States’ 
preferences for the protection of commercially sensitive information. As stated by an 
official of the Council of the European Union, informing the Commission – and by 
extension the other Member States – at the intention stage could have negative 
commercial implications (Interview No 17).  
Moreover, as will become clearer in the next subsection, the Commission also 
proposed some points in addition to those foreseen by the Conclusions of the European 
Council. The question arises as to why the Commission presented such an ambitious 
proposal, even if it was very aware of the preferences of the Member States. According 
to an interviewee working in a Permanent Representation (Interview No 11), the 
Commission tried to “discharge” some responsibility in order to be able to claim that 




the Commission did its part and that Member States did not want to follow. Other data 
suggests that the rationale underlying the Commission’s preference for such a proposal 
was competence-maximization. As stressed by a Commission official, the 
Commission knew that some of the IGAs had provisions which were not in conformity 
with the internal market rules, such as third party access, price-setting and so on 
(Interview No 3). The proposal then was meant to give the Commission the tools to 
assess the compliance of IGAS to EU Energy law. It is for that reason that the proposal 
contained measures such as the ex-ante assessment of the compatibility of the IGAs, 
and the participation of the Commission in negotiations between the Member States 
and third countries (Ibid). 
To summarise this section, the data seems to suggest that the Commission’s proposal 
deviated from Member States’ preferences, as the Commission did not take into 
account the preferences of the Member States’ for the protection of commercially 
sensitive information. As the following section shows, the proposal also contained 
other elements not foreseen by the Member States.   
4.4.3. Member States’ opposition to the proposal: “take it or 
leave it” 
Not surprisingly, the proposal engendered strong opposition among Member States. 
Indeed, Member States had clear preferences for the protection of commercially 
sensitive information and delegated to the Commission in the expectation that the 
communication and the proposal would have satisfied those preferences.  According 
to the Council, however, the proposal contained “additional elements compared to the 
request from the European Council” (Council of the European Union 2012a, 2):  
1. Member States should inform the Commission in detail before the start of any 
negotiation with a third country; 
2. the Commission would have the right to be present at meetings throughout the 
negotiations; 
3. Member States would not only have to send the (draft) agreement, but also 
each other relevant document to which the agreement refers - which could 
include commercial agreements; 




4. the Commission would be given the opportunity and time to form an opinion 
on the compatibility of each draft agreement with internal energy market 
legislation before such agreement would be signed; 
5. the Commission would develop "model clauses" that Member States could use. 
Discussion within the Council showed that there was “strong opposition from a large 
number of Member States to the obligatory nature of points 1 to 4” (Ibid).  
The majority of Member States found the Commission’s proposal very “ambitious” as 
the Commission was granting itself the possibility of intervening on the agreements 
even before they were signed. In doing so, the Commission left themselves the 
possibility of entering into negotiations between a Member State and a third country 
(Interview No 7). This was seen by some Member States as “unfair” and as an 
“interference” (Ibid). Italy and France assumed possibly the strongest position. 
According to an Italian official, Italy could not accept those provisions that prevented 
the Member States from signing an agreement which the Commission did not deem 
conformed to the acquis (Ibid). Moreover, Italy could not accept that the Commission 
would be able to get involved in the negotiations between a Member State and a third 
country (Ibid). The involvement of the Commission in the negotiations of IGAs was 
seen as interference by the Commission in the relations between Italy and third 
countries.  The above can be better understood if we take into the account the fact that 
Italy is involved in many IGAs with non-EU countries and, at the time Decision 
994/2012 was being negotiated, was deeply involved in negotiations for the Trans-
Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) for transporting natural gas from Azerbaijan to Italy.29 
Germany, Belgium and the UK also opposed the proposal. In the German example, 
44% of German gas imports originate from Russia (Westphal 2011). Moreover, the 
Russian-German agreement on the Nord-Stream pipeline is a very good example of 
IGA likely to affect the functioning of the internal energy market. As one German 
official commented (Interview No 28), the information exchange mechanism “was 
                                                 
29 In the framework of Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) project, a tri-lateral agreement was signed between 
Italy, Greece and Albania on the on 13th February 2013 (See: http://www.tap-ag.com/news-and-
events/2013/12/05/italian-parliament-approves-ratification-law-on-the-tri-lateral-intergovernmental-
agreement-between-italy-greece-and-albania-on-tap). 




almost invented for Germany” which had signed several IGAs in the past. Regarding 
Belgium, a Belgian official argued that the country is traditionally privatised and that 
energy is dealt with in the framework of commercial contracts signed by energy 
companies to which the Government does not have access (Interview No 10). Thus, 
the Belgian position was that commercial contracts had to stay private and were not to 
be shared with the Commission. Finally, the UK raised three points of concern: a) the 
Commission’s right to participate as an observer in negotiations of IGAs, b) the 
practical implications of the four-month standstill period for assessing an agreement, 
and c) the need to ensure the protection of confidential information (House of 
Commons, European Committee 2012). The UK has discussions on energy with 
Norway, Iceland, the Channel Islands, and more general trading arrangements with 
energy partners around the world, most notably with Qatar on gas. So far the UK has 
not experienced any direct intervention from the Commission in those agreements as 
they do not constitute a major issue of energy security. One of the main reasons for the 
UK opposition then, was that it saw the proposal as allowing the Commission to 
become involved inappropriately beyond its powers. In the eyes of the UK government 
“it is important […] that Member States retain the right to act on their own in a way 
consistent with EU law, and that the division of competence between member states 
and the EU is respected” (Ibid). 
To summarise this section, apart from Poland and Lithuania, Member States opposed 
the Commission proposal as an attempt by the Commission to interfere in their 
relations with third countries and putting at risk their preference for the protection of 
commercially sensitive information. As stated in a Note of the Council “even though 
some other Member States support or could accept the obligatory nature of these 
provisions, it has not been possible in revised drafts of the Decision to do otherwise 
than to make the provisions 1 to 4 listed above optional, in order to prevent outright 
rejection of the proposal by a large majority of delegations” (Council of the European 
Union 2012a, 2). In PA terms, the threat of rejection can be seen as a control 
mechanism. Indeed, an outright rejection of its proposal would be seen by the 
Commission as a “slap” from its Member States principals and would negatively affect 
its credibility as an agent. The strong position assumed by some of the Member States 
constrained the Commission and they stepped back. As one Commission official 




commented, the majority of Member States clearly said that they did not want any 
systematic mechanism. They offered a minimalistic mechanism instead, essentially 
saying “take it or leave it” and the Commission had to “go again in College and decide 
what to do” (Interview No 3).  
4.4.4. Trialogues: looking for a compromise 
In line with the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, both the Parliament and the Council 
started working on the Commission proposal. As stated in a Note from the General 
Secretariat of the Council to Coreper, the European Parliament’s ITRE Committee 
voted on the draft amendments on 28 February on the basis of the report prepared by 
rapporteur Dr. Arturs Krišjānis (EPP, Latvia). Subsequently, the Council’s Energy 
Working Party30 examined these draft amendments and while, in the context of an 
overall compromise, several of them could be taken up, these amendments were 
reflected in a “Presidency compromise”. The Note also stated that “although one or 
two delegations would prefer the text of Article 5(1) to be more in line with the 
Commission proposal and Parliament’s position, there appears to be broad support for 
the present compromise text” (Council of the European Union 2012b, 2). 
Article 5(1) was one of the three points on which the Parliament and the Council had 
divergent positions. The first point was Article 3(2) of the proposal on the exchange 
of information between the Commission and the Member States. The main divergence 
was about information to be provided from the Member States to the Commission 
about the intention to enter in negotiations with a third country, in order to negotiate a 
new IGA or amend an existing one. While Commission and the Parliament wanted this 
to be compulsory, the Council wanted it to be voluntary. Furthermore, the Council 
position was that “the Member States concerned shall indicate to the Commission 
whether this information may be shared with other Member States” (Ibid).  
Secondly, Article 4 about assistance of the Commission was also matter of divergence. 
While the Commission proposed that a Member State may request the assistance of 
                                                 
30 The Energy Working Party is one of more than 150 highly specialised working parties and committees 
that support the Council of Ministers. These groups are also known as the “Council preparatory bodies” 
(For a list of these bodies, see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/) 




the Commission in the negotiations with third countries for the conclusion or 
amendment of IGAs, the Parliament amended the proposal by deleting that article. The 
Council instead, specified that on request of the Member State concerned, or on request 
of the Commission and with the written approval of the Member State concerned, the 
Commission may participate as an observer in the negotiations. The Council also 
proposed that, in cases where the Commission participated as an observer, it might 
provide advice on how to avoid incompatibility between the negotiated IGA and EU 
law. 
Finally, Article 5, which deals with ex-ante compatibility control, was another main 
reason for controversy. The Commission proposed that it might, at its own initiative, 
assess the compatibility of the negotiated agreement with EU law before the agreement 
is signed. Thus, the Member States concerned would be required to refrain from 
signing the agreement for a period of four months following the submission of the draft 
intergovernmental agreement to the Commission for examination. The European 
Parliament proposed an amendment reducing this period to two months – but 
extending it to by a further two months if the Commission raised doubts about the 
compatibility with EU law. The Council rejected the amendment.  
Based on the compromise text proposed by the Presidency of the Council, a first 
informal trialogue took place on 28 March 2012.In addition, there was a technical 
meeting on 29 March. Furthermore, the Presidency held bilateral informal 
consultations with delegations to assess their potential flexibility, if any (Council of 
the European Union 2012c). On the basis of these meetings, the Presidency proposed 
further changes. The most relevant changes proposed are the following: 
- the initial assessment as to whether an IGA has an impact on the internal market 
for energy or the security of energy supply in the Union should be the 
responsibility of the Member States [and not of the Commission as in the 
Commission’s proposal] and that, in case of doubt a Member States should 
consult the Commission (Art 4, p.6);  
- the Commission “should have the possibility to inform Member States of its 
opinion on the compatibility” of IGAs [while according to the Commission 




proposal the Commission has “the right to assess the compatibility” of IGAs 
with Union law, according to the Council] (Art 10, p. 13); 
- the Council stressed that when the Commission makes all the received 
information available to all other Member States, that should happen in 
“secure” electronic form. Moreover, the Council also added a subparagraph 
stating that “if a Member State considers an intergovernmental agreement to 
be confidential, it should provide a summary thereof to the Commission for the 
purpose of sharing this summary with the other member states” (Art 12a,  p. 
14); 
- the Commission “should develop optional model clauses” to be used in IGAs 
[while, according to the Commission proposal, the Commission “should 
recommend” those standard clauses] (Art 13, p. 15); 
- on ex-ante compatibility control, the Council proposed that the Member States 
“shall, when in doubt about the compatibility of the negotiated agreement with 
Union law, inform the Commission” about IGAs [while the Commission 
proposal foresaw that Member States shall inform of all the IGAs likely to 
affect the functioning of the internal energy market (Art 5(1), p. 28); 
- On confidentiality, the Council stressed that the Member States may indicate 
“in particular commercial information disclosure of which could harm the 
business activities of the parties involved” to be regarded as confidential 
(Article 7/3a, p. 33). 
Overall, the changes proposed by the Council, aimed to providing more guarantees for 
the Member States. A second informal trialogue was held on 23 April. Communicating 
to Coreper the outcome of this trialogue, the Presidency underlined that it had indicated 
to Parliament that on the few remaining outstanding issues identified by the Parliament 
and discussed during informal trialogue, Council could potentially show flexibility on 
the review clause. Additionally, that the Council would furthermore examine what 
“aspirational” language it could offer on other issues. The Presidency stressed that a 
final effort should be made by the Council to accommodate Parliament’s wishes, in 
particular on the issue of the review clause, with a view to reaching an agreement at 
the next and last informal trialogue (Council of the European Union 2012d).  




The Presidency proposed another compromise text and called on delegations to show 
the required flexibility to accept the final compromise offer. The last informal trialogue 
took place on 9 May.  The rapporteur informed the Presidency on 23  May that he 
believed there was a majority supporting the Council’s final compromise offer 
(Council of the European Union 2012e). 
The European Parliament adopted its position at first reading on 12 September 2012, 
making one amendment to the Commission proposal (13472/12). The outcome of the 
European Parliament’s vote reflected the compromise agreed on between the 
institutions (Council of the European Union 2012f). On 4 October 2012, the Council 
adopted the text after Parliament's first reading, voting by qualified majority, and with 
all twenty seven Member States voting yes (Council of the European Union 2012g).  
On 25 October, the final act was signed and the procedure ended in Parliament. The 
final act was published in the Official Journal on 27 October 2012.  
4.4.5. The final outcome: “we scrubbed everything” 
The legislative process leading to Decision 994/2012 shows that the Decision was 
really the result of a compromise between the Council, the Parliament and the 
Commission. The Decision provides that Member States shall submit, by 17 February 
2013, all existing intergovernmental agreements (Art. 1). The Decision also provides 
that “before or during negotiations with a third country on an intergovernmental 
agreement or on the amendment of an existing intergovernmental agreement, a 
Member State may inform the Commission (Art. 3(3)). Therefore, there is no 
obligation for the Member States to inform the Commission when they want to enter 
into negotiations with a third country as the proposal provided. The Decision asks 
Member States to communicate existing agreements (Art. 1) and allows Member 
States to ask for the assistance of the Commission in negotiations (Art. 5). In 
communicating those IGAs, the Member States may indicate whether any part of the 
information is to be regarded as confidential and whether the information provided can 
be shared with other Member States (Art. 4(1)). The access of the Commission itself 
to confidential information, however, shall not be restricted (Art. 4(2)). After having 
received the information, the Commission may make it accessible in secure electronic 




form to all the Member States. When a Member State instructs the Commission not to 
make an intergovernmental agreement available to other Member States, the 
Commission only makes a summary of it available (Art. 7). 
In addition, the final version of the Decision provides for an ex-post control 
mechanism when it states that “By 1 January 2016, the Commission shall submit a 
report on the application of this Decision to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the European Economic and Social Committee” (Art. 8 (1)). The report has a twofold 
objective. Firstly, it will assess “the extent” to which the Decision “promotes 
compliance of intergovernmental agreements with Union law and a high level of 
coordination between Member States with regard to intergovernmental agreements” 
(Art. 8 (2)). Secondly, the report will also assess the impact that this Decision has on 
Member States’ negotiations with third countries and whether the scope of this 
Decision and the procedures it lays down are appropriate (Ibid). 
Data suggests that the final Decision is very much closer to the Member States’ 
position than to the Commission’s proposal. The Commission tried to deviate despite 
the principals having fairly homogeneous preferences. As stated by an official working 
at the Commission, however,  the Commission “lost” as it had to content itself with a 
“minimalistic mechanism” (Interview No 3). Interview data collected among officials 
working in a number of Permanent Representations also confirm this. As one official 
stated: “from the first version that [the Commission] produced to what we have 
decided there is nothing any more. All what [the Commission] wanted to have - the 
role of the Commission in the negotiations, the pre-information from the Member 
States […] before the agreement [was signed] – we scrubbed everything” (Interview 
No 11).  
It seems sensible to argue that one of the reasons why the Member States managed to 
make deep changes on the Commission proposal, is that they were united in their 
opposition to the Commission. As indicated in official documents, only one or two 
delegations were supportive of the Commission proposal. Official documents, 
secondary and interview data states that those States were Poland and Lithuania. Given 
their strong dependency on Russia, and their difficulties in implementing the Third 




Energy Package, they had a very weak negotiating position vis-à-vis Russia. 
Moreover, those countries suffered from the lack of coordination in the internal energy 
market. The fact that Germany had already signed an agreement with Russia for Nord-
Stream – which excluded Poland – is a very powerful example of the way some 
Member States forge alliances with Russia and, in doing so, make the EU more 
dependent on Russian gas (Dempsey 2010).  
4.5.  Conclusion  
This chapter has analysed a case study on the role of the Commission as agenda setter 
in Decision 994/2012 on establishing an information exchange mechanism with 
regard to intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third countries 
in the field of energy. The chapter investigated whether the preference alignment 
among the principals (IV1) and the preference alignment between the principals and 
the agent (IV2) affected the Commission in deviating from Member States’ 
preferences (DV).  
The analysis of the case suggested that Member States had homogenous preferences 
for a sharing of information about new and existing bilateral energy agreements with 
third countries. According to the model presented in this thesis, when the preferences 
among the principals are homogenous, the agent is less likely to try to deviate from 
the preferences of the principals (H1).  PA literature argues that “when principals share 
preferences, the agent’s discretion is expected to decrease” (Pollack 2003; Hawkins et 
al. 2006; Delreux 2011).  Following this rationale, this thesis argues that when the 
discretion of the agent decreases, their deviation from Member States’ preferences 
may also be expected to decrease, as it would be hazardous for the Commission to 
deviate from those preferences. One possible explanation is that principals sharing 
homogeneous preferences are likely to make an effective use of control mechanisms 
and  sanctions in case of deviation (Pollack 1997, 116–7). The hypothesis however, 
does not seem particularly compelling in this case study. Data seems to suggest that 
although the Member States had fairly homogenous preferences, the Commission did 
try to deviate. This deviation, however, is better explained by the second independent 
variable of this research.  




This chapter has argued that the Member States and the Commission had 
heterogeneous preferences (IV2). The latter had a preference for an information 
exchange mechanism with a) a legal instrument for a mandatory exchange of 
information; b) an Ex-ante control compatibility of the agreements with Union law 
and c) participation as an observer in the negotiations with third countries. This case, 
therefore, has tested the following hypothesis: when the preferences between the 
principals and the agent are heterogeneous, the agent is more likely to try to deviate 
from the preferences of the principals. (H3). The PA literature argues that when the 
preferences between the principals and the agent are heterogeneous, the agent is 
expected to satisfy its own preferences rather than those of the principals (Pollack 
2003) and “conflict situations” may arise (Da Conceição 2010, 1110). Data provided 
in this chapter indicates that the Commission did try to deviate from Member States’ 
preferences generating a conflict with the Council. Officials working in several 
Permanent Representations have described the negotiation of the Decision as a “tug of 
war” or “arm wrestling” between the Commission and the Member States (Interview 
No 7). The Commission issued a proposal which did not take into account the 
preference of the Member States – notably the preference for the protection of 
commercially sensitive information. Rather, the Commission tried to satisfy its own 
preference for an exchange mechanism likely to expand its competence in the field of 
IGAs. A comprehensive role for the Commission was foreseen, such as ex-ante 
assessment control of compatibility, collection and sharing of information, and 
participation as observer in negotiations (4.4.2.).  
This case shed light on the role of the Commission as agenda-setter, suggesting that 
the Commission attempted to deviate from the preferences of the Member States.  The 
case shows that using the sole right of initiative, the Commission issued a proposal 
where the preferences of the Member States were not duly taken into account. In doing 
so, the Commission deviated from the Member States’ preferences. To which of the 
typologies of deviation described earlier in this thesis (3.2.) therefore can this case 
study be ascribed? Data suggests that the Commission behaved in a way that was 
systematically different from the preferences of the principals and tried to grant itself 
an active role in the field of intergovernmental agreement. The Commission tried to 




arrange for ex-ante assessments of the compatibility of IGAs with the EU law and for 
the right to participate in negotiations between Member States and third countries, 
which is a function Member States never requested. The Commission’s proposal, 
therefore, generated a conflict situation between the Commission and the Council, and 
is thus taken as a case of attempted deviation. This point will be revisited in the 
conclusion (chapter 8) of this thesis, alongside the results emerging from the other 
empirical chapters.  
The next chapter also looks at a case of internal legislation, analysing the legislative 
process leading to Directive 2009/73/EC on common rules for the internal market in 
gas.




Chapter 5  Directive 2009/73/EC on common 








This chapter is a case study on Directive 2009/73/EC on common rules for the internal 
market in gas (hereinafter the Directive). The Directive is part of the Third Energy 
Package which, in turn, is part of a broader liberalization process started in the 1990s 
with the aim of curbing the natural monopolies of gas and electricity and, in doing so, 
building an internal market for energy (Buchan 2010a, 361). The Directive introduces 
the concept of Ownership Unbundling (OU) which refers to the separation of the 
various stages of the gas chain: production, transmission, distribution, and supply. 
Such separation was already required by the Second Energy Package through legal 
unbundling, and Member States complied with that requirement in different ways. 
However, unsatisfied with the existing state of affairs, the European Commission 
proposed OU as its preferred option to realise a separation of supply and production 
activities from network operation (European Commission 2007c, 529).  OU means that 
the same person or persons31 cannot control both the stage of supply and transmission 
of energy. This means that companies controlling both stages – as it is the case for 
many companies in the EU – should give up control of one of them (Ibid). For this 
reason, the Commission’s proposal for the Directive caused strong opposition from 
some Member States. 
                                                 
31 The proposal uses the following terms: “person or group of persons”, “legal person” (p. 6), “person 
or body” (p. 35), “natural or legal person”. For the purpose of this chapter I will simply use the term 
“person”.  




This case is expected to contribute to the research question of this thesis by helping to 
provide insights on the behaviour of the Commission in the legislative process leading 
to the Directive. The chapter defines the preference alignment among the principals as 
heterogeneous because Member States had different preferences on how to implement 
unbundling.  In order to compare the heterogeneous preferences of the principals with 
those of the agent, an empirically informed small subset of Member States sharing 
homogenous preferences is identified, as suggested in section 3.4.2. of this thesis. The 
use of this analytical device aims to contribute to the literature and is also revised in 
the conclusion of this thesis.  The preference alignment between the principals and the 
agent is also defined as heterogeneous because the Commission had a preference for 
OU while the subset of the Member States had a preference for a third option of 
unbundling.  
As a consequence of the values of the independent variables, this chapter tests the 
following two hypotheses: when the preferences among the principals are 
heterogeneous, the agent is more likely to try to deviate from preferences of the 
principals (H2) and when the preferences between the principals and the agent are 
heterogeneous, the agent is more likely to try to deviate from the preferences of the 
principals (H3). Testing these hypotheses is therefore expected to shed light on the 
Commission’s deviation.  
5.2. Context: Liberalizing the internal energy market 
This section provides some background information about the internal energy market 
in gas. Notably, the section starts with an overview of the gas value chain and then 
moves to the concept of unbundling, as conceived in the process of liberalisation of 
the internal energy market. This has been undertaken by the Commission since the 
First Energy Package of the 1990s. Looking at the concept of unbundling is important 
in order to understand the context in which the proposal for the Directive analysed in 
this chapter emerged.  
First of all, some preliminary information about the natural gas chain and how does it 
work is needed in order to understand the debate about Directive 2009/73/EC.  The 




natural gas value chain starts with discovering gas fields and ends with providing 
products to the consumer. The chain is composed of several stages:  
1) production;  
2) transmission;  
3) distribution;  
4) supply.  
After production (1), gas is taken by pipeline towards a mainland terminal where it is 
converted into liquid – Liquid Natural Gas (LNG). LNG is stored in tanks before 
regasification. In the transmission stage (2), gas is transported through a network of 
high-pressure pipelines. Transmission is carried out by transmission system operator 
(TSO), a natural or legal person responsible for operating, ensuring the maintenance 
of, and developing the transmission system in a given area. Then, in the distribution 
stage (3), gas is transported on a smaller scale through local or regional pipeline 
networks. Distribution is carried out by a Distribution System Operator (DSO). 
Finally, in the supply phase (4), gas is sold to customers.  
The stages above are related to two main groups of activities. While transmission (2) 
and distribution (3) are network activities, production (1) and supply (4) are 
commercial activities. Currently, in the EU energy market, vertically integrated 
companies, such as the French Gaz de France and the German RWE, control both of 
these stages. This means that these energy companies control the entire gas chain from 
production to supply.  
The Directive on Gas called for the separation of commercial activities from network 
activities because, as will be explained in more detail below, vertically integrated 
companies represent an obstacle for the competitiveness of the internal energy market. 
For this reason, the Directive prescribes that companies involved in production and 
supply cannot also be engaged in transmission and distribution, thus requiring that 
companies would be asked to divest ownership in one or both activities (Del Guayo, 
Kühne, and Roggenkamp 2010, 327). 




So what was the rationale behind a third Gas Directive? What is the broader picture in 
which the Directive has to be considered?  By separating production and supply 
activities from network activities, the Gas Directive aimed to boost the process of 
liberalisation of the gas market. The process of liberalisation of the gas market began 
in the 1990s with a first package of legislative proposals. It was, however, in the second 
package of legislative proposals, adopted in 2003, that unbundling was first proposed. 
The Second Energy Package included an Electricity Directive (2003/54/EC) and a Gas 
Directive (2003/55/EC). The Directives introduced the concept of unbundling as “legal 
separation” between distribution and transmission “in order to ensure efficient and 
non-discriminatory network access” (see 2004/54/EC (8) and 2004/55/EC (10)). Legal 
separation, however, is different from Ownership Unbundling which was only going 
to be introduced in the Third Energy Package.  Indeed, “legal separation does not imply 
a change of ownership of assets” (Ibid).  From the proposals for a Second Energy 
Package (EC 2001) (COM (2001) 125), it can be inferred that the Commission already 
deemed ownership unbundling for transmission as “more effective” in guaranteeing 
non-discriminatory access. However, legal unbundling was the compromise achieved 
at that time.  
The Second Energy Package required network operations to be legally and 
functionally separated from supply and generation or production activities. Member 
States were free to comply with that requirement by applying the preferred 
organisational structure. On the one hand, some Member States created a totally 
separate company for network operations. This was the case, for instance, with 
Gasunie in The Netherlands, which was split up into two autonomous companies: a 
gas transport company (NV Nederlandse Gasunie) and a purchasing and supply 
company for natural gas (Gasunie Trade & Supply BV) (Del Guayo, Kühne, and 
Roggenkamp 2010). On the other hand, some Member States decided to create a legal 
entity within existing integrated companies (e.g. Gaz de France in France).  
Creating a legal entity within existing integrated companies however, led – according 
to the Commission (2007c) –  to three types of problems. The first problem was a 
conflict of interests which could arise within integrated companies. Notably, while the 




supply and production interests aim to maximise their sales and market share, the 
network operator is obliged to offer non-discriminatory access to competitors. When 
vertically integrated companies control both transmission and production/supply, they 
may use the transmission system operator, which is supposed to offer non-
discriminatory access to competitors, to make entry more difficult for competitors.  
That means that the transmission system operator may treat its affiliate companies 
better than the competing third parties.     
The second problem was that creating a legal entity within existing integrated 
companies could not guarantee non-discriminatory access to information. This was 
because there was no effective means of preventing transmission system operators 
from releasing market-sensitive information to the generation or supply branch of the 
integrated company. Third and finally, in an integrated company, investment 
incentives would be distorted as companies would try to limit new investments when 
those investments are likely to benefit their competitors.  
According to the Commission, OU was the best way to tackle the aforementioned 
issues as it would have removed the distorted investment incentives of vertically 
integrated transmission system operators. It is in this context that the proposal for the 
Directive analysed in this chapter was issued.32 
Before looking at the proposal and at the legislative process in detail however, the next 
section outlines the preferences of the Commission and those of the Member States, 
and then links these to the hypotheses that are to be tested with this case study.  
                                                 
32 The Directive is part of the Third Energy Package which includes: 
- Directive 2009/72/EC 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in 
electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC; 
- Directive 2009/73/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in 
natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC (analysed in this chapter);  
- Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators; 
- Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for 
cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003; 
- Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas 
transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005. 




5.3. Identifying the independent variables 
This section determines the preference alignment among the principals (IV1) and the 
preference alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2) as far as the Directive 
is concerned. Member States’ preferences were shaped as a reaction to the 
Commission proposal. It is therefore reasonable to start this section analysing the 
preferences of the Commission and then move to the preferences of the principals. The 
section will argue that the preferences among the principals were heterogeneous. 
Accordingly, the preferences of the principals will be compared to those of the agent 
and it will be argued that the preferences were also heterogeneous between the two 
actors (IV2). 
Commission’s preferences on unbundling: the “preferred option” (a) and 
the “alternative option” (b) 
The Commission’s proposal concerning common rules for the internal market in 
natural gas (European Commission 2007c, 529), which lead to the Directive which is 
the object of this case study, is very informative about the preferences of the 
Commission as far as the effective separation of supply and production activities from 
network operation is concerned. The document states that the Commission had “one 
preferred option” – Ownership Unbundling (OU) – and an “alternative option” – 
Independent System Operator (ISO). For the purpose of this chapter then, 
Commission’s preferences are operationalised and ranked in the sense that the first 
preference was more preferred than the second. A description of each of the 
preferences – as expressed in specific policy choices (Milner 1997) – is offered below, 
together with the rationale underpinning them and the interests (or fundamental goals) 
they are supposed to serve.  
a) The “preferred option”: Ownership Unbundling (OU).  
The Commission’s proposal stated that, as far as separation of supply and production 
activities from network operation is concerned, “the preferred option of the 
Commission remains Ownership Unbundling”. The Commission expressed preference 
for a “clear ownership separation between transmission system operators and any 




supply undertakings”. OU means that a person controlling a supply undertaking33 
cannot, “at the same time, hold any interest in or exercise any right over a transmission 
system operator or transmission system” (Ibid), and vice versa (Ibid, 5).  
Why was OU the preferred option of the Commission? By separating ownership of 
transmission from ownership of supply, OU would solve the inherent conflict of 
interests typical of vertically integrated companies. Indeed, as described in more depth 
in the context section of this chapter (5.2.), when the transmission system operator is 
a legal entity within an integrated company, it may treat its affiliated companies better 
than competing third parties. More specifically, within integrated companies there is a 
conflict of interest: while supply and production interests aim to maximise their sale 
and market share, the network operator is obliged to offer non-discriminatory access 
to competitors. However, the independence of the transmission system operator is 
almost impossible to monitor. Therefore, the transmission system operator may favour 
its affiliated companies over third parties. By providing an ownership – and not merely 
legal – separation between the transmission system operators and any supply 
undertakings, the Commission expected that OU would overcome the conflict of 
interests typical within integrated companies.  
How then is the preference for OU supposed to serve what is assumed to be the 
Commission’s interest for competence maximisation? “The Commission has been the 
champion of liberalisation in the European energy market” (Buchan 2010a, 361). As 
will be clear in the discussion of process-tracing (5.4.), the Commission’s aim was to 
strengthen its role as protector of liberalisation of the energy market by curbing the 
monopoly of vertically integrated companies. OU entailed several tasks (or 
competences) for the Commission, such as the role of assessing the compatibility of 
the certification of transmission system operators with the legislation on unbundling. 
In contrast, other types of unbundling would have given more freedom – in terms of 
                                                 
33 A “Supply undertaking” means “any natural or legal person who carries out the function of supply” 
(Directive 2009/73/EC (Art. 2(8)). More generally, a "natural gas undertaking" means “a natural or legal 
person carrying out at least one of the following functions: production, transmission, distribution, 
supply, purchase or storage of natural gas, including LNG, which is responsible for the commercial, 
technical and/or maintenance tasks related to those functions, but shall not include final customers” 
(Directive 2009/73/EC Art. 2 (1)). 




actual implementation – to the Member States. According to the Commission, 
effective unbundling would “help to create supra-national transmission system 
operators as the operators are no longer held back by mutual distrust” (Ibid). Doing so 
would have curbed the monopoly of vertically integrated companies and contributed 
to a liberalised energy market where compliance with EU law was to be guaranteed by 
the Commission. 
b) An “alternative option”: Independent System Operator (ISO) 
The Commission, however, was also aware that some Member States might have 
decided not to support OU and provided “an alternative option” called the Independent 
System Operator (ISO) (Ibid, 5-6). The proposal stated as follows:  
“This option enables vertically integrated companies to retain the 
ownership of their network assets, but requires that the transmission 
network itself is managed by an independent system operator – an 
undertaking or entity entirely separate from the vertically integrate 
company – that performs all the functions of the network operator.”  
The Commission clarified that the ISO option must provide the same guarantees as 
ownership unbundling regarding “independence of action of the network in question 
and the same level of incentives on the network to invest in new infrastructure that 
may benefit competitors” (Ibid). A legitimate question may arise: why was the ISO 
only a second best option after OU? According to the Commission, ISO would require 
“regulation and permanent regulatory monitoring” (Ibid, 6) in order to ensure that “the 
operator remains and acts truly independently of the vertically integrated company” 
(Ibid). Therefore, ISO lacks the guarantees of effectiveness and stability of the OU 
option. Indeed, only the latter could guarantee truly independent transmission system 
operators that were no longer held back by mutual distrust and, therefore, contribute 
to the achievement of EU-wide market integration. The latter can be seen as an 
expression of the Commission’s interest for competence-maximisation because in 
promoting OU the Commission would perpetuate its role of “champion of 
liberalisation in the European energy market” (Buchan 2010a, 361). 




c) Third country aspect  
The Commission’s proposal also contained a specific paragraph on third country 
aspects, which is crucial for the external dimension of the EU internal energy market. 
According to the proposal, effective unbundling would have applied not only to EU 
companies but also to non-EU companies. This means that companies of third 
countries wishing to acquire “a significant interest or even control over an EU 
network”, would have to comply with the same unbundling requirements – whether 
OU or ISO - as EU companies (Ibid, 7).  
Thus, the Commission proposed that companies of third countries cannot control 
transmission (a transmission system or a transmission system operator) unless a 
specific agreement between the EU and the third country is signed (Ibid, 7).  Third 
country companies then, as for EU companies, needed to be certified by a national 
regulatory authority as having complied with the unbundling requirements. The 
Commission proposed that where a certification was requested by a transmission 
system owner or transmission system operator controlled by a person or persons from 
third countries, it should be denied, unless the transmission system owner or 
transmission system operator could demonstrate that there was no possibility for the 
entity concerned to be influenced by any operator active in the production or supply 
of gas or electricity, or by a third country (Art. 7b (2)). The proposal also provided that 
the certification of a transmission system operator should be notified to the 
Commission without delay. If, in examining the notification, the Commission found 
serious doubts as to the compatibility of the certification with the proposed legislation 
on unbundling, it could decide to initiate proceedings.  
In summary, the Commission proposed the denial of third country control of the 
transmission of energy, unless guarantees of compliance to the proposed unbundling 
legislation are provided. The aforementioned provisions also granted the Commission 
the role of assessing the compatibility of the certification with the legislation on 
unbundling. The Commission justified this strong requirement by arguing that “the 
aim is to guarantee that companies from third countries respect the same rules that 
apply to EU based undertakings in both letter and spirit – not to discriminate against 




them” (Ibid). Again, the third country aspect was deemed to achieve the goal of the 
proposal which was “promote competition in the European energy markets and 
promote the proper functioning of these markets” (Ibid, 7). The third country aspect 
stresses the relevance of the Directive in terms of external dimension. More precisely, 
by ensuring that the unbundling provisions would apply also to non-EU companies, 
the Commission wanted to make sure that external competitors do not undermine the 
further integration of the internal energy market.  
This sub-section therefore has identified the preferences of the Commission as 
Ownership Unbundling. OU was the “preferred” option of the Commission, while ISO 
was only “the second best” (European Commission 2007c). In-depth analysis and 
interpretation of data suggest that the Commission’s preference for OU is supposed to 
serve the interest of competence maximization. By breaking production and supply on 
the one hand and transmission and distribution on the other, the Commission seems to 
have aimed to break up the monopoly of vertically integrated companies that were 
deemed to be an obstacle to a competitive and liberalised energy market. In doing so 
the Commission seemed willing to reaffirm its role of “champion of liberalisation” in 
the European energy market (Buchan 2010a, 361). This seems to have been an 
important reason for the Commission proposing OU as the preferred option for 
unbundling.  
5.3.1. Preference alignment among the principals (IV1): 
pushing for different options 
Tracing Member State preferences on the unbundling is less straightforward.  Much 
of the difficulty of this task is due to the wide range of situations across the energy 
markets of the Member States.  For analytical purposes, this section looks at the 
preferences of the Member States after the Commission proposal was issued, since 
these clearly emerged in reaction to the Commission proposal. While the Commission 
had two preferences (a first preferred option and a second best option), for the sake of 
simplification and for the purpose of this chapter, each Member State is deemed to 
have only one preferred option from the following: a) Ownership unbundling (OU); b) 
Effective and Efficient Unbundling (EEU); c) Status quo.  




In the following subsections, each option is analysed in detail. In order to infer the 
underlying preferences of the Member States, this section relies on four main sources. 
Firstly, the section builds on the comments sent by twenty delegations of the Member 
States to the Council before the Commission proposal was issued. In order to steer the 
debate on the four main issues which the Commission was supposed to address in the 
legislative proposal to be submitted in September 2007, the Presidency of the Council 
drew up four questions, one of which was on unbundling34 (Council of the European 
Union 2007a). The twenty written contributions are a precious source of information 
as they allow understanding about whether those Member States were in favour or 
against “further unbundling measures”.35  
Secondly, a Study on Unbundling of Electricity and Gas Transmission and 
Distribution System Operators is also used as a source of information. The study, 
issued in 2006, reports an overview of the legal implementation of Gas Directive 
2003/55/EC, which was the legislation in force when the proposal for the Directive 
analysed in this chapter was delivered. Reporting about the implementation of 
unbundling of each Member States, the study allows some inferences about the 
preferences of the Member States. Data seems to suggest that Member States who had 
already applied ownership unbundling would support the Commission proposal for 
OU because they would benefit, in terms of a more competitive energy market, from 
other Member States doing the same.  
Thirdly, a Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the legislative 
package on the internal market for electricity and gas impact assessment (SEC(2007) 
1179) (European Commission 2007a) reports some important information about EU 
Member States. It identifies Member States with full ownership unbundling in the gas 
sector (the TSOs of Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain and the UK) 
together with the six Member States that had a derogation from the unbundling 
                                                 
34 Together with unbundling, the other issues were effective regulation, adequate infrastructure and 
cooperation among network operators. 
35 For the sake of completeness the question was formulated as follows: “Effective unbundling. Should 
further unbundling measures, if proposed by the Commission, be applied only to the transmission 
networks or to distribution networks as well; and should electricity and gas be treated differently?” 
 




requirements, i.e. Cyprus, Finland, Greece (until end 2006), Latvia, Lithuania and 
Malta. Finally, a letter sent from eight Member States to the President of the European 
Parliament Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) Commission in 
January 2008, suggest a specific preference for those Member States (Représentation 
Permanente de la France auprès de l’Union Européenne 2008).  
a) Ownership Unbundling (OU)  
According to a Note of the Council of the European Union ( 2007r, 6) “a significant 
number” of Member States agreed with the Commission that effective separation of 
supply/generation activities from transmission network could best be achieved through 
Ownership Unbundling of the Transmission System Operator (TSO). Similarly to the 
Commission, the Council shared the view that OU was “the best means” to resolve the 
problems which occur when the TSO is a legal entity within an integrated company, 
namely “the inbuilt incentive to treat its affiliated companies better than the competing 
third parties and to limit new investment when this will benefit its competitors” (Ibid). 
Which Member States preferred the Ownership Unbundling? Comparing data from the 
multiple sources listed above, this chapter suggests that Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Portugal, Spain, and the UK had a preference for ownership unbundling. These 
countries were already fully unbundled or were granted a derogation under the 2003 
Directive. This subsection looks at the specific position of the Member States 
preferring OU.  
According to the UK’s written contribution to the Council (Council of the European 
Union 2007b), “the present unbundling arrangements in many Member States are not 
adequate and […] more effective measures are needed.” “Full ownership unbundling”, 
instead, was expected to ensure two main results. Firstly, ownership unbundling must 
ensure market players that they would be granted non-discriminatory access to 
networks, and that market-sensitive information they provide to the network business 
was kept confidential and not used to commercial advantage (for example to the 
benefit of the affiliated supply or generation businesses). As a consequence, this would 
encourage and facilitate market entry by new generators and suppliers to compete with 
incumbent companies. Secondly, unbundling would provide the right incentives for 
network investments as it would overcome the problems that occur when separation 




does not exist, notably, the risk that “network businesses fail to develop the network if 
this will enable new generators and suppliers to compete with the affiliated business” 
(Ibid).  
Belgium’s written contribution also confirms that “Belgium has always supported the 
idea of effective unbundling of competitive activities and regulated activities”. One of 
the reasons suggested for the support of OU seems to be that  “the network operator 
must therefore be as independent as possible of the incumbent operator so as to offer 
a level playing field to all market players” (Council of the European Union 2007l). 
Support for unbundling was also suggested by an interviewee working for the 
Permanent Representation of Belgium who confirmed that energy production in the 
country has always been in the hands of the private sector and the networks were 
always in the hands of the Government (Interview No 10).  
The Swedish official position was quite clear on unbundling for transmission 
operators: “effective unbundling is a cornerstone in a well-functioning internal 
market” – but less clear on unbundling of distribution companies which Sweden did 
not see “neither necessary or desirable at this stage” (Council of the European Union 
2007m). An official working within the Swedish Permanent Representation argued 
that Sweden was “quite a strong supporter of the unbundling principle” (Interview No 
22). Unbundling was a priority for Sweden and OU was deemed the best solution to 
achieve harmonisation, while the other options – such ISO or the third option proposed 
by some Member States – were seen as “a bit complicated” (Ibid).  
Denmark also had quite a strong position affirming that “effective unbundling is 
synonymous with ownership unbundling”. More precisely, unbundling “avoids the 
adverse effects of alternative arrangements, viz. excessively detailed and complex 
regulation and disproportionately heavy administrative burdens” (Council of the 
European Union 2007p). Finland “supports the ownership unbundling of vertically 
integrated transmission system operators (TSOs)” as it would “guarantee that 
investment decisions […] would be made solely from the network business’ point of 
view”. The requirement of ownership unbundling, however, should not have been 
imposed to distribution system operators (DSOs), as network congestions are usually 




not a problem in the distribution level, and non-discriminatory network access can be 
guaranteed with national legislation (Council of the European Union 2007g).  
The position of Portugal was that, for transmission networks, full ownership 
unbundling should apply as “it is the only way to ensure competitiveness, non-
discriminatory network access and effective creation of an internal energy market” 
(Council of the European Union 2007o). Finally, Spain also deemed that OU should 
be the first target for all the Member States “as situations involving extensive 
discrimination between countries might otherwise arise.”  In view of the results 
achieved in Spain, OU of transmission was expected to bring “high levels of 
liberalisation” (Council of the European Union 2007j).  
As far as the third country aspect was concerned, Member States belonging to this sub-
group did not show any particular concern. The UK’s written contribution to the 
Council for example, stressed that OU unbundling would not have allowed upstream 
companies or third country supplier companies to control the network in the Member 
States (see written contributions) as was feared by some Member States having 
different preferences. 
To summarise, data suggests that Member States supporting unbundling were already 
fully unbundled (Denmark, Portugal, Spain, UK) or were granted a derogation under 
the 2003 Directive (Finland). Supporting unbundling and extending unbundling to all 
the other European countries, was expected to break vertically integrated companies 
and boost competition in the European market, as all companies would have been 
expected to play according to the same rules. The preference for OU was supposed to 
protect the interest of maintaining control over energy policy, because OU was deemed 
the best policy-choice at national level.  
b) Effective and Efficient Unbundling (EEU) 
In January 2008, some of the Member States who were dissatisfied with the 
Commission proposal – Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, France, Greece, Luxembourg, 
Latvia and Slovakia – came up with a third option named Effective and Efficient 
Unbundling (EEU) (Représentation Permanente de la France auprès de l’Union 




Européenne 2008).36 The third option provided an alternative to unbundling that meant 
an “effective separation of supply and production activities from network operations 
based on independently run and adequately regulated network operations system” 
(Ibid).  The main difference with the Commission proposal was that the transmission 
system operator was not supposed to be ownership unbundled. The third option instead 
provided a set of measures in order to guarantee the effectiveness and the 
independence of the TSO. In order to explain the preferences of the Member States 
belonging to this subgroup, this section first offers some information about the 
positions of the individual Member States and then looks at the main features of the 
third option.  
What kind of Member States supported a third option? The argument presented in the 
previous section would already suggest that the countries belonging to this subgroup 
do not have unbundled markets. In fact, Greece and Latvia were granted exemption 
for the application of the 2003 Directive, France and Germany had implemented the 
2003 Directive while Austria and Slovakia had implemented that Directive only partly. 
Again, the written contributions sent to the Council are particularly useful in 
understanding the preferences of the Member States. Austria, for instance, rejected 
full ownership unbundling as it would have meant “excessive interference in 
ownership rights”. According to the Austrian position, there was no need for new 
legislation, rather “full implementation and exploitation of the existing legal 
framework in all Member States” was needed (Council of the European Union 2007i).  
Greece had a similar position to Austria, stating that “the legislative framework of the 
Member States is adequate for the efficient operation of the energy market.” The issue 
of ownership unbundling was to be examined again at a later stage, when there would 
be sufficient data to evaluate the progress of the liberalised markets of all twenty seven 
Member States (Council of the European Union 2007e). Bulgaria, in which the 
process of legal unbundling had been recently completed, was also in the position of 
                                                 
36 Media offers contradictory data about the number of Member States wishing a “third way to 
unbundling”.  At times it is argued that they were seven, others that they were eight. I take the letter 
signed by eight Member States in January 2008 as reference. 




retaining the current approach for an “independent, legally and organisationally 
unbundled system operator” (Council of the European Union 2007h). 
According to Slovakia “the common internal market was not ready to support 
ownership unbundling of networks. […]. As stated in the written contribution, “Slovak 
Republic in contrary to the Commission doesn’t regard unbundling as the best and 
universal tool for development of an internal energy market”. Rather, “national 
conditions, such as size of the markets and its structure”, are particularly influential. 
Moreover, Slovakia was sceptical of the Commission’s argument that that “realisation 
of unbundling is able to eliminate all barriers that are limiting the investment” (Council 
of the European Union 2007d).  
The biggest and more vocal countries in this subgroup however, were France and 
Germany. The French position was that full ownership unbundling “would undermine 
property rights, introduce a high degree of legal insecurity for investors and have 
consequences for the organisation of the sector that would be both major and difficult 
to predict.” Moreover, France warned against “moving toward a single solution 
without having envisaged and studied other possible models.” France proposed the 
Regulated Unbundling model (RUN), stating that is was “less radical and more 
comprehensive than that involving full unbundling of ownership” (Council of the 
European Union 2007d). German industry and politicians defined OU as an 
“expropriation” measure against the property rights of network owners (Buchan 
2010a, 362; Del Guayo, Kühne, and Roggenkamp 2010). Indeed, the German energy 
sector is privately owned and energy rights are constitutionally guaranteed (Ibid).  
As far as the third country aspect is concerned, some Member States belonging to this 
sub-group feared that OU would weaken the position of their national companies vis-
à-vis companies from third countries. This concern was particularly clear in the written 
contribution produced by the French delegation (Council of the European Union 
2007d). Other sources suggest that Germany and Austria feared that the third country 
clause – as it was in the Commission’s proposal – could have damaged the bilateral 
agreements through which they had already secured their gas supply (Gutiérrez and 
Kostadinova 2008). 




What kind of option was proposed by the countries mentioned so far? The third option 
was composed of two pillars. Firstly, as far as the organisation and governance of the 
undertaking was concerned, this option imposed “strict obligations” on the vertically 
integrated undertakings, in order to guarantee the effective independence of the TSO. 
Moreover, according to this option, the organisational framework was to be 
implemented and controlled “by compliance officer and public authority” in the 
respective Member State. Secondly, the role of the national level was also stressed for 
grid investments, market integration and connection of new power plants. The option 
proposed a national network development plan and, only in case the transmission 
system operator was not willing to realise an infrastructure identified as necessary in 
the plan, the role of the regulatory authority was foreseen. The third option also 
proposed the fostering of regional cooperation, with the possibility of designating a 
regional coordinator in charge of facilitating the dialogue between all national 
competent authorities, TSOs and power exchanges. 
The third option seems then to suggest that Member States aimed to keep national 
control and oversight over the system. More precisely, they proposed a system that 
would be implemented and controlled at national level. As far as the development of 
network was concerned, the letter proposed a national network plan and, potentially, 
some sort of regional cooperation. The points analysed so far seem to suggest that the 
preference for EEU was actually intended to allow Member States to keep national 
control and oversight of the system.  
c) Status quo: Member States depending on only one gas supplier 
Other Member States – such as Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovenia – were against OU, although they did not join the group proposing a 
third option. Member States belonging to this third subgroup were particularly 
concerned that OU would have a negative impact on their gas market because they 
were not interconnected, with centralised and limited gas markets or were heavily 
dependent on one external supplier. These countries were particularly concerned that 
the third country clause – as in the Commission’s proposal – would have weakened 
their position vis-à-vis their main suppliers.  




Small island states, such as Cyprus, and countries with a centralized and limited market 
in gas, such as Czech Republic, seemed concerned that OU could have had a negative 
impact. Cyprus, for instance, argued that OU “would give rise to additional, increased 
administrative and operational expenses which would have a direct negative impact on 
consumers” (Council of the European Union 2007q). In order to avoid such 
consequences, then, the decisions on further unbundling measures should be “left to 
the discretion of the Member States (principle of subsidiarity)” (Ibid). Similarly, the 
Czech Republic had serious concerns that ownership-separated companies might see 
their market position significantly weakened, thus also affecting their negotiating 
position in relation to capital-powerful suppliers. Their concern was that this weakened 
position could be reflected in prices for end customers (Council of the European Union 
2007f).  Estonia was also concerned about the consequences that OU could have on 
Member States with only one (monopoly) supplier on the market, as well as deliveries 
from only one source (Council of the European Union 2007k). 
Lithuania expressed the opinion that, before proposing new legislation on OU, the 
Commission should have assessed the “influence of vertically integrated companies 
from the third countries on the liberalised EU market” as a “topical issues”. More 
precisely, the Lithuanian delegation argued that the EU internal energy market needed 
to be protected from distortion of competition by the vertically integrated energy 
companies from the third countries. Lithuanian concerns are sensible if we think that 
Lithuanian gas is supplied from a single external gas supplier, Gazprom,  and the 
degree of integration in the gas market is low because Lithuania has a single 
interconnection with the EU Member States (interconnection with Latvia), which is 
meant to ensure gas supply solely in extreme situations (Council of the European 
Union 2007n).  
The Polish position was that the full implementation of Directive 2003/55/EC 
provided “sufficient foundation for creating a uniform market for natural gas.” Poland 
feared that should the ownership unbundling be properly defined, external gas 
suppliers to the EU would pose a threat to taking over natural gas enterprises. More 
precisely, Poland did not support ownership unbundling of the Distribution System 
Operators because it could mean such enterprises would need to be sold, leading to a 




situation where “the dominating natural gas supplier takes over strategically important 
market segments”. According to the Polish delegation, this was the case, as the main 
external suppliers do not have to comply with Community unbundling regulations” 
(Council of the European Union 2007k). Finally, according to the Slovenian position, 
“new measures were not needed yet because some Member States were still 
implementing legal unbundling” (Council of the European Union 2007c). 
To summarise the preferences of the Member States belonging to this subgroup, the 
main reason for their opposition to OU was that, because they are heavily dependent 
on one non-EU supplier and are not well connected to the rest of the EU market, they 
feared that OU might have weakened their positions towards the suppliers. Those 
Member States would have rather kept the status quo than introduced new legislation 
requiring OU. As for the previous subgroups, the preferences of these countries were 
supposed to protect their interest for maintaining control over energy policy. Rather 
than accepting OU as the only option proposed by the Commission, Member States 
belonging to this subgroup seemed keen to adopt a system of unbundling in line with 
their national energy policies.  
To summarise this section on the preferences of the Member States on Directive 
2009/73/EC, it has been argued that Member States had heterogeneous preferences. 
Member States can be divided in three subgroups:  
a) Member States preferring OU. Member States already fully unbundled 
(Denmark, Portugal, Spain, UK) or exempted under the 2003 Directive 
(Finland), expected OU to bring competitiveness, non-discriminatory-network 
access, and harmonization of the internal energy market. 
b)  Member States preferring Effective and Efficient Unbundling (EEU). 
Member States willing to keep to keep national control and oversight over the 
system, refused the Commission proposal for OU and proposed a third option 
in which the transmission system operator did not need ownership unbundling.  
c) Member States preferring the status quo. Member States heavily dependent 
on one non-EU supplier and not well connected to the rest of the EU market, 




had a preference for keeping existing legislation rather than introducing a new 
obligation of OU. 
As described more thoroughly in the research design section (3.4.2.), when the 
preferences of the principals are heterogeneous – as seems to be the case here, an 
analytical device needs to be introduced in order to compare those preferences with 
those of the agent. More precisely, an empirically informed small subset of Member 
States sharing homogenous preferences has been identified. Preliminary research on 
this case suggests that Member States preferring Effective and Efficient Unbundling 
(EEU) were the most active; it therefore seems sensible to take them as a subset that 
represents the preferences of the principals to be compared to those of the 
Commission. As the following section (5.4.) will explore more in detail, those Member 
States really led the fight against the Commission proposal and were highly influential 
during the legislative process. The value of this analytical device will be revisited in 
the conclusion of this work when presenting the potential contribution to PA literature. 
In the next section, the preferences of the principals – as represented by the subset – 
are compared to those of the Commission in order to analyse the impact of the second 
independent variable, the preference alignment between the principals and the agent.  
5.3.2. Preference alignment between the principals and the 
agent (IV2): divergences on OU 
In this section the preferences of the principals are compared to those of the agent in 
order to assess whether the preferences between the principals and the agent were 
homogeneous or heterogeneous (IV2). The preference alignment between the 
principals and the agent is expected to affect the Commission in its deviation from the 
preferences of the Member States.  
In the previous section the preference of the Commission has been identified as a 
preference for Ownership Unbundling (OU). OU is defined by the Commission as 
“clear ownership separation between transmission system operators and any supply 
undertakings” (European Commission 2007c). On the other hand, the preferences of 
the Member States were found to have been heterogeneous because the Member States 
had different preferences on unbundling. More precisely, some Member States had a 
preference for OU (a), others for EEU (b) while others preferred the status quo (c). In 




order to compare the preferences of the Member States with those of the Commission, 
the previous section introduced an empirically informed small subset of Member States 
sharing homogenous preferences. The small subset identified was the one having a 
preference for Effective and Efficient Unbundling (EEU).  
This section therefore argues that the Commission and the Member States had 
heterogeneous preferences on the Directive. Simply put, the Member States had a 
preference for EEU while the Commission had a preference for OU. In line with the 
PAM, the preferences were meant to serve difference interests. Data seems to suggest 
that one of the reasons why the Commission supported OU was to serve its interest of 
competence maximization, while the Member States, as represented by the small 
subset, seemed to support EEU as a means to keep national control over the system.  
How do the two independent variables affect the Commission’s deviation in the 
external dimension of the EU internal energy market? As explained in more depth in 
the research design of this thesis (3.5.), when the preferences between the principals 
and the agent are heterogeneous, the agent is more likely to try to deviate from the 
preferences of the principals. (H3). More precisely, when the principals and the agent 
have different preferences, “conflict situations” might arise (Da Conceição 2010: 
1110) as the Commission is expected to satisfy its own preferences rather than those 
of the Member States (Pollack 2003).   
As far as the preferences of the principals are concerned, this case study allows testing 
of the following hypothesis: when the preferences among the principals are 
heterogeneous, the agent is more likely to try to deviate from preferences of the 
principals (H2). Indeed, the PAM assumes that the Commission might exploit the fact 
that Member States have heterogeneous preferences to deviate from those preferences. 
The Commission can “shirk within certain limits, exploiting cleavages among the 
member states to avoid sanctions, Council overruling of decisions, or alteration of the 
agent’s mandate” (Pollack 1997, 129). Moreover, having agenda-setting powers, the 
Commission might also “push through those proposals closest to its own preferred 
policy that also can garner a qualified majority in the Council” (Ibid).  One of the 
possible reasons for this kind of scenario is that heterogeneous preferences among the 




Member States make the use of control mechanisms and sanctions more costly and 
complicated.  
In the following section, the legislative procedure leading to the Directive is analysed 
by way of process-tracing in order to assess how the two independent variables can be 
seen to have affected the Commission’s deviation from Member States’ preferences.  
5.4. From the Proposal to the Final Outcome: tracing 
the legislative process leading to Directive 
2009/73/EC 
This section analyses the decision-making process leading to Directive 2009/73/EC on 
common rules for the internal market in gas. By applying the process-tracing method, 
this section aims to analyse the effect of the preference alignment among the principals 
(IV1) and the preference alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2) on the 
Commission’s deviation from Member States’ preferences (DV). According to the 
hypotheses recalled earlier in this chapter (5.3.2.), in this case study, the Commission 
is expected to try to deviate from the preferences of the Member States because the 
preferences among the principals are heterogeneous as are the preferences between 
the principals and the agent. 
This section is grounded primarily on documents related to the legislative procedure 
such as Council Conclusions, Committee Reports and Opinions of the European 
Parliament.  This data is then supplemented with secondary sources and interview data. 
This section is divided in eight parts relating to the main phases of the legislative 
procedure: 1) the act of delegation, 2) the Commission proposal, 3) Member States’ 
reaction to the proposal, 4) the third way, 5) the unbundling of German companies, 6) 
the Council’s broad agreement, 7) the debate in the Council and 8) the informal 
compromise, second reading and final act.  In each subsection, the link between the 
legislative process and the theoretical framework of this research is stressed. The final 
section will conclude that hypotheses 2 and 3 of this study have been confirmed in this 
case.  




5.4.1. The act of delegation: European Council of 8/9 March 
2007 
The analysis of this case study starts with the Conclusions of the European Council of 
March 2007, which agreed on the need for an “effective separation of supply and 
production activities from network operations (unbundling)” (European Council 2007, 
16). The European Council agreed on an Action Plan (2007-2009) for an “Energy 
Policy for Europe” (EPE) comprising several priority actions, among which were some 
related to the “Internal Market for Gas and Electricity”, which is the object of the 
analysis of this chapter. The European Council agreed, inter alia, on the need for 
“effective separation of supply and production activities from network operations 
(unbundling), based on independently run and adequately regulated network operation 
systems which guarantee equal and open access to transport infrastructure and 
independence of decisions investment infrastructure” (Ibid). The European Council 
invited the Commission: 
- to provide additional clarifications related to the key measures envisaged and 
their impacts in time for the June Council (Energy); 
- to elaborate together with Member States the medium and long-term forecasts 
for gas and electricity supply and demand, and to identify the additional 
investment required to satisfy EU strategic needs; 
- to assess the impact of vertically integrated energy companies from third 
countries on the internal market and how to implement the principle of 
reciprocity; 
- to assess access to gas storage in the EU. 
Even more importantly for the purpose of this chapter, the European Council invited 
the Commission “to come forward with relevant proposals, including through the 
development of existing legislation where possible” (Ibid). 
From a PA perspective, the European Council Conclusions may be seen as a target 
delegation from the Member States to the Commission. The primary act of delegation, 
however, is to be found in the Treaties where this legislative process has its legal 




basis.37  The co-decision procedure is adopted, i.e. the Commission has the sole power 
of initiative, which also makes this a useful case for studying the Commission as 
agenda-setter and initiator of new legislation. The European Council Conclusions are 
instead a target delegation through which the Member States gave the Commission a 
mandate to come forward with “relevant proposals” including the “development of 
new legislation” (Ibid).  
5.4.2. The Commission’s proposal: OU as “the best option” 
As a response to the conclusion of the European Council, the Commission issued a 
proposal on 19 September 2007 (European Commission 2007c). The proposal started 
from the point that existing unbundling provisions were not sufficient to ensure a well-
functioning internal energy market. As mentioned in the context section of this chapter 
(5.2.), the Second Energy Package had required Member States to adopt a legal 
unbundling and while some of them created a totally separate company for network 
operation, others created a legal entity within an integrated company. According to the 
Commission however, the latter solution had led to many problems in the energy 
market such as conflict of interests within vertically integrated companies, non-
discriminatory access of information, and distorted investments incentives. In order to 
overcome these shortcomings, the Commission proposed OU as its “preferred option.” 
The Commission deemed OU “the most effective and stable way of achieving effective 
unbundling of the transmission network and thus of solving the inherent conflict of 
interests” (Ibid).  
Aware of the variety of situations that existed among the different Member States, the 
Commission also provided a so called “alternative option” for those Member States 
that did not want to choose OU: the “Independent System Operator” (ISO). ISO 
allowed vertically integrated companies to retain the ownership of their network assets. 
However, it also required that the transmission network was managed by an 
independent system operator. The latter was expected to be an undertaking or an entity 
entirely separate from the vertically integrated company and had to perform all the 
functions of a network operator. This second option, however, required regulation and 
                                                 
37 EC Treaty (after Amsterdam) EC 055; EC Treaty (after Amsterdam) EC 095; EC Treaty (after 
Amsterdam) EC 047-p2. 




permanent regulatory monitoring to ensure that the operator remained and acted truly 
independently of the vertically integrated company (Ibid, 6).  
The Commission also made clear in the proposal that the requirement for effective 
unbundling was intended to be applied to both publicly and privately owned 
companies. Moreover, the Commission proposed unbundling requirements to apply to 
EU as well as non-EU companies. The Commission suggested that “third country 
individuals and countries could not acquire control over a Community transmission 
system or TSO unless this was permitted by an agreement between the EU and the 
third countries” (Ibid). The aim of this requirement was to guarantee that “companies 
from third countries respect the same rules that apply to EU based undertakings in both 
letter and spirit” (Ibid, 7). This point on the third country aspect stresses the external 
dimension of this case study. The Commission’s proposal suggested that, by proposing 
that the unbundling requirements were to be applied by EU and non-EU companies, 
the Commission aimed to make sure that non-EU companies would participate in the 
EU internal energy market according to EU law. Having non-EU companies acting 
according to EU-legislation would strengthen competition inside the EU internal 
energy market and would strengthen the internal energy market, serving the 
Commission’s interest of competence-maximization as “champion of liberalisation”.  
As stressed in the section on preferences (5.3.2.), the Commission’s proposal was 
closer to the Commission’s preferences than to those of the Member States as the 
European Council did not mention OU as an option. As clearly stated by an official of 
the Commission, the latter went for the most extreme option of “a clear cut system”:  
“The Commission was always a bit sceptical about the possibility to ensure 
effective independence if you stay within the same group.  That’s why all 
discussion focused on how to practically ensure that if you are not 
ownership unbundled you still have sufficient guaranteed independence 
that the transmission system operator will not favour the group of 
companies he belongs to or will not influenced in a certain manner […]” 
(Interview No 1). 
In the Commission’s view, OU was therefore the most practical way to ensure 
unbundling and to ensure the independence of the TSOs. Other options would have 
required several safeguards to achieve the same objective. As highlighted by an official 




working in the Commission “if you don’t opt for ownership unbundling, the other 
options are extremely demanding in terms of oversight, safeguard measures and so on” 
(Ibid). 
The Commission’s proposal may be seen as rather opportunistic because it proposed a 
clear-cut system of full ownership unbundling as a first option. As mentioned earlier 
in this chapter (5.3.1.), data about the implementation of the 2003 Directive together 
with the written contributions produced by several Member States suggest that 
Member States had heterogeneous preferences on unbundling:  some of them 
supported it, others defended the status quo of current legislation and others proposed 
an alternative option. This point seems to suggest that, as expected by the PA literature, 
the Commission exploited the fact that Member States had different preferences 
pushing forward a proposal “closest to its own preferred policy” (Pollack 1997, 129). 
Aware of the fact that Member States had different preferences on unbundling, the 
Commission put forward its preferred option of OU, leaving divided Member States 
working to find a common position.  
To summarise this section, the Commission’s proposal provided OU as the “preferred 
option” in order to guarantee “a clear ownership separation between transmission 
system operators and any supply undertaking.” The proposal also proposed a second 
option, ISO, which would have allowed the vertically integrated companies to retain 
ownership of their network assets, but would have also required regulation and 
permanent regulatory monitoring in order to guarantee the independence of the TSOs. 
In PA terms, the Commission deviated from the Member States’ preferences because 
it behaved opportunistically, presenting a proposal that provided OU (and ISO as an 
alternative) which was the Commission’s preferred option but did not reflect the 
Member States’ preferences. In the next section, Member States’ reactions to the 
proposal are analysed to understand how the heterogeneity of preferences between the 
principals and the agent affected the Commission’s deviation from the preferences of 
the Member States.  




5.4.3. Member States’ reactions to the proposal: struggling for 
a common position 
A progress report of the Council of the European Union (hereinafter “the Council”) 
states that “divergent views among Member States” existed on the Commission 
proposal (Council of the European Union 2007r, 07). Although Member States agreed 
that “effective separation of supply/generation activities from transmission activities” 
had to be achieved, they had different views on how such separation should be 
achieved (Ibid, 3).  
A significant number of Member States agreed that OU was the best solution as it 
avoided problems like those outlined above, such as integrated companies having the 
incentive to treat their affiliated companies better than competing third parties, or 
limiting new investments when this will benefit its competitors. As suggested by 
several sources, among those Member States were Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Portugal, Spain, and UK. Those countries had already implemented some form of 
unbundling and would have benefitted from all other Member States unbundling their 
systems. Other Member States however, strongly rejected the Commission’s proposal 
for OU. Moreover, they also rejected the Commission’s alternative option of ISO 
because they did not see it as a genuine alternative to OU. Rather, ISO was seen as “a 
particular form of ownership unbundling” as it imposed the ownership unbundling of 
the body responsible for infrastructure management. Those countries saw OU and ISO 
as “infringing property rights” (Ibid, 4).  
According to journalistic reports, France had the strongest position against the 
Commission proposal and Germany was its “most powerful ally among the antis” (The 
Economist 2007). Supplementing these sources with official documents and secondary 
sources suggests that the French position was the following: if full ownership 
unbundling “were to be imposed by a regulation, it would undermine property rights, 
introduce a high degree of legal insecurity for investors and have consequences for the 
organisation of the sector that would be both major and difficult to predict” (Council 
of the European Union 2007d, 149). As mentioned earlier in this chapter with regard 
to the preferences of the Member States (5.3.1.), the French position can be explained 
by the fact that the gas sector is dominated by vertically integrated companies which 




would have been seriously damaged by OU. The same can be stated for Germany 
where the Government was “one of the fierce opponents to further unbundling” with 
the argument that unbundling was an infringement of property rights (Del Guayo, 
Kühne, and Roggenkamp 2010, 344).  The opposition against  the Commission’s 
proposal was led by France and Germany who were also followed by smaller Member 
States arguing that their energy companies were “too small to be unbundled, especially 
in gas where they must confront foreign suppliers of considerable size” (Buchan 
2010a, 362).  
As far as the third country aspect is concerned, an investigation of several sources 
suggests that Member States’ positions on this point were also heterogeneous. Member 
states in favour of OU did not manifest any concern on the third country aspect. The 
UK and Denmark, for example, stressed that OU unbundling would not have allowed 
upstream companies or third country supplier companies to control the network in the 
Member States (see written contributions to the Council, 5.3.1.). This latter scenario 
was indeed feared by many of the countries which opposed the Commission proposal 
according to which, they claimed, OU would have weakened EU energy companies 
against vertically integrated energy companies from the third countries (this was the 
position of, for example, Poland, Lithuania and the Czech Republic). The Council 
progress report statement about the third country aspect is therefore understandable. 
Most Member States agreed that limitations to TSOs’ ownership by companies from 
third countries should aim only to guarantee that those companies respect the same 
rules that apply to EU undertakings and not to discriminate against companies from 
third countries (Council of the European Union 2007a, 7).  This seems to reflect the 
concerns of the EU countries which had already secured bilateral agreements with 
third-country suppliers, such as Austria and Germany (Gutiérrez and Kostadinova 
2008).  The report also states that Member States agreed that further discussion was 
required on the nature and the criteria of the agreement enabling control by third 
country undertakings. More precisely, Member States required more guarantees about 
the agreement which, according to the Commission proposal, was needed to enable 
control by third country undertakings. What has been mentioned so far suggests that 
Member States opposing OU feared that it might have allowed third country 




companies to control network operations in the EU; Member States in favour of OU, 
in turn, did not have that concern.  
Member States’ requests for further discussion on the third country aspect can also be 
seen as a control mechanism through which the Member States wanted to make sure 
that the final Directive would have reflected their preferences. Stressing that no 
discrimination should have been made against companies from third countries and 
requiring further discussion on the nature and criteria of the agreement enabling third 
countries to control undertaking, Member States aimed to shape the legislation 
according to their preferences. This point will be revisited in the coming subsections.  
The preferences among the Member States therefore were so heterogeneous that the 
Council could not reach a common position (Council of the European Union 2007a, 
07). Rather, Member States stressed some points needing further discussion, such as 
the third country aspect, making use of their control mechanism to direct the legislative 
process. The countries opposing both OU and ISO called for “another alternative 
ensuring a more effective unbundling without interfering with property rights and in 
line with the European Council conclusions” (Ibid). The Presidency therefore invited 
those countries to present a concrete alternative which is analysed more in depth in the 
next subsection.  
5.4.4. The “third way” 
Accepting the invitation of the Council to propose an alternative to OU and ISO, on 
29 January 2008, eight Member States – Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Latvia, 
Luxembourg and Slovakia – sent a letter to the President of the ITRE Committee, to 
the President of the Energy Council, and to the Energy Commissioner. The letter – 
also known as “third option letter” - presented an alternative position for ensuring an 
effective separation of production and supply and management of the energy 
distribution networks (Représentation Permanente de la France auprès de l’Union 
Européenne 2008). The core argument of these Member States was that competition 
could be achieved without full OU or a third-party oversight (ISO) as proposed by the 
Commission. On the contrary, they proposed an alternative – Effective and Efficient 
Unbundling (EEU) – with a number of safeguards concerning the independence, 




management and investment decisions of the TSOs. The “third option letter” therefore, 
proposed provisions imposing strict obligations to be implemented and monitored by 
compliance officers and public authorities. The organisational framework, therefore, 
was to be implemented and controlled in each respective Member State. Accordingly, 
third country provisions on network investments were not required. This letter reflects 
specific preferences of the eight signatory Member States. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter (5.3.1.), Member States proposing EEU wanted a system that would be 
implemented and controlled at national level.  
What is important to stress is the way in which these Member States tried to influence 
the legislative process. The letter, sent to the ITRE Committee and DG Energy, can be 
seen as a manifest attempt to affect and control the legislative process. In PA terms, 
the letter can be seen as a particular control mechanism. Using an informal tool – a 
letter, which is not foreseen by the formal legislative procedure – these Member States 
made their preferences known to the Council, the Parliament and the Commission. It 
is also remarkable that the letter was sent by the Permanent Representation of France 
because France was the real leader of the opposition against the Commission proposal. 
Germany, an ally, and other smaller Member States were also dragged into it. This was 
noted by an official working in a Permanent Representation of a country which did not 
sign the third option letter: “it was a very tough negotiation and it was actually against 
the Commission, it was France leading the pack against the Commission supported by 
Germany” (Interview 10).  
In the meantime, the debate in the Council went on and unbundling was again on the 
agenda in the 2854th meeting on 28 February 2008. As stated by a Summary provided 
by the Council, delegations still voiced “different opinions” concerning the 
Commission proposal; the third option presented by the eight Member States 
mentioned above was also taken into account. On that occasion, Member States could 
not reach a common position and agreed that further work in the Working Group and 
at Coreper was needed (Council of the European Union 2008a, 02). 
This sub-section has therefore stressed the role of the heterogeneity of preferences 
among the Member States (IV1) in the legislative process. Member States had to deal 




with a very opportunistic Commission proposal that did not really take into account 
the variety of situations existing in each State but instead only proposed a full OU as 
first option. The preferences among the Member States were so divergent that 
achieving a common position in the Council was impossible. France and Germany 
emerged as the most active Member States leading the opposition against the 
Commission’s proposal and dragging other smaller States with them. This point seems 
to confirm the hypothesis mentioned earlier in this thesis (3.5.) that when the agent has 
preferences that are systematically different from those of the principals, conflict 
situations might arise (Da Conceição 2010, 1110). As also stressed earlier (5.3.2), the 
preference of the Commission for OU was deemed to serve the interest of competence-
maximization as champion of liberalisation in the European energy market. France, 
however, had systematically different preferences as its energy gas market was 
dominated by vertically integrated companies such as Gaz de France, and OU would 
have forced those companies to sell their ownership rights. The fact that the 
Commission and a small group of very active Member States had different preferences 
created a conflict situation between the principals and the agent and strongly affected 
the Commission’s deviation from the preferences of the Member States. This sub-
section also indicates the usefulness of looking at a small subset of relevant Member 
States in order to compare the preferences of the principals with those of the agent. 
More precisely, the subsection suggests that the Member States presenting a third 
option were particularly active in opposing the Commission during the legislative 
process. This point will be revisited in the conclusion of this thesis (Chapter 8).   
5.4.5. The unexpected unbundling of German companies  
While France and Germany were leading a fight against the Commission proposal, 
German companies began, on their own initiative, to unbundle. This aspect is not 
covered in official documents. Media and interview data however confirm this point. 
On 28 February 2008, German energy giant E.ON made a proposal “to commit to sell 
its electricity transmission system network to an operator which would have no interest 
in the electricity generation and/or supply businesses" (EurActiv 2008). Similarly, on 
5 December 2008 RWE AG announced that it had “submitted a formal statement of 
commitment to the EU Commission to sell its German gas transmission network (TSO 




Gas)” (RWE AG 2008). RWE had ongoing proceedings with the Commission for non-
compliance with legal requirements for its gas business and decided in agreement with 
the Commission to bring those proceedings to a close (Ibid). 
The fact that German companies started to unbundle is also confirmed by interview 
data. One Permanent Representation official remarked how “during the negotiations, 
all of a sudden, the German companies decided to unbundle behind the back of 
Merkel” (Interview No 10). This was also confirmed by a German official who stated 
that Germany had some problems with unbundling at the beginning but then 
“companies had to unbundle because of financial restraints” (Interview 28).  
The question remains then about what the link between the official German position 
and their firms. According to secondary literature (Eikeland 2011), DG Competition 
(DG COMP)38 had started investigations and a court-filing against major companies 
such as Distrigaz, EdF, Suez-Electrabel and German E.ON, for breaching Community 
competition rules. Apparently, DG COMP “presented these companies with deals that 
would reduce fines for infringement of EU competition rules in return for the sell-off 
of their network business” (Ibid: 253). In doing so, DG COMP expected to weaken the 
incentives for the companies to lobby Member State governments and to provide 
leeway for other national forces to convince the governments to alter their stance 
(Ibid).  
Although interesting, the analysis above still says little about the dynamics between 
the Member States and the Commission and about the preferences informing the 
official German position. The analysis carried in this chapter suggests that the main 
Member State objecting to the Commission proposal was France, with Germany as 
ally. France and the Commission had opposite ideas as far as the market for gas and 
electricity was concerned. As can be inferred from the written contribution they 
presented to the Council, France feared that OU would have seriously weakened 
European gas marketing companies in their dealing with foreign producers (Council 
of the European Union 2007d, 07). The Commission’s proposal, instead, depicted 
                                                 
38 For the purpose of this research DG Competition is not an actor. It is mentioned in this sub-section in 
order to provide some information about the unbundling of German companies.  




quite a different scenario stressing the negative effects of vertically integrated 
companies in the EU internal energy markets (notably conflict of interests within 
vertically integrated companies, non-discriminatory access of information, and 
distorted investments incentives) (European Commission 2007c). Interview data 
suggests that France was the leader against unbundling, and that it had to work hard to 
come up with new proposals in order to lobby and get support for its position. 
According to a member of a Permanent Representation (Interview No 10) even after 
E.ON communicated its decision to unbundle, the German delegation kept supporting 
France:  
“the German official position remained: “we are against it” but behind 
their back they were doing it. So, in the end was France only who wanted 
something else”.  
Ultimately, only France was pushing for the third option. This research can say little 
about the reason for Germany’s decision to support France in a blocking minority 
against the Commission proposal, a point that could be investigated by further 
research. What is important, however, is the dynamic between the Member States and 
the Commission. With limited information about the reasons informing the German 
position, it can be assumed that in supporting France, Germany was probably receiving 
something in return, and was not harming its national companies.  More precisely, in 
pushing for a third option to be added in the final Directive, the latter would have left 
energy companies free to choose the options that would have suited them better.  
5.4.6. The Council’s broad agreement 
According to the documents of the European Legislative Observatory, “although not 
all Member States could agree with all elements of the package” the Council reached 
a “broad agreement on the essential elements” of the internal energy market package 
in June 2008 (Council of the European Union 2008b). The broad agreement included 
OU as the first option and “an option allowing for an independent transmission 
operator (ITO) […] in order to take account of cases where arrangements are in place 
for a transmission system that belongs to a vertically integrated undertaking, which 
guarantees more effective independence of the TSO” (Ibid). This wording seems to 
refer to countries like France and Germany in which vertically integrated companies 




own the transmission system. The ITO option, therefore, was developed as a 
compromise between the third option/EEU proposed in the letter of January 2008 and 
OU.  Data suggests that the compromise was the result of French pressure and 
opposition to the Commission proposal. As confirmed by an official of a Permanent 
Representation of a country in favour of OU, the French delegation had to work hard 
to come up with new proposals, lobbying and seeking support for ITO (Interview No 
10). In the end, ITO seems to be a variant of the “third way” (or third option). 
On the third country aspect, Member States argued that “irrespective of the option 
retained to achieve effective separation” the issue of third country control of networks 
needed to be addressed in a non-protectionist way, to make sure that these companies 
respected the same rules that apply to EU undertakings, and to address Member States’ 
concerns about third country control. The Council also highlighted its concern for 
“potential implications in Community competence and the handling of existing 
investment.” The Council therefore called for a text to provide the criteria against 
which investment from third countries would be assessed, in particular referring to EU 
security of supply (Council of the European Union 2008b). This passage suggests that 
the delegations that were concerned that companies from third countries could have 
control over networks within the EU, managed to insert “security of supply” as a 
criteria against which investment from third country would be assessed. This point is 
particularly meaningful as it stressed the external dimension that is of particular 
interest for this case study. The Directive was not limited to the EU internal energy 
market; once in force it would have consequences on the relations between the 
Member States and third countries, notably those supplying gas. It does not come as 
surprise then that Member States heavily dependent on gas from non-EU countries did 
the most to draft a Directive that would have protected their national interests as 
foreseen by the model in this thesis.  
The broad agreement reached by the Council in June 2008 then incorporated ITO as a 
third option. That means that the eight countries identified as the most relevant ones 
leading the opposition against the Commission managed to persuade the other 
delegations to include ITO as an option. On the third country aspect, this subsection 
has revealed that those countries that feared their companies would be weakened by 




companies from third countries, managed to insert “security of supply” as criteria 
against which investment from third country would be assessed.  
5.4.7. The debate in the Council: rejecting Parliament’s 
amendments 
The European Parliament adopted a legislative resolution on 9 July 2008. Firstly, the 
Parliament rejected the Commission’s ISO option and endorsed the ITO model. More 
precisely, the resolution confirmed its endorsement of a proposal based on a 
Commission compromise text involving the “creation of independent transmission 
system operators” (European Parliament 2008). The proposal incorporated some 
aspects of the “third option” proposed by some Member States that allowed a company 
to retain the ownership of pipelines, if its management is in the hands of a TSO with 
“effective decision-making rights”. However, in addition to the “third option,” it also 
introduced some further safeguards of these rights. Moreover, as far as the ITO option 
was concerned, the resolution of the Parliament required that an independent Trustee 
should be appointed by the regulatory authority to safeguard the independence of the 
TSOs from the vertically integrated undertakings. The Parliament rejected the ISO 
option, but endorsed the ITO model. 
After the European Parliament delivered its opinion at first reading on 9 July 2008 
(adopting 122 amendments to the Commission proposal), the Council did not approve 
the Parliament’s position and adopted a common position on 9 January 2009, 
communicating it together with a statement of its reasons to the European Parliament 
(European Council 2009, 09). There were two main points in the Council common 
position. Firstly, the Council confirmed its third option, the Independent Transmission 
Operator (ITO) “for the case a transmission system operator is part of a vertically 
integrated undertaking (VIU) at the entry into force of the Directive.” According to the 
Council, the three options were to be conceived on equal footing. Distinct from the 
resolution of the European Parliament, the Council did not expected any Trustee 
should be appointed, were ITO chosen as an option. Secondly, as far as the third 
country aspect was concerned, the common position introduced a new Article which 
ensured that TSOs of third countries have to respect the same unbundling rules as 
Community TSOs. The Article also introduced “security of energy supply of the 




Member States and the Community” as a criterion to be taken into account when 
deciding on a certification to be granted to third countries TSOs in order to operate on 
the network of a Member State. In addition, the main decision on certification was to 
remain with the national regulatory authorities while the Commission was asked to 
give its opinion (Council of the European Union 2009). 
Data suggests that the position of the Council reflected the heterogeneity of 
preferences among the Member States.  Firstly, the third option seems to be intended 
to accommodate the preferences of France. As stated by an official of a Permanent 
Representation supporting OU, “France got its ITO” (Interview No 10). Secondly, as 
far as the third country aspect is concerned, Member States made sure that TSOs of 
third countries had to respect the same unbundling rules as the transmission system 
operators of EU countries. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this clause was 
particularly important to countries heavily dependent on Russia’s Gazprom in 
particular. The concern for the influence of vertically integrated companies from the 
third countries on a liberalised EU market is apparent in several of the written 
contributions presented by the Member States to the Council, including those from 
Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic. These countries also attached 
particular importance to the security of Member States’ energy supply as a criterion to 
be taken into account when certification was to be granted to third countries’ TSOs. In 
addition, the fact that the main decision of certification had to remain with the national 
regulatory authority (and not with the Commission) can be seen as a control which 
Member States introduced. Member States seem to have tried to limit the role of the 
Commission in the certification phase. The proposal provided for a greater role for the 
Commission in establishing that the certification had to be notified to the Commission 
for it to examine it and, in case of doubts about its compatibility with the unbundling 
requirements, to decide to initiate proceedings (Art 7b (7)).  
5.4.8. The informal compromise, second reading and final act 
On 12 January 2009, the Commission issued a communication concerning the 
common position of the Council. According to the Commission, the common position 
of the Council contained “all the essential components of the Commission’s proposal” 
and could therefore be “generally supported” (European Commission 2009, 907).  The 




Commission endorsed the three options for effective unbundling but stressed that it 
continued to “regard ownership unbundling as the best solution.”  The Commission 
also stressed that it could accept the third option of ITO “as a part of an overall 
compromise” but made clear that that option “must not be weaker than the common 
position and contain the strongest possible features a political compromise will allow.” 
The Commission also accepted that the common position removed the binding 
oversight role of the Commission under the certification procedure. Indeed, under all 
the three options, the TSO has to be certified by the national regulator that only has an 
obligation to “take the utmost account” of the Commission’s positions. On the so-
called “third country clause” the Commission deemed the common position 
“acceptable as part of an overall proposal.” The Commission accepted that an 
agreement with a third country was no longer a prerequisite to allow control by an 
investor from the third country concerned. More simply, under the certification 
procedure, Member States have to ensure compliance with any of the three unbundling 
options and “to refuse certification if this put at risk the security of supply of the 
Member States concerned or the Community” (Ibid). 
Given that the Council and the European Parliament had different opinions on the 
proposal, informal talks were held between the Council, the European Parliament and 
the Commission, with a view to reaching agreement at second reading. At its sitting 
on 22 April 2009, the Parliament adopted, at second reading, amendments to the 
common position. According to the Council, those amendments reflected the 
compromise agreement between the three institutions and were accepted (European 
Council 2009, 1).  The Council adopted all the European Parliament amendments on 
25 June 2006 and the final act was published in the Official Journal on 14 August 
2009. The main points of the final Directive are as follows. Firstly, Member States can 
choose between three options for separating supply and production activities from 
network operations: a) full ownership unbundling; b) the independent system operator 
(ISO); and c) the independent transmission operator (ITO). The Member States then 
did manage to add a third option to the Commission’s original proposal which 
identified OU as best option and ISO as an alternative option. Moreover, as far as ITO 
is concerned, the Directive does not require any Trustee as was proposed as an 




alternative by the European Parliament in first reading. Secondly, some important 
changes concerned the third country aspect. The first one was that Article 11 – on 
certification of TSOs in relation to third countries – does not foresee any agreement 
between the EU and the third country as was outlined in the Commission’s proposal. 
Moreover, Member States managed to include security of supply as a criterion to be 
taken into account when granting certification. Finally, certification is principally 
dependent on the regulatory authority and less on the Commission, again a distinction 
from what was in the Commission’s original proposal.  
The final Directive then, seems to suggest that the Member States managed to affect 
the legislative process and to have most of their preferences reflected in the final 
Directive. Data analysed in this chapter provides some evidence in support of 
hypotheses 2 and 3. The preference heterogeneity among the principals (IV1) seems 
to explain, at least partly, the deviation of the Commission from the preferences of the 
Member States. It appears that the Commission took advantages in the variety of 
preferences amongst the Member States to push forward an ambitious proposal 
reflecting its own preferences. By the same token, the heterogeneity of preferences 
between the Commission and the Member States seems to provide some explanation 
for the deviation of the Commission from the preferences of the Member States.  
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed a case study on Directive 2009/73/EC on common rules for 
the internal market in gas. The analysis indicated that the Member States had 
heterogeneous preferences on unbundling (IV1). More precisely, some of them were 
in favour of OU as proposed by the Commission (a), others proposed a third option, 
EEU (b) and some of them were in favour of the status quo, claiming that no new 
legislation was needed (c). The fact that the Member States had heterogeneous 
preferences has allowed testing of the second hypothesis of this thesis according to 
which, when the preferences among the principals are heterogeneous, the agent is 
more likely to try to deviate from preferences of the principals (H2). The analysis 
shows that that the Commission did indeed deviate from the preferences of the 
principals potentially exploiting the fact that they had different preferences on 
unbundling. The Commission seemed to behave opportunistically, issuing a proposal 




very close to its own preferences and proposing OU as the best option to be chosen by 
the Member States and ISO as second option.  
In order to compare the heterogeneous preferences of the principals (IV2) to those of 
the agent, this chapter has used an empirically-informed subset of Member States 
sharing homogenous preferences. The eight countries proposing a third option - 
France, Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Luxembourg, Latvia and Slovakia -  were 
chosen as a subset given their particular relevance for this case study. Indeed, France 
and Germany led a real battle against the Commission proposal, managing eventually 
to include a third option in the final Directive. These two countries also managed to 
attract other smaller countries in opposing the Commission. Moreover, this chapter has 
sought to illustrate the convenience of using the small subset as analytical device 
because these Member States managed to affect the legislative process in opposing the 
Commission’s proposal. This case study has tested whether, when the preferences 
between the principals and the agent are heterogeneous, the agent is more likely to try 
to deviate from the preferences of the principals (H3). The analysis in this chapter has 
suggested that – pushing forward a proposal for OU and defending OU throughout the 
legislative process – the Commission deviated from the preferences of the Member 
States. 
To which of the typologies of deviation described earlier in this thesis (3.2.) can this 
case study then be ascribed? As mentioned earlier in this section, the chapter has 
shown that the Commission deviated from Member States’ preferences likely pursuing 
its own interests and – consequently – creating a conflict situation with the principals. 
The Commission acted in an opportunistic way and instead of proposing an unbundling 
which would have taken into account differences in the markets of the several Member 
States, put forward its preferred option which was essentially a battle against vertically 
integrated companies. That the Commission wanted to end the dominant position of 
vertically integrated companies, is also clear in its proposal (COM (2007) 529). 
Describing the shortcoming of situations in which a legal unbundling had been chosen 
(rather than an ownership one), the Commission points out the conflict of interests 
inherent to vertically integrated companies as the core problem. The preference of the 




Commission was intended to serve the interest of competence-maximization as the 
“champion of liberalisation” in the energy market.39 
This chapter has also shown what control mechanisms Member States can use in order 
to control the agent and influence the legislative process. Possibly the most interesting 
control mechanism for the purpose of this chapter is the third option letter, signed by 
the eight Member States which proposed EEU as an alternative to OU and ISO. Other 
control mechanisms are set in the Directive. Member States concerned that unbundling 
could have weakened the position of their companies vis-à-vis companies from third 
countries, managed to include several criteria according to which the certification was 
to be given to a non-EU company operating within the EU. Firstly, Member States 
ensured that the certification was to be given in the first instance by the national 
authority and not by the Commission as outlined in the proposal. This point is 
particularly relevant as the control of the process was kept at national level. Secondly, 
Member States managed to introduce energy security as a criterion to be taken into 
account when deciding whether to award certification or not. This latter point was 
clearly meant to please the Member States heavily dependent from one single external 
supplier.  
The next two chapters consider the second way in which the external dimension of the 
internal energy market manifests itself (see section 3.2): initiatives aimed at the 
creation of an integrated energy market with third countries. These are the Energy 
Community Treaty (Chapter 6) and the Energy Charter Treaty (Chapter 7). .
                                                 
39 The Commission has been acting – both internally and externally - to make sure that the EU legislation 
on energy is implemented. Internally, since September 2011, the Commission launched 19 infringement 
case for non-transposition of the Directive 2009/72/EC (on electricity) and 19 cases for non-
transposition of Directive 2009/73/EC (on gas)(EC 2012b). By 14 October 2012, only 12 cases had 
been closed and the rest of the proceedings were ongoing (Ibid). In 2012 and early 2013, reasoned 
opinions were sent to 16 Member States who still had not completed the transition (DG Energy 2014). 
At the end of 2012 and in the beginning of 2013, a number of Member States were referred to Court: 
Poland, Slovenia, Finland, Bulgaria, Estonia, the UK and Romania (Ibid). Externally, on 4 September 
2012, the Commission also opened formal proceeding against Gazprom itself (Sartori 2013). The 
Commission wanted to investigate whether Gazprom “might be hindering competition in Central and 
Eastern European gas markets, in breach of EU antitrust rules” (EC 2012a). This seems to confirm that 
the interest – or fundamental goal of the Commission – is competence-maximization in terms of 
liberalization of the energy market. 
 










6.1.  Introduction 
The two previous chapters examined two legislative processes concerning the internal 
energy market and its external dimension.  This chapter and the next one in turn look 
at another aspect of the external dimension of the EU internal energy market (see 
section 3.2.): initiatives aiming at the creation of an integrated energy market with 
third countries. This chapter analyses the Energy Community Treaty (EnCT) which 
was signed in October 2005 and established an international organisation in which the 
EU40 – representing all its Member States – is Party to the Treaty together with other 
Contracting Parties which are countries from South East Europe (SEE) and Black Sea 
(Energy Community 2006c).41 The EnCT extends the EU internal energy policy to the 
other Contracting Parties on the ground of a legally binding framework.  
This case is expected to contribute to the research question of this thesis by looking at 
the behaviour of the Commission in the EnCT. The chapter defines the preference 
alignment among the principals as homogeneous (IV1) because the Member States had 
similar preferences for a common market in energy with SEE. Homogeneous is also 
defined as the preference alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2) as the 
                                                 
40 The Energy Community Treaty was signed in 2005 – when the European Community (EC) had legal 
personality - and is still ongoing today. Since 2009, however, the European Union (EU) has gained the 
status of legal personality. For the purpose of this chapter then, both the acronyms EC and EU will be 
used. The expression EC/EU is also used. 
41 The geographic scope of the EnCT has been indicated with several terms such as South East Europe, 
Western Balkans, and Black Sea Region. This thesis will mainly use the term South East Europe (SEE); 
the term Western Balkans will be also used as a synonym.  




chapter highlights that the Commission and the Member States shared the same 
preference on this case.   
Consequently, the chapter tests the following hypotheses: when the preferences among 
the principals are homogenous, the agent is less likely to try to deviate from the 
preferences of the principals (H1) and when the preferences between the principals 
and the agent are homogenous, the agent is less likely to try to deviate from the 
preferences of the principals (H4). Both hypotheses suggest that the deviation scenario 
is less likely to happen. This case therefore offers the opportunity to investigate 
whether other types of agent’s behaviour – such as responsive autonomy and 
compliance – might occur.  
6.2. Context  
The EnCT was signed by the European Community and nine Contracting Parties of 
South-East Europe (hereinafter SEE): Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Kosovo42. The aim of the 
EnCT is “to create a single regulatory space for trade in gas and electricity” (EnCT, 
preamble).   
The SEE had been the object of the European Community’s attention since the late 
1990s when the Stability Pact for Southern Europe was launched to strengthen the 
efforts of those countries in fostering peace, democracy, respect for human rights and 
economic prosperity (“Stability Pact” 2014). The region had faced violent wars in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991-1995) and Kosovo (1999). As a consequence, the area 
suffered from many political, economic and social issues. Concerning energy, in the 
late 1990s, SEE lacked a unified energy system. In the framework of an ongoing 
cooperation with the European Community, SEE countries committed to adjust their 
legislation to be in line with EC law in energy (Karova 2009). The long-term objective 
was the creation of a regional market that would be integrated with the EC internal 
energy market (Furfari 2012).  
                                                 
42 The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo pursuant of the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1244 (hereinafter Kosovo).  




This section, therefore, will focus on the main steps leading to the conclusion of the 
EnCT in October 2005. Subsequently, the institutional framework of the EnCT and 
the decision-making process will be described.  
6.2.1. Milestones  
The origin of the EnCT is generally linked to the so called Athens Process to indicate 
the institutions that were established by a first Memorandum of Understanding signed 
in November 2002 by Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, 
Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Kosovo. The Athens Memorandum set up a 
number of institutions: the Ministerial Council, the Permanent High Level Group 
(PHLG) and the South East Europe Electricity Regulation Forum (Athens Forum). The 
aim of the memorandum was to create a regional energy market in SEE which would 
eventually be integrated into the EC energy market (Karova 2009). The Memorandum, 
however, has to be seen in a broader context.  
In 1999, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was launched to support SEE 
countries in fostering peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic 
prosperity.43 The Stability Pact provided a framework to stimulate regional co-
operation and expedite integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.  In June 
1999, the European Council reaffirmed its willingness to support the countries in the 
Western Balkans44 and to take the lead in the implementation of the Stability Pact 
(European Council 1999).  The European Council held on 19-20 June 2000 stressed 
its objective of   
“the fullest possible integration of the countries of the region into the political 
and economic mainstream of Europe through the Stabilisation and Association 
process, political dialogue, liberalisation of trade and cooperation in Justice 
and Home Affairs” (European Council 2000a).  
The European Council also highlighted that all the countries concerned were “potential 
candidates for EU membership” (Ibid).  The Southeast Europe Summit, held in Zagreb 
in November 2000 also confirmed the “European perspective of the countries 
                                                 
43 For more information on the stability pact see http://www.stabilitypact.org/ 
44 For the purpose of this chapter the terms Western Balkans and South-East Europe (SEE) are used 
interchangeably.  




participating in the stabilisation and association process and their status as potential 
candidates for membership” (European Council 2000b). In order to reach these 
objectives, the Commission committed to launch a Community aid programme called 
CARDS45 (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratisation and 
Stabilisation) (Ibid).  
It was in this framework that the first Athens Memorandum was signed. Having a clear 
perspective for membership in the European Union, the countries from SEE began a 
process of reforms in the energy sector (Karova 2009). By signing the first Athens 
Memorandum in 2002, nine SEE countries accepted the political obligation to adjust 
their legislation to the EC law in the energy sphere (Ibid, 9). The Commission and the 
Stability Pact acted as sponsors. Support for the Athens Process was expressed by the 
Council of the European Union (Council of the European Union 2003) and the 
European Council (European Council 2003) on several occasions. The EU-Western 
Balkans summit held in Thessaloniki on 19 June 2003 also confirmed its support for 
the Athens Process (European Council 2003). A second Memorandum was signed in 
December 2003, aimed at expanding the cooperation from the electricity to the gas 
sector (Karova 2009, 9). In the Athens Memorandum of 2003, the SEE countries also 
committed to replace the latter with a legally binding agreement, which thus was the 
Treaty establishing the Energy Community (EnCT), signed on 25 October 2005 (Ibid, 
10).  
6.2.2. The institutional framework of the EnCT 
The Energy Community is “an international organisation dealing with energy policy” 
(Energy Community 2006c). The organisation was established by an international law 
treaty and entered into force in July 2006. When it comes to the members of the Treaty, 
a distinction has to be made between Parties, Observers and Participants. At present, 
the Parties of the Treaty are the European Union and eight Contracting Parties, notably: 
                                                 
45 The CARDS programme covers in particular: reconstruction; stabilisation of the region; aid for the 
return of refugees and displaced persons; support for democracy, the rule of law, human and minority 
rights, civil society, independent media and the fight against organised crime; the development of a 
sustainable market-oriented economy; poverty reduction, gender equality, education and training, and 
environmental rehabilitation; regional, transnational, international and interregional cooperation 
between the recipient countries and the Union and other countries of the region (European Commission 
2007b) 




Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, FYR of Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine. 46 There are four Observer states: Armenia, Georgia, 
Norway and Turkey.47 Finally, participant status is held by nineteen EU Member States 
which have a “special bond” with the EnCT (European Commission 2011f, 2). This 
status can be obtained by any EU Member State. As Members of the EU, participants 
have an obligation to comply with the acquis communautaire. In addition, participants 
may take part in all institutional meetings of the Energy Community, but they cannot 
vote.  
The EnCT reconfirmed the institutional settings that had been established by the 
Athens Process. The Energy Community relies on four institutions and a Forum on 
Electricity, Gas, Oil and Social (Energy Community 2006a). The two decision-making 
institutions are the Ministerial Council and the Permanent High Level Group (PHLG). 
Moreover, a Regulatory Board (ECRB) and a Secretariat have been established.  
The Ministerial Council48 is composed of one representative of each Contracting Party 
and two representatives of the EU. The EU is represented by a Council representative 
who is designated by the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council,49 and a 
Commission representative (see Art. 3, Decision 2006/500/EC). Non-voting 
representatives of each Participant may also take part in the meetings of the Ministerial 
Council. As the executive organ of the Energy Community, the Ministerial Council 
                                                 
46 This information is updated to 1 July 2013. When the Treaty was signed in 2005 the Parties were 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, the FYR of Macedonia, Romania, 
Serbia and UNMIK on behalf of Kosovo. Ukraine and Moldova joined the Energy Community in 
December 2009. Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union in 2007 and their status was changed 
to that of Participants. The same happened with Croatia in July 2013. (See:  (Energy Community 2006b) 
and (Energy Community 2006a) 
47 Georgia is in the process of joining the Energy Community as a full member. 
48 The Ministerial Council has not to be confused with the Council of the European Union, neither with 
the European Council. For the purpose of this chapter, the term Ministerial Council refers to the 
institution part of the Energy Community. The term Council will be used as to refer to the Council of 
the European Union, which is composed of national ministers from each EU country. The term 
European Council will be used to refer to the institution composed by Heads of State or Government of 
the Member States.  
49 The Decision also states that “when this Member State designates as the Council representative a 
representative of one of the Member States directly affected by Title III of the Energy Community 
Treaty, it shall do so on the basis of a rotation between those Member States” (Decision 2006/500/EC, 
Art. 3(1)).  




has the task of providing general policy guidelines, taking measures and adopting 
procedural acts.  
The Permanent High Level Group (PHLG) is composed of one representative of each 
Contracting Party and two representatives of the EU. As for the Ministerial Council, 
the EU is represented by a Council representative and a Commission representative. 
Moreover, one non-voting representative of each Participant may also take part in the 
meetings. The PHLG is more closely involved in the Energy Community’s day-to-day 
work performing tasks such as preparing the work of the Ministerial Council, giving 
assent to technical assistance requests made by international donors, reporting to the 
Ministerial Council on progress made toward achievement of the objectives of the 
Treaty, and taking measures if so empowered by the Ministerial Council.50  
The Secretariat is a permanent body based in Vienna. It is mainly responsible for 
providing administrative support to the other EnCT institutions and fora. Finally, the 
Energy Community Regulatory Board (ECRB) acts as coordination platform for the 
exchange of knowledge and the development of best practice for regulated electricity 
and gas markets.  
6.2.3. The decision-making process 
Article 3 of the EnCT establishes a “three-tier structure”, also referred to as the 
Treaty’s concentric circles (Energy Community 2006a).  Each circle deals with a 
particular area of the purpose of the Treaty. The EnCT foresees different decision-
making processes according to which the Ministerial Council, the Permanent High 
Level Group and the Regulatory Board shall act or take measures.  
The first circle is related to Title II the Extension of the acquis communautaire of the 
EnCT. This title addresses only the Contracting Parties that have committed to 
implement core parts of the EU acquis communautaire. Measures are taken based on 
a proposal from the European Commission; the European Commission may alter or 
                                                 
50 The PHLG is also responsible for adopting Procedural Acts, not involving the conferral of tasks, 
powers or obligations on other institutions of the Energy Community; discussing the development of 
the acquis communautaire described in Title II on the basis of a report that the European Commission 
shall submit on a regular basis. 




withdraw its proposal at any time (Art. 79); each Contracting Party has one vote 
(Article 80) and the three institutions act by a majority of the votes cast (Art. 81). 
The second circle is related to Title III mechanism for operation of Network Energy 
Markets. This title addresses not only the Contracting Parties but also seven EU 
Member States connected to the region, which are Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Romania and Slovenia. The aim of this circle is to create mechanisms for long-
distance transportation of Network Energy51, to adopt security of supply statements 
and to promote high levels of energy provisions to citizens. Measures are taken based 
on a proposal from a Party or the Secretariat (Art. 82) and require two third majority 
of the votes cast, including a positive vote from the EU (Art. 84).  
Finally, the third circle is related to Title III the Creation of a Single Energy Market 
which addresses the Contracting Parties and the entire EU. It provides for the free 
movement of network energy and aims to create a single energy market through the 
adoption of further measures. Measures are taken from a proposal from a Party (Art. 
84) and require unanimity (Art. 85).  
The milestones leading to the signing of the EnCT, together with its institutional 
structure and decision-making process, indicate why this case is relevant and 
appropriate for analysis.  Firstly, the EnCT has a clear external dimension, because it 
is a case of EU external representation on energy:  the EU represents its Member States 
in an international organisation. More precisely, in the institutions of the Energy 
Community, the EU is represented by a representative of the Council and a 
representative of the Commission. This means that EU positions need to be drafted 
with the Member States before the meetings in the Energy Community take place. 
Accordingly, this case study allows the analysis of the decision-making process for the 
external representation of the EU in international organisations.  Secondly, the case 
also satisfies the second selection criterion as it offers some useful variation across the 
                                                 
51 According to the EnCT ’Network Energy’ shall be understood as to include the oil sector, i.e. supply, 
trade, processing and transmission of crude oil and petroleum products falling within the scope of the 
directive 2006/67/EC and the related pipelines, storage, refineries and import/export facilities (See 
Energy Community 2013, 14).  
 




independent variables and the dependent variables. The way these variables manifest 
themselves empirically is discussed in the next section. 
6.3. Identifying the independent variables 
This section determines the preference alignment among the principals (IV1) and the 
preference alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2) as far as the EnCT is 
concerned. As with previous chapters, the preferences of the Commission are 
determined first. The section then turns to the preferences of the Member States. 
Finally, the former are compared to the latter. In contrast to previous chapters however, 
this case study suggests that the preferences of the Commission and those of the 
Member States are homogeneous. The interests these preferences are supposed to 
serve however, are different. Particular attention will therefore be devoted to the 
interests.  
6.3.1. European Commission. Looking for a “unified EU 
representation and EU position” 
This section identifies the preferences of the Commission on the EnCT. As mentioned 
earlier (section 6.2.), the Commission showed its commitment to a common energy 
market with the Western Balkans since the Athens Memoranda were signed in 2002. 
In 2003, the Commission stated its endeavour to “come forward with proposal for 
extending the internal energy market to the region as a whole [Western Balkans]” 
(European Commission 2003a, 6). Along the same lines, through its Communication 
on the development of energy policy for the enlarged European Union, its neighbours 
and partner countries, the Commission stated that it had brought forward proposals 
for the creation of a regional electricity market in South East Europe (SEE) and that a 
similar gas plan would also be presented in the future (European Commission 2003b, 
2). In its Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing of the Energy Community 
Treaty (COM (2005) 435 final), the Commission stated that the “Treaty creates an 
internal energy market between the European Community and the non-EU countries 
of the region”. Moreover, the EnCT “enables the setting up of a regulatory framework 
for the EU countries of the region. It provides for the implementation of the relevant 
acquis communautaire on energy environment, competition and renewables for the 
non-EU countries of the region” (Ibid). Official documents therefore suggest that the 




Commission had a preference for a an internal energy market between the EU and SEE 
countries, setting up a regulatory framework to provide for the implementation of the 
EU acquis on energy.  
Interview data is also useful for identifying the Commission’s preferences on the 
EnCT. According to an official working in the Commission who followed the process 
closely, the Treaty was conceived in a “pre-accession perspective” (Interview No 1) 
which meant that the point of reference for the establishment of rules and mechanisms 
was EU legislation (Ibid). This pre-accession perspective was also confirmed by an 
official working within DG Enlargement who stated that the latter “subcontracts work 
to the Energy Community” (Interview No 13).52 According to this interviewee, 
between the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s,  it became clear that the 
energy system of the Balkan countries, which had been integrated before the war, had 
to be reconstructed and SEE countries had to be “recomposed as regional market” 
(Ibid). In that context, the Commission wanted to promote a regulatory framework in 
the Western Balkans which was in line with EU legislation. The latter was supposed 
to help the Commission in reaching two objectives. In the short term, a common 
regulatory framework with the SEE would have facilitated relationship between the 
EU and its neighbours. In the long-term, it would have facilitated the accession of 
those countries to the EU (accession requires huge efforts for candidate countries and 
several years of alignment to the EU acquis). Beginning that alignment beforehand 
therefore, would be convenient for both the Commission and the candidate countries 
(Interview No 4).   
Secondly, interview data suggests that the Commission looked at the EnCT as a tool 
for a unified EC/EU representation and still does. As stated by Karova (2009, 14), “it 
seems that by enlarging the European internal energy market to SEE countries, the 
Commission tries also to increase the potential bargaining power of the EU vis-à-vis 
its external energy partners.” An official working with DG Energy stated that the EnCT 
gave a “unified EU representation and EU position” (Interview No 1) for two main 
reasons. The first one is that only the EU as a whole is party of the EnCT, and not the 
                                                 
52 DG Enlargement is not considered as an actor for the purpose of this research but as a source of 
information.  




Member States; this gave the Commission direct power. The second reason was 
expressed as follows: 
“[The EnCT] mainly deals with EU legislation. The question of 
competence is extremely clear:  if we are discussing the implementation of 
the EU Renewable Energy Directive in this or that Energy Community 
instance, we do not need to have any mandate from the Council because 
we have the mandate directly from our EU Treaty that the European 
Commission ensures the external representation of the EU except on cases 
of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) […]” (Ibid).  
Along the same lines, the Commission also continues to see the EnCT as an 
opportunity to play a leading role in the region. As stated by an official working within 
DG Energy:  
“[…] because we [DG Energy] are not, of course, the only ones to come 
and support reforms in these countries [SEE], it is important that the 
Energy Community is the single reference when you have the World Bank 
coming in and saying “look I want to support […] energy efficiency”.   It 
is very important that it is energy efficiency as we understand it, based on 
EU legislation” (Ibid). 
Official documents and data interviews seem to suggest that the Commission had a 
preference for a common energy market with SEE countries. More specifically, the 
Commission had a preference for extending the EU energy acquis to those countries 
adopting a common regulatory framework. As indicated so far, there seemed to be 
three main reasons underpinning the preferences of the Commission. Firstly, the 
extension of the EU internal energy market to the SEE countries was meant to facilitate 
the integration of those countries that were expected to seek accession to the EU. 
Having those countries implementing EU legislation on energy before accession was 
intended to contribute to their effective integration in the EU internal energy market. 
Secondly, the EnCT was an opportunity for the Commission to exercise unified 
external representation because the EC/EU, represented by the Commission (and not 
the Member States), is Party to the Treaty. Additionally, the content of the EnCT is 
EU legislation, which is a competence of the Commission. Having a unified 
representation and position would allow the Commission to reach its objectives in the 
external dimension of the EU internal energy market: extending the EU energy law to 
the SEE. Both the extension of the acquis to the SEE countries and the unified external 




representation are meant to serve the Commission’s interest for competence-
maximization. For the Commission, the EnCT was an opportunity to increase its 
competence in the external dimension of the EU internal energy market. This is 
because the EnCT would give the Commission not only the opportunity to represent 
the EC/EU in international fora but also the opportunity to play a role in the region and 
export the EU acquis on energy.  
To summarise therefore, official documents and interview data suggest that the 
Commission had a preference for an internal energy market between the EU and SEE 
countries, setting up a regulatory framework providing for the implementation of the 
EU acquis on energy. This preference was meant to serve the interest for competence-
maximization.   
6.3.2. Preference alignment among the principals (IV1): 
looking for a common market in energy with SEE 
Data does not seem to indicate any heterogeneity of preferences among the principals. 
As will be analysed in more depth in the next section on process- tracing (6.4.), the 
EnCT seems to be an initiative of the Commission to which Member States granted 
their support. Official documents, secondary data and interview data do not seem to 
reveal any strong heterogeneity of preferences existing among the Member States. 
Data suggests that it is sensible to argue that the preferences among the principals can 
be defined as homogenous, as all Member States would equally benefit from the SEE 
implementing the EU energy acquis. More precisely, having the SEE countries 
implementing EU legislation on energy would have allowed a common regulatory 
framework for cooperation in the energy sector. This kind of scenario would have 
benefitted Member States by opening opportunities of trade and cooperation with those 
countries adopting regulatory frameworks provided by EU law. In addition, the EnCT 
would not have challenged Member States’ national energy polices because the Treaty 
would only have extended existing EU legislation to the SEE countries. This suggests 
that Member States’ preference for a common market in energy with SEE was in line 
with, or at least not against,  their interest for maintaining control over energy policy.  




Interview data emphasises that the preference for the EnCT was shared by small as 
well as large Member States and so was by countries more dependent as well as less 
dependent on external energy sources. As stated by an interviewee of a country not 
heavily-dependent on energy coming from abroad:  
“in general, we support the [Energy] Community, we support the 
Commission approach, but we don’t have a very harsh position in this I 
think, the Commission is doing well […] we follow most time the 
Commission line, we don’t have very strong position” (Interview No 12).  
Similarly, a representative of a large Member State argued that the EnCT is welcomed 
as a way to “help […] neighbouring countries to implement the acquis so to get ready 
for the accession” (Interview No 28). 
In summary therefore, data suggests that Member States had homogeneous 
preferences for a common energy market with SEE countries. That preference was 
expected to serve their interest for control over energy policy.  Neither the official EU 
documents nor the media suggest any significant divergence among Member State as 
far as the EnCT is concerned. For the purpose of this chapter then, the preference 
alignment among the Member States is defined as homogeneous.  
6.3.3. Preference alignment between the principals and the 
agent (IV2) 
This section identifies the preference alignment between the principals and the agent 
as homogeneous: the Member States and the Commission both had a preference for a 
common energy market with the SEE countries. The interest underpinning these 
preferences however, was different. On the one hand, the Member States wanted a 
common regulatory framework under the EnCT for the sake of their own national 
energy policies in order to increase the security of energy supply. On the other hand, 
the Commission saw in the Treaty the opportunity to maximize its competences 
through playing a role in preparing SEE countries for accession and ensuring a unified 
external representation. As a result, the Commission was the main driving force for 




the Energy Community, while the Member States simply endorsed the initiative. This 
factor will be explained in the next section on process tracing (6.4).  
It is therefore reasonable to look at Member States’ preferences as the endorsement of 
something proposed by the Commission: a common energy market with SEE 
countries. Why did the Member States support the EnCT? According to an official 
working in DG Energy, “the Energy Community was supported by Member States 
because it did not imply any negative implication on their own energy choices – the 
nuclear – and on their major companies. As long as you do not touch the nuclear and 
the major companies there is always room for cooperation” (Interview No 4). 
The positive rationale behind Member States’ support is that the EnCT was expected 
to guarantee the security of supply. As stated by the President-in-Office of the Council 
at that time, Mr Hans Winkler, during the debate on the EnCT in the European 
Parliament, the Council considers the EnCT as an important instrument for “security 
of the electricity and gas supply to the European Community” (European Parliament 
2006b).  Providing more guarantees of security of supply, Member States aimed to 
serve their national energy policies.  
6.4. Tracing the process towards the EnCT and 
observing the Commission’s behaviour in the 
EnCT 
This section analyses two main events related to the EnCT. The first is the signing of 
the EnCT and the related process of the negotiation of the Treaty itself between the 
Commission and the SEE countries. The second concerns the conclusion of the Treaty, 
which is the process through which the EnCT is approved on behalf of the EC/EU and 
the rules on how an EC/EU position is to be taken in the institutions created by the 
EnCT are established. More precisely, this section looks at how the homogeneity of 
preferences among the principals (IV1) and the homogeneity of preferences between 
the principals and the agent (IV2) affected the Commission behaviour.  
This section tests two hypotheses developed earlier in this thesis (3.5.): when the 
preferences among the principals are homogenous, the agent is less likely to try to 
deviate from the preferences of the principals (H1) and when the preferences between 




the principals and the agent are homogenous, the agent is less likely to try to deviate 
from the preferences of the principals (H4). This case study therefore does not expect 
the Commission to deviate from the preferences of the Member States because the 
preferences among the principals are homogeneous and so are the preferences between 
the principals and the agent.  
This section is structured as follows: a first sub-section looks at the Commission as a 
negotiator of the EnCT, while a second-subsection looks at the Commission as the 
actual external representative of the EC/EU in the institutions created by the EnCT.  
6.4.1. The Commission as negotiator 
The mandate to negotiate the EnCT 
The Council Decision of 17 May 2004 gave the Commission the mandate to negotiate 
a treaty establishing an Energy Community with the SEE countries (Albania, Bulgaria, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Turkey, 
and Kosovo). 
A Council official described this mandate as “more open” than others (Interview No 
17). This was because the Energy Community wanted to provide a vehicle for a regular 
implementation of the energy legislative framework in SEE countries. The mandate 
therefore had to be open in order that any development in the EC/EU energy acquis 
could be implemented in SEE countries (Ibid). Interview data suggests that both the 
Commission and the Member States saw the EnCT as a constantly developing tool 
intended to expand the EU energy acquis to SEE countries. More precisely, the EnCT 
has been described by a Council official as having an “evolving scope” (Ibid) and by 
a Commission official as a “living instrument” (Interview No 1). This explains why 
the EnCT is mainly focused on procedural elements such as institutions and dispute 
settlements, rather than on substance (Interview No 17). 
Interview data collected at the Council is particularly useful in understanding the 
negotiation process of the EnCT. According to a Council official “it went reasonably 
well in terms of reporting and allowing Member States to follow” (Interview No 17). 
This piece of data seems to suggest that the negotiation process developed without any 
major conflicting situation arising between the Commission and the Member States. 




None of data collected from various sources suggests that any conflictual situations 
existed between these actors during the negotiations of the EnCT. The absence of 
conflict during the negotiations on the EnCT might be explained by the circumstance 
that the Member States and the Commission had seemingly homogeneous preferences 
for a common energy market with SEE countries, and that they were both genuinely 
interested in realising this policy-choice, even if they intended to serve different 
interests. This chapter then provides some evidence for the hypothesis according to 
which the Commission is less likely to try to deviate from the preferences of the 
Member States (H4). This point will be revisited in the conclusion of this chapter.  
During the negotiation process, one of the “major concerns” of the Member States was 
to find a balance between controlling the Commission and guaranteeing the flexibility 
of the institutional framework of the EnCT (Ibid). Member States wanted to have some 
control over the institutions that were to be established by the EnCT and the 
mechanisms that would allow the EnCT to evolve (i.e. future legislation). This control, 
however, had to be balanced with the necessity of having flexible institutions. As was 
made clear by the aforementioned Council official:  
 “the major concern of Member States […] was to make sure that there is 
a balance between the Commission and the role of control of the Member 
States […]  and the difficulty was to achieve a sort of good balance 
between this sort of control but at the same time institutions that are 
flexible enough so that whatever something new has to be introduced, 
presented to those countries,  the Commission could do it in reasonably 
flexible way without having, for each and every dot, comma, to consult 
Member States” (Interview No 17) 
The need for a balance between delegation and control is one of the core topics of the 
PA literature. Principals need to give some discretion to the agent to assure the agent 
an optimal bargaining power. In the case of the negotiation of the EnCT, the 
Commission was given rather “open” mandate in order to sign the EnCT, i.e. they were 
given a mandate to negotiate the Treaty with the SEE countries itself. PA literature 
also indicates however that discretion has to be balanced to limit the preference and 
information advantages of the agent (Tallberg 2002). This point becomes clear when 
looking at the Decision for the conclusion of the EnCT by the European Community. 
This Decision established the rules which the Commission had to respect in its role as 




external representative in the institutions created by the EnCT. The Decision is 
analysed in depth in the next subsection.  
The Decision for the conclusion of the EnCT  
In September 2005, the Commission issued a two-fold proposal: one for a Decision on 
the signing and one for a Decision on the conclusion of the EnCT (European 
Commission 2005). Two months after the EnCT was signed, the Council adopted joint 
guidelines proposing several amendments to the Commission proposal on the 
conclusion of the Treaty. The amendments concerned the rules for the position to be 
taken by the EC/EU in the institutions created by the EnCT.  All the amendments were 
integrated in the final Decision 2006/500/EC (Council of the European Union 2005a). 
For the sake of clarity therefore, this section offers a simplified overview of the most 
significant amendments. Overall, three procedural amendments and some substance 
amendments are presented in this subsection and analysed in a principal-agent 
perspective. At the end of this subsection, table 6.1 summarises the main differences 
between the Commission proposal and the final Council Decision.  
A first important amendment concerned the position to be taken by the European 
Community within the institutions of the EnCT (Article 4). While the Commission 
proposal stated that those decisions were to be adopted by the Council by “qualified 
majority voting on a proposal from the Commission”, the amended version stated that 
they “shall be adopted by the Council acting in accordance with the relevant provisions 
of the Treaty establishing the European Community”, meaning unanimity or qualified 
majority voting.53 The decision under Article IV refers, in turn, to Title III and IV of 
the EnCT and not to Title II dealing with the extension of the acquis communautaire 
which concerns EU legislation. EU legislation is a competence of the Commission. 
Therefore, decisions taken in this domain do not need to be adopted by the Council.  
                                                 
53 The decisions to which Art. 4 refers were those “in Article 76 of the Energy Community Treaty 
pursuant to Articles 82, 84, 91, 92, 96, and 100”. Article 76 establishes general provisions for the 
Decision-making progress. Articles 82 and 84 deal with how measures are to be taken under Title III 
(Mechanism for the operation of network energy markets) and IV (Creation of a single energy market) 
respectively. Articles 91, 92 and 96 EnCT deal with the existence of breaches. Article 100 deals with 
Revision and Accession to the EnCT. 




The Council also added a paragraph to this Article stating that “Without prejudice to 
the relevant procedures of the Treaty establishing the European Community, before 
the Commission tables a proposal for a measure under Title III of the Energy 
Community Treaty, it shall duly consult the Member States directly affected by the 
proposal” (Art. 4(4)). As mentioned before, Title III deals with a mechanism for 
operation of network energy markets and, as far as the European Community is 
concerned, has a geographical scope limited to some countries neighbouring the 
Energy Community countries.  
By modifying the legislative proposal with the amendments above, the Member States 
wanted to ensure control over the process of the formulation of the positions to be 
taken by the European Community within the EnCT institutions. Thus, the Council 
wanted to have a say on the formulation of those positions and not simply adopt them 
by “qualified majority voting on a proposal from the Commission” (COM (2005) 435 
final).  
A second important amendment concerns Article 5 of the proposal. The Council 
deleted the provision in Art 5(3) ensuring the consultation of the European Parliament 
before adopting the position of the European Community, the so-called “consultation 
procedure”. During the debate in Parliament, the President-in-Office of the Council at 
that time, Mr Hans Winkler, justified this choice by arguing that the Commission 
proposal had envisaged consultation of the European Parliament only in case of 
decisions on the extension of the EnCT to other energy products and carriers, or other 
essential network infrastructures (Article 100(iii)). According to the Commission 
proposal, the Commission would present the Council with a draft relating to the 
establishment of a Community position on this type of amendment of the EnCT, and 
the Council would then have to consult Parliament on this position. The Council, 
however, did not accept the proposal, as such a procedure is not provided for in the EC 
Treaty (European Parliament 2006b). This point suggests that the Council did not want 
to be bound by the European Parliament on the establishment of a Community 
position. For this reason, the Council recalled the existing EU legislation, arguing that 
the role the EP was claiming was not envisaged.  




A third procedural amendment was in Article 6, where a paragraph was added stating 
that “within the Ministerial Council, the position of the European Community shall be 
expressed by the representative of the Council for decisions taken under Article 92 of 
the Energy Community Treaty.” The reason for this amendment is that Article 92 deals 
with Dispute Settlement Procedure which is a politically sensitive topic. It is therefore 
reasonable to think that the Council wanted to maintain control and take the floor in 
the EnCT on this particular issue.  
In a PA perspective, the three amendments above can be seen as an ex-ante control 
mechanism through which the Council set boundaries for the Commission to represent 
the EC/EU in the EnCT. The Council therefore set the rules before the game – that is, 
the representation of the EC/EU in the EnCT – began.  
There were additional amendments which were not strictly related to the decision- 
making process. Firstly, the Council attached Annex IV  to the signed Treaty text, 
defining the contribution of each party to the budget of the EnCT (European 
Parliament 2006a).  Secondly, the Council introduced an amendment, Article 4(3), 
ensuring that in the event of special circumstances, decisions falling under Chapter IV 
of Title IV of the EnCT – Mutual Assistance in the Event of Disruption - may go 
beyond the acquis communautaire. This last clause is important because mutual 
assistance was not fully covered by the existing acquis. Therefore, flexibility had to be 
introduced, and this was done by giving the Council the opportunity to decide on a 
case-by-case basis by qualified majority voting, whether or not the specific 
circumstances justifying mutual assistance have been met (European Parliament 
2006a).  
Finally, the Council introduced an article providing that  “three years after the entry 
into force […], the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the 
Council a report on the experiences gained from the implementation of this Decision, 
accompanied, if appropriate, by a proposal for further measures” (Council of the 
European Union 2005b). In a PA perspective, Article 7 can be seen as an ex post 
control mechanism falling into the category of what McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) 
call “police-patrol oversight.” This comprises active monitoring of the agent’s 




behaviour by the principals “with the aim of detecting and remedying any violations 
of legislative goals and, by its surveillance, discouraging such violations” (Pollack 
1997).  
In summary, the proposal issued by the Commission foresaw some important 
competences for the agent.  The Council amended the proposal in a substantial way to 
maintain control over the EnCT, particularly on the formulation of the EC/EU position 
in the EnCT institutions. The analysis of this first phase then seems to suggest that the 
Commission tried to satisfy its interest for competence-maximization while the 
Member States tried to satisfy their interest for control over energy policy, as expected 
in the PA literature. Ultimately however, the Commission’s proposal did not challenge 
the substance of the EnCT: the policy choice for a “common energy market with SEE 
countries”. By the same token, this preference was not questioned by the Council 
either. The Council used the ex-ante control mechanism at its disposal to make sure it 
could not lose control of the situation in the EnCT institutions. As far as this phase is 
concerned therefore, the Commission’s behaviour seems to be one of “responsive 
autonomy” (see 3.3.) because, despite the Commission’s attempt to satisfy its interest 
for competence-maximization, it was still responsive to Member States’ demand for a 
“common energy market with SEE countries.” 
  




Table 6.1: Comparison between Commission proposal COM (2005) 435 final and Council 
amendments 
Commission Proposal for a Council 
Decision on the conclusion by the 
European Community of the Energy 
Community Treaty (COM (2005) 435 
final) 
Council’s amendments on the 
Commission proposal incorporated in the 
Decision 2006/500/EC 
 (8) In special circumstances such as the 
event of disruption of network energy, 
security of supply needs to be ensured in 
the Energy Community. The mutual 
assistance mechanism of the Energy 
Community Treaty can help to mitigate 
the consequences of the disruption, in 
particular in the territories of the 
Contracting Parties within the meaning of 
that Treaty. 
(14) It is appropriate to lay down a 
specific procedure for the application 
of the internal 
revision clause provided for in Article 
101(iii) of the Treaty 
(15) It is appropriate to lay down a specific 
procedure for the application of the 
internal revision clause provided for in 
Article 100(i), (iii) and (iv) of the Energy 
Community Treaty 
Art. 3 (1) The European Community 
shall be re 
presented in the Ministerial Council 
and 
the Permanent High Level Group set up 
under the Treaty by: 
(a) a representative of the Council of 
the European Union designated by the 
Member State holding the Presidency 
of 
the Council of the European Union 
Art. 3(1) The European Community shall 
be represented in the Ministerial Council 
and the Permanent High Level Group set 
up under the Energy Community Treaty 
by: 
 
(a) a Council representative 
designated by the Member State 
holding the Presidency of the Council; 
when this Member State designates 
as the Council representative a 
representative of one of the Member 
States directly affected by Title III 
of the Energy Community Treaty, it 
shall do so on the basis of a rotation 
between those Member States 
Art. 4(1) The position to be taken by the 
European Community within the 
Ministerial 
Council, the Permanent High Level 
Group and the Regulatory Board for 
decisions as defined in Article 76 
second paragraph of the Treaty adopted 
by the Energy Community pursuant to 
Articles 82, 84, 91, 92, 96, and 100 of 
Art. 4(1) The position to be taken by the 
European Community within the 
Ministerial Council, the Permanent High-
Level Group and the Regulatory Board for 
decisions as referred to in Article 76 of the 
Energy Community Treaty pursuant to 
Articles 82, 84, 91, 92, 96, and 100 
thereof, having legal effect, shall be 
adopted by the Council acting in 




Commission Proposal for a Council 
Decision on the conclusion by the 
European Community of the Energy 
Community Treaty (COM (2005) 435 
final) 
Council’s amendments on the 
Commission proposal incorporated in the 
Decision 2006/500/EC 
the Treaty, affecting the European 
Community, shall be adopted by the 
Council acting by a qualified 
majority on a proposal from the 
Commission. 
accordance with the relevant provisions 
of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community. 
 Art. 4(3) For decisions of the Energy 
Community falling under Title IV of the 
Energy Community Treaty, and 
applicable to the territories to which the 
Treaty establishing the European 
Community applies under the conditions 
laid down therein, positions adopted under 
paragraph 1 shall not go beyond the acquis 
communautaire. However, positions 
adopted under paragraph 1 may go beyond 
the acquis communautaire with respect to 
Chapter IV of that Title in the event of 
special circumstances. 
 Art. 4(4) Without prejudice to the relevant 
procedures of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, before the 
Commission tables a proposal for a 
measure under Title III of the Energy 
Community Treaty, it shall duly consult 
the Member States directly affected by the 
proposal. 
Art. 4(4) The positions of the European 
Community to be taken within the 
institutions of the Energy Community 
shall ensure that 
the Energy Community does not take 
any measure affecting the European 
Community that conflicts with any 
part of the Acquis communautaire, 
creates any discrimination between 
Member States or affects the 
competence of an EU Member State as 
regard the determination of the 
conditions for exploiting its energy 
resources, the choice between energy 
resources and the general structure of 
its energy supply. 
Art. 4(6) The positions of the European 
Community to be taken within the 
institutions of the Energy Community 
shall ensure that the Energy Community 
does not take any measure having legal 
effect that: 
- conflicts with any part of the acquis 
communautaire, 
- creates any discrimination between 
Member States, or 
- affects the competence and rights of 
an EU Member State as regards the 
determination of the conditions for 
exploiting its energy resources, the 
choice between energy resources and 




Commission Proposal for a Council 
Decision on the conclusion by the 
European Community of the Energy 
Community Treaty (COM (2005) 435 
final) 
Council’s amendments on the 
Commission proposal incorporated in the 
Decision 2006/500/EC 
the general structure of its energy 
supply. 
Art. 5(1) The procedure set out in the 
two paragraphs below shall apply 
before a position can be taken by the 
European Community pursuant to 
Article 4(1) above for decisions 
adopted by the Energy Community 
pursuant to Article 100(iii) of the 
Treaty. 
Art. 5(1) The procedure set out in 
paragraph 2 shall apply before a position 
can be taken by the European Community 
pursuant to Article 4(1) for decisions 
adopted by the Energy Community 
pursuant to Article 100(i), (iii) and (iv) of 
the Energy Community Treaty. 
Art 5(2) Upon recommendation by the 
Commission, the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority, shall authorise the 
Commission to deliberate within the 
institutions of the Energy Community. 
The Commission shall conduct these 
deliberations in consultation with a 
special committee appointed by the 
Council to assist it in this task and 
within the framework of such 
directives as the Council may issue to 
it 
Art 5(2) Upon recommendation by the 
Commission, the Council, acting in 
accordance with the relevant provisions 
of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, shall authorise the 
Commission to deliberate within the 
institutions of the Energy Community. 
The Commission shall conduct these 
deliberations in consultation with a special 
committee appointed by the Council to 
assist it in this task and within the 
framework of such directives as the 
Council may issue to it. 
Art. 5(3) The Council shall consult the 
European Parliament before adopting 
the position of the European 
Community. 
Deleted 
 Art. 6(2) Within the Ministerial Council, 
the position of the European Community 
shall be expressed by the representative of 
the Council for decisions taken under 
Article 92 of the Energy Community 
Treaty. 
 Art. 7 Three years after the entry into force 
of this Decision, the Commission shall 
submit to the European Parliament and to 
the Council a report on the experiences 
gained from the implementation of this 
Decision, accompanied, if appropriate, by 
a proposal for further measures 
 




6.4.2. The Commission as external representative of the 
Member States in the institutions of the EnCT 
The previous section has shown how the Council established several ex-ante control 
mechanisms to constrain the Commission in its role as EU external representative in 
the institutions created by the EnCT. This section in turn looks at the current role of 
the Commission in these institutions. The section builds mainly on interview data 
collected from the Commission and selected Permanent Representations.  
Interview data confirms that the Commission is the EU external representative at the 
EnCT institutions. More precisely, a Commissioner represents the EU at the 
Ministerial Council, and a Deputy Director General represents the EU at the Permanent 
High Level Group. In both instances, only those two people take the floor and speak 
for the EU. This point is particularly important as the EU, represented by the 
Commission, and not the Member States, is Party to the EnCT. It is therefore the 
Commission and not the Member States that takes the floor and votes in the EnCT.  
Interview data suggests that the EnCT is a success story of unified EU representation 
in international organisations. According to an official of a Permanent Representation, 
expanding the internal energy market outside the EU is “the only thing” that the 
Commission can do in their external policy, but that it is also “the max they can do” 
(Interview No 10).  This was also confirmed by another official working in another 
Permanent Representation, who stated that it “is the expansion of the internal market” 
and is “the most efficient” the Commission can be because “it is legal, it has nothing 
to do with the private sector and that is the capacity that the Commission has by the 
Treaty” (Interview No 11).  
What the interview data above seems to suggest is that the Commission has a 
particularly powerful position in the EnCT as it represents the Member States. The 
domain in which the Commission can take decisions at the EnCT however, is rather 
limited, as it only concerns existing EU legislation. This is the reason why the 
Commission is particularly “efficient” in the EnCT: because it cannot create new 
binding legislation for Member States. This fact reduces the opportunities for the 
Commission to deviate from Member States’ preferences. Although it is correct to 




argue that the Commission is a powerful external representative of the EU in the EnCT, 
as the EU, represented by the Commission, is the only Party to the Treaty (and Member 
States are not), it also has to be acknowledged that the Commission can act without 
the consent of the Member States only on existing EU legislation.  
More precisely, as far as the decision-making process is concerned, interview data 
seems to confirm that the level of engagement of the Commission and the Member 
States in the EnCT institutions depends on the nature of the decision to be taken. As 
described earlier in this chapter (6.2.3.), there are two types of decision to be taken: 
the ones falling entirely under the competence of the Commission and the ones which 
also require involvement of Member States. As far as the first group is concerned, 
interview data suggests that the Commission experiences “a certain degree of 
autonomy” because it has a role defined in the Treaty itself [the EnCT] as well as a 
role of external representation that is defined in the EU Treaty (Interview No 1). In 
other words, when the decision to be taken falls within the acquis communautaire on 
energy, environment, competition and renewables, that is, the first of the three circles 
in which the Treaty is structured (Title II of the Treaty), the decision is taken “on a 
proposal from the European Commission”. In addition, the Commission may “alter or 
withdraw its proposal at any time” (EnCT, Art. 79). 
By contrast, when the decision to be taken in the EnCT has legal implications and it is 
not covered by existing EU legislation, an EU position needs to be defined and 
Member States are asked to take a position. Examples include programmes to be taken 
for the EnCT, the appointment of the director, decisions about the incorporation of 
new elements of the acquis into the scope of the Treaty, possible derogations for the 
countries, the budget etc. In these cases the formal decision-making process applies, 
which means that the Commission drafts a position with the Energy Working Party in 
the Council which then goes to the Coreper and is then expressed as an EU formal 
position at the EnCT (Interview No 1). 
How can this case help to answer the research question of this thesis? It has been 
argued earlier in this chapter that the preferences of the principals were homogenous 
(IV1) and homogenous with those of the agent (IV2). These preferences, however, 




were deemed to serve different interests for the agent and the principals, namely 
competence-maximization for the Commission and control over energy policy for the 
Member States. Milner’s (1997) distinction between preferences and interests, 
therefore, allows consideration of both the policy choices taken by the actors and the 
fundamental goals which are deemed to drive actors’ choices. The PAM seemed to 
provide sufficient explanatory power on this case. Firstly, the divergence of interests 
between the Commission and the Member States offers room for a PA analysis. 
Secondly, the way the Council and the Commission behaved on the EnCT file suggests 
that, while the agent was trying to grant itself as much discretion as possible, the 
principals used both ex ante and ex post control mechanisms to constrain the agent. 
Ultimately, because both the actors had a preference for a common energy market with 
SEE, the Commission did not actually deviate from the preferences of the Member 
States. Another possible reason for this behaviour might be that during the negotiations 
of the Treaty, Member States made extensive use of control mechanisms and 
constrained the Commission by establishing the procedures for the formation of 
positions and adoption of measures within the EnCT institutions. This point will be 
reviewed in the conclusion (chapter 8) of this thesis.  
6.5. Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the role of the Commission as the external representative in the 
EnCT. The case has suggested that the Member States had homogenous preferences 
for a common market in energy with SEE. The case has then tested whether when the 
preferences among the principals are homogenous, the agent is less likely to try to 
deviate from the preferences of the principals (H1). The case has also identified that 
the preferences of the Member States were homogeneous with those of the 
Commission (IV2) and has therefore enabled the testing of whether when the 
preferences between the principals and the agent are homogenous, the agent is less 
likely to try to deviate from the preferences of the principals (H4). The chapter has also 
highlighted that, despite sharing the same preferences, the Commission and the 
Member States aimed to satisfy different interests. The former saw in the EnCT a tool 
to expand its competences – through effective EU external representation and being a 




point of reference for energy relations with SEE countries. The Member States, on the 
other hand, supported the EnCT for the sake of their national energy polices. 
This chapter has provided some empirical evidence to support the hypotheses above, 
suggesting that the EnCT the Commission did not deviate from the preferences of the 
Member States. This might be the case because if the principals and the agent share 
the same preferences, there would be no reason for the agent to diverge from the 
preferences of the principals. On the EnCT, both the Commission and the Member 
States had a preference for a common energy market with SEE countries and they both 
aimed to implement this policy choice. Hence, the case has shown that the Commission 
did not try to diverge from the preference for a common energy market with SEE 
countries. The chapter has also stressed, however, that the Commission tried to get the 
most out of the window of opportunity offered by the EnCT as it tried to affirm itself 
as the only legitimate representative of the EU on the acquis on energy, environment 
and competition. Member States, on the other hand, used all the possible control 
mechanisms to constrain the Commission within the EnCT institutions. This kind of 
behaviour then seems to be one of “responsive autonomy” as defined in section 3.3. of 
this thesis.  
The analysis of this case suffers of some limitations which further research can solve. 
Firstly, the EnCT was signed in 2005 and there is a long time-span to be covered in 
the analysis. The Energy Community can be analysed from various aspects: the 
delegation from the Council to the Commission to negotiate the Treaty and the post-
delegation period, i.e. what happened in the Energy Community since the Treaty came 
into force. During the interview process interviewees moved from one aspect to the 
other. This chapter tried to focus on both Decision 2006/500/EC and on the Energy 
Community as it is today. The Energy Community was defined by one Commission 
official as a “living instrument” (Interview 1) and as an “evolving instrument” by a 
Council official (Interview 17). The evolving nature of the EnCT therefore has to be 
taken into account when the Energy Community is analysed.  
Another possible limitation of this chapter is the discrepancy emerging between the 
official documents and interview data on the role of the Commission in the EnCT. On 




the one hand, interviewees from the Commission emphasized the role of the 
representatives of the Commission as the only ones speaking for the EU in the 
Ministerial Council and the PHLG of the EnCT. Official documents, however, in 
particular Decision 2006/500/EC, still recognise a role for the representative of the 
Council in the EnCT institutions. This Decision however only refers to representatives 
of the Council and does not mention anything about who is supposed to take the floor 
for the EU in the EnCT institutions; nor does the Decision mention anything about the 
voting procedures. From the internal rules of procedure of the Ministerial Council we 
can learn that “As provided in Article 80 of the Treaty, each Party shall have one vote.” 
It could therefore be assumed that, while both the Commission and the Council can 
have a representative in the EnCT institutions, only one of them can vote for the EU 
and – according to Interviewee No 1 – it is then the Commission that takes the floor.  
Despite the limitations above, this case seems to contribute to the understanding of the 
relations between the Commission and the Member States as far as the external 
dimension of energy policy is concerned. The process leading to Decision 
2006/500/EC offers a good overview of the dynamics that occurred between the two 
actors and offers some insights on the reason why the Commission did not deviate 
from Member States preferences. The analysis of initiatives aiming at the creation of 
an integrated energy market with third countries continues in the next chapter which 
turns to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). The ECT was signed in 1994 and establishes 
a multilateral legal framework for cross-border energy co-operation and also deals 
with the promotion and protection of investment, trade and transit of energy goods.










7.1.  Introduction 
This chapter is a case study on the Energy Charter Treaty (hereinafter ECT or the 
Treaty). The ECT establishes a multilateral legal framework for cross-border energy 
co-operation and deals with the promotion and protection of investment, trade and 
transit of energy goods (Energy Charter Treaty Secretariat 2002; Cameron 2002). 
Similar to the previous chapter on the Energy Community Treaty (EnCT), this chapter 
looks at an initiative aiming at the creation of an integrated energy market with third 
countries (see 3.2.). The individual Member States and the EU54 are signatories of the 
Treaty and parties of the Energy Charter Conference which is the decision-making and 
governing body established by the ECT. Therefore, both the Commission and each 
individual EU Member State can take the floor in the Energy Charter Conference.  
This case is expected to contribute to the research question of this thesis by looking at 
the role of the Commission in the ECT. The chapter defines the preference alignment 
among the principals as heterogeneous (IV1) because the Member States had different 
preferences on the ECT. As in chapter 5, an empirically informed small subset of 
Member States sharing homogenous preferences is defined to compare the preferences 
of the principals to those of the agent. The preference alignment between the principals 
                                                 
54 The Energy Charter Treaty was signed in 1994 – when the European Community (EC) had legal 
personality - and is still ongoing today. Since 2009, however, the European Union (EU) has gained the 
status of legal personality. For the purpose of this chapter then, both the acronyms EC and EU will be 
used. The expression EC/EU is also used. 




and the agent is defined as homogeneous because the actors had similar preferences 
(IV2).  
Consequently, this case study tests the following hypotheses: when the preferences 
among the principals are homogenous, the agent is less likely to try to deviate from 
the preferences of the principals (H1) and when the preferences between the principals 
and the agent are homogenous, the agent is less likely to try to deviate from the 
preferences of the principals (H4). These two hypotheses predict different outcomes. 
The chapter, therefore, aims to assess which one of the two independent variables has 
a major effect on the dependent variable or, in other words, which of the outcomes 
above is more likely.  
7.2. Context 
This section provides some background information about the ECT in order to better 
understand the context in which the PA relationship between the Commission and the 
Member States is analysed here. Firstly, the main steps leading to the signature of the 
ECT are presented in the sub-section below. A second sub-section looks at the 
institutional framework of the ECT and the rules for the adoption of the decisions 
within the institutions created by the Treaty.  
7.2.1. Milestones 
The ECT is the result of a process that began with a proposal by the Dutch Prime 
Minister Ruud Lubbers for a pan-European energy community at a June 1990 meeting 
of European Union Heads of State and Government in Dublin (Doré 1995, 1). When 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) started to collapse, Lubbers proposed 
an Energy Charter as an instrument for economic integration of Western and Eastern 
Europe. The Charter aimed to ensure the free circulation of energy in Europe after the 
decline of the Soviet system (Furfari 2012, 389–390). The Charter also aimed to 
facilitate access to the energy resources of the former USSR and ensure the transit of 
energy through the countries of the old Soviet bloc (Ibid). As stressed by Matlary 
(1997), Russia and Central Europe were facing a critical situation at that time. The 
Gulf crisis caused oil price volatility and a concomitant Russian demand for energy 
payments in hard currency. Not only was the Russian energy production system in a 




state of crisis, but the ability to pay for energy in Central Europe was also in a state of 
emergency (Ibid, 74).  
The President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, took Lubbers’ proposal into 
consideration and developed the Commission’s ideas on the possible content of a 
European Energy Charter (Doré and De Bauw 1995). That idea was further discussed 
at the summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on 21 
November 1990. High-level talks on the proposal for the energy charter were also held 
between Delors, Commissioners Andriessen and Cardoso e Cunha, together with the 
Russian Deputy Prime Minister (Matlary 1997, 73–4). The high-level group concluded 
that the EC would commit to assisting Russia to produce and transport natural gas, and 
in return the EC would receive a stable supply.  Thus, oil price volatility caused by the 
Gulf crisis, together with Russian demand for energy payments in hard currency, 
intensified the work of the EC towards a grand strategy. In December 1990, the 
European Council gave the Commission a mandate to progress with the charter and 
adopt a draft communication outlining its contents. Following that, the Council 
decided to convene an international conference in 1991 with the aim of promoting 
some form of long-term energy cooperation. 
The Charter reflected the concept of the internal energy market – that is, to establish 
binding commercial rules for the transportation and sale of energy. Rules concerning 
exploration and production in joint ventures, however, were not covered by the internal 
energy market but were needed in the Charter. The latter was signed in December 1991 
as a political declaration. It was a concise expression of the principles that should 
underpin international energy cooperation (Energy Charter Secretariat 2014). In 
particular, the Charter was based on the following principles: development of open 
and efficient energy markets, creation of conditions that will stimulate the flow of 
private investment and the participation of private enterprises, non-discrimination 
among participants, respect for state sovereignty over natural resources, recognition of 
the importance of environmentally sound and energy-efficient policies (Energy 
Charter Treaty Secretariat 2002, 8). The Charter was, therefore, a type of “political 
commitment to co-operation in the energy sector” (Ibid); a sort of “basic agreement” 




negotiated with the aim of creating a legally binding framework for the charter 
(Matlary 1997, 105). 
Going beyond that expression of principles, the Treaty was then signed in 1994 and 
provided a multilateral framework for energy cooperation which was a novelty in 
international law (Energy Charter Secretariat 2014). The negotiations began in 1992 
and were relatively quick, especially considering that “there was no previous 
experience with negotiations of an agreement of similar type” (Energy Charter Treaty 
Secretariat 2002, 8). The Treaty was then adopted by forty-nine states, including 
Russia (Furfari 2012, 190). The signatories also included the other major energy 
producers in the Eurasian continent, such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Norway, the 
EC as well as EU Member States, Japan and Australia (Belyi 2012, 307). 
At the beginning, there was talk of making the Charter a process of the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) or of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE). In the end, however, the EC alone conducted the process. The Commission 
coordinated the policy process and at the CSCE summit in Paris in November 1991, 
Jacques Delors recalled that a European charter for energy was the best way to achieve 
East-West integration and create a confident environment for the best use of energy 
resources in the international community (Matlary 1997, 75). In 2002, fifty-two 
countries – and the EC – had signed the ECT and forty-six had completed the 
ratification procedures. Among those countries which did not ratify the treaty was 
Russia. Russian non-ratification is considered one of the biggest weaknesses of the 
Treaty, which, without such a big energy producer, loses a lot of its potential. As of 
June 2013, Russia is not the only country which has signed the Treaty but not yet 
ratified it. The other countries are Australia, Belarus (applies the Treaty provisionally), 
Iceland, and Norway.  
7.2.2. Institutional framework and decision-making process 
The institutional framework of the Energy Charter is composed of two main 
institutions: the Energy Charter Conference and the Energy Charter Secretariat. The 
Energy Charter Conference (hereinafter the Conference) is the main institutional body 
of the ECT with the political responsibility for the implementation of the Treaty itself. 




The Conference is an intergovernmental organisation whose members are all the states 
that have signed or acceded to the Treaty (Energy Charter Treaty Secretariat 2002, 11): 
each contracting party is entitled to have one representative. The EU has also one 
representative as it is also party of the Treaty.  
The Conference meets periodically at intervals determined by the Conference itself. It 
is not only a negotiation forum for the development of new instruments mandated 
under the ECT, but also an oversight body. The Conference is also in charge of the 
issues related to the implementation of the Treaty (i.e. progress towards ratification, 
request for accession, review of exceptions to national treatment, etc.). The Conference 
also decides on possible amendments to the Treaty and on the admission of new 
members (Ibid, 59-61). 55 
The Energy Charter Secretariat was established in Brussels in 1996 to serve the 
Conference and its Member States (Ibid). The Secretary-General is appointed by the 
Charter Conference. The Secretariat is responsible to the Conference, which it 
provides with the necessary assistance to perform its duties.  
The decision-making process within the ECT is differentiated depending on the subject 
matter on which a vote is taken. The general rule is that decisions provided for in the 
Treaty shall be taken by a three-quarter majority of the Contracting Parties (CPs) 
present and voting at the meeting of the Charter Conference. A decision shall be valid 
however only if it has the support of a simple majority of the CPs. In each case, 
Contracting Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement by consensus (Ibid, 60-
61). 
Unanimity is required for political decisions of a fundamental character, such as 
amendments and accessions to the ECT, as well as the conclusion of association 
                                                 
55 Some further functions and powers of the Energy Charter Conference are the following: carry out the 
duties assigned to it by the Treaty and its Protocols; keep under review and facilitate the implementation 
of the principles of the Charter and the provisions of the Treaty; consider and approve the annual 
accounts and budget of the Secretariat; encourage cooperative efforts aimed at facilitating and 
promoting market-oriented reforms and the modernization of energy sectors in transition economies; 
authorize and approve amendments to the Treaty, negotiations of accession and association agreements, 
and the negotiations of new Declarations and Protocols related to the Treaty; appoint the Secretary 
General (Energy Charter Secretariat 2002). 
 




agreements. Unanimity is also required for changes to the Annexes of the Treaty or 
the approval of the Secretary General’s nominations of panellists for trade disputes. 
Finally, qualified majority voting is required for decisions on budgetary matters, while 
decisions concerning amendments of the functions of the Charter Conference or the 
Secretariat require a three-quarter majority of the Contracting Parties (Ibid).  
To summarise therefore, the ECT was signed in 1994 and established a multilateral 
legal framework for cross-border energy co-operation between the Member States of 
the EC, the EC itself, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Treaty 
established two main bodies, the Energy Charter Conference and the Energy Charter 
Secretariat. In the Energy Charter Conference, which is the main institutional body of 
the ECT, each Contracting Party is entitled to have one representative, and the EU also 
has one representative, as it is party of the Treaty. It is in this context that the role of 
the Commission as external representative is analysed in this chapter. In the next 
section the two independent variables likely to affect the Commission’s behaviour are 
identified and defined. 
7.3. Identifying the independent variables 
This section identifies the preference alignment among the principals (IV1) and the 
preference alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2) for the case of the 
ECT.  As was described in more depth in the research design section (3.4.), preferences 
are  defined as “specific policy choices” that derive from interests (Milner 1997, 15) 
and need to be identified on a case by case basis. Interests, instead, are “fundamental 
goals” which change little. For the purpose of this research, interests are taken as given 
and deduced from existing literature. In particular, the interest of the Commission is 
competence-maximization, while the interest of the Member States is maintaining 
control over energy policy. This section then defines the preferences of the 
Commission and those of the Member States with regard to the ECT.  
This research expects the preferences among the principals (IV1) to be heterogeneous 
and the preferences between the principals and the agent (IV2) to be homogenous. 
From a methodological point of view, the heterogeneity of preferences among the 
principals requires a benchmark in order to be compared with those of the Commission 




(see section 3.4.2.). In the next subsection therefore, a small subset of Member States 
sharing homogenous preferences is used to compare the preferences of the principals 
with those of the agent. The contribution of this analytical device is revisited in the 
conclusion of this thesis.  
7.3.1. Preference alignment among the principals (IV1): a 
variety of preferences 
Data suggests that Member States had heterogeneous preferences on the ECT with 
some of them placing more importance than others on the Treaty. The Netherlands and 
the UK for example, attached the most importance to the Charter ahead of the Treaty. 
As the context section (7.2.) highlighted, the Energy Charter was a Dutch initiative, 
backed and pushed forward by the European Commission (Matlary 1997; Furfari 
2012; Cameron 2002; Mayer 2008). Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers first launched the 
idea of establishing closer economic relations with the Eastern European suppliers in 
June and November 1990 (Mayer 2008). This initiative was also backed by Italy and 
the UK at the time (Ibid). This original heterogeneity of preferences is very well 
described by Matlary (1997). France was not very positive on the Energy Charter as it 
feared that non-nuclear countries would delay the protocol on nuclear energy and that 
non-European countries would be included in the Charter. As work progressed 
however, France began to participate fully. The UK strongly favoured the Charter as 
a means of extending the liberalisation of the energy market to the whole of Europe. 
The UK was however, not ready to favour any “elements that could lead to a transferral 
of power to the EU institutions or a new supranational institution” (Matlary 1997, 89).  
Germany had a position very similar to that of the UK as it favoured a major role for 
private firms and minimal EU administration of the Charter. Italy supported the 
Charter from the beginning, declaring itself an “umbilical cord” between the reserves 
of Algeria and Central Europe.  
Interview data shows that Member States still have different preferences on the ECT 
and attribute different degrees of importance to the Treaty. Based on their preferences 
on the ECT, Member States can be divided in three subgroups: 1) energy producers 
and traders; 2) countries that are highly dependent on energy coming from Russia and 
3) Member States less dependent on energy from Russia. Firstly, energy producers and 




traders, notably the UK and the Netherlands, have a preference for the ECT as an 
instrument to promote trade in energy. The UK was until recently largely self-reliant 
for energy, producing significant quantities of oil, gas and coal; since late 2005, the 
UK has been a net oil importer. According to a report of the IEA, the UK exports two-
thirds of its crude oil and natural gas liquids (NGL) production, mainly to the 
Netherlands (36% of total exports in 2010), the United States (18%), Germany (18%) 
and France (9%). In turn, the UK imports crude oil from Norway (68% of total 
imports), Russia (8%) and Libya (6%). The UK also exports one third of its oil 
products, mainly to the Netherlands (21% of the total), the United States (20%), Ireland 
(14%) and France (6%) (IEA 2012). With regard to the Netherlands, the country is the 
biggest natural gas producer in the EU. According to Eurostat data, the country 
accounted for 43.2% of EU-28 gas production in 2012 (European Commission 2014). 
As stated by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (2014) during a Meeting of the 
Energy Charter Conference held in Kazakhstan, private sector investments play a key 
role in ensuring that future energy demand is met and the ECT is a tool for providing 
investors with rules and stability. The Netherlands also exports gas to Germany, 
Belgium and France (Ibid). The Netherlands and the UK therefore attach particular 
importance to the ECT as an instrument of investment protection.  
The second sub-group includes countries that are highly dependent on energy coming 
from Russia, notably Eastern European countries (EEC). EEC joined the ECT in the 
1990s prior to joining the EU in 2004. In the early 1990s, oil price volatility caused by 
the Gulf crisis and the concomitant Russian demand for energy payments in hard 
currency triggered the need for binding legislation for the transportation and sale of 
energy (Matlary 1997). Even at this time, EEC import almost if not the entirety of their 
gas consumption from Russia (see table 7.1 below). It seems therefore sensible to 
argue that the EEC attaches “the most attention” to the ECT because it concerns their 
regions and interactions with Russia, as stated by an official working in a Permanent 
Representation (Interview No 10).  




Table 7.1: Eastern European Countries: Gas Imports from Russia 
 Gas as % of primary fuel -2007 Gas coming from Russia (2008) * as 
% of total gas consumption 
Bulgaria  15 99 
Czech rep.  15 82 
Estonia  13 100 
Hungary 40 83 
Latvia  29 85 
Lithuania 32 96 
Poland  13 58 
Romania 32 31 
Slovakia  28 117 (some re-export) 
Slovenia 12 51 
Source: (Buchan 2010b) 
 
Finally, a last subgroup is composed of Member States less dependent on energy from 
Russia. This subgroup includes countries for which Russia is not the only exporter 
such as Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Italy, Finland and France. The subgroup 
also includes countries that do not import from Russia at all such as Croatia, Denmark, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. For these countries, the 
ECT is not a high-priority. This attitude is well captured by an official of one of the 
countries listed above: 
“We used to put more emphasis on emphasis on Energy Charter Treaty. 
We don’t have human resources. We took part in the agenda, we are in 
favour of the ECT but we have a limited administration. The Commission 
is putting a lot of effort. Poland would be more outspoken. To me it moves 
forward, we encourage the work of the Commission” (Interview No 18).  
In order to compare the preferences of the Member States to those of the Commission, 
an empirically informed small subset of Member States sharing homogenous 
preferences is defined based on the three subgroups identified above. Interview data 
and secondary data suggest that the Netherlands, the UK and the EEC have a strong 
preference for the ECT. All of them see the Treaty as a tool to protect and facilitate 
trade and investment in the energy field. It seems therefore sensible to look at those 
countries as small subset of active Member States with homogenous preferences to be 




compared with the Commission; their preference then can be identified as legal 
framework for trade and investment in energy (IV1).  
In the theoretical framework of this thesis it has been argued that preferences are 
deemed to serve interests – fundamental goals. How can the preferences of the 
Member States serve their interest for maintaining control over energy policy? A legal 
framework for trade and investment in energy is expected to serve the economic 
interests of energy producers and traders, notably the Netherlands and the UK.  
Moreover, stable and binding rules for the trade and investment in energy are expected 
to favour the EEC that are heavily dependent on imports from Russia. These Member 
States then supported the ECT for the sake of their national energy polices. 
In the next section the preferences of the Member States (IV1), defined as the 
preference of a small subset of them sharing homogeneous preferences, is compared 
with the preference of the Commission. In doing so, the second independent variable 
of this research, the preference alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2), 
is identified and defined for the specific context of the case. 
7.3.2. Preference alignment between the principals and the 
agent (IV2) 
This section defines the preference alignment between Member States and the 
Commission (IV2). The preferences of the principals have been operationalised using 
an analytical device as “legal framework for trade of and investment in energy.” 
Analysing official documents supplemented by interviews conducted with officials 
working within the Commission, this section aims to identify the preferences of the 
Commission.  
The Communication proposal sent to the Council for the conclusion of the ECT, 
provides some useful information about the Commission’s preferences on the Treaty:  




“The Commission considers that the conclusion [of the ECT] will mark a 
major step in the development of cooperation with the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. On the one hand, the Treaty will provide greater 
legal certainty for investors, by giving them the benefit of national 
treatment, will introduce an obligation for transparent treatment of 
investments and will give consumer countries supply guarantees. At the 
same time the implementing procedures (Secretariat, Ministerial 
Conference and recognized arbitration mechanisms) guarantee control and 
introduce a process for cooperation in the energy field”  (European 
Commission 1995, 2).  
The excerpt above suggests that the Commission conceived of the ECT as a tool for 
cooperation in the energy field. The ECT was supposed to provide rules for trade and 
investment in energy, giving certainty and guarantees to investors and consumer 
countries. As the ECT was signed in 1995, the target countries for cooperation at the 
time were the Central and Eastern European countries and the countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States.  The world has certainly changed profoundly 
since then, and more recent data needs to be analysed in order to fully grasp the 
preferences of the Commission.  
In a Communication entitled An Energy Policy for Europe, the Commission mentioned 
the ECT as an instrument for the EC and its Member States to be “a key driver in the 
design of international agreements” (European Commission 2007d). Similarly, in a 
Communication on security of energy supply and international cooperation, the 
European Commission (2011) stressed that a “comprehensive and coherent legal 
environment for EU energy relations with key suppliers and transit countries” is crucial 
for further regulatory convergence with EU neighbours. More recently Commissioner 
Oettinger (2012), speaking at the Energy Charter Conference, recalled the core 
objective of the ECT being “to promote a global model for energy cooperation in the 
long term within the framework of a market economy and based on mutual assistance 
and the principle of non-discrimination”. 
Official documents suggest that the Commission had a preference for a legal 
environment for EU energy relations. The Commission was interested in regulatory 
convergence of EU countries, and in promoting a global market for energy 
cooperation. Interview data seems to confirm this statement. According to an official 




working at the Commission, the ECT was meant to promote some rules of transparency 
in order to promote investments and trade with Russia (Interview No 4). It seems 
therefore sensible to define the preference of the Commission as “legal framework for 
trade of and investment in energy”. How is this preference of the Commission 
supposed to serve the interest of further integration? As will be explained more in 
detail in section 7.4. of this chapter and as suggested in the context section (7.2.), the 
ECT might be seen as an opportunity for the Commission to expand its competences 
in the energy field. Being part of an international organisation dealing with energy 
would give the Commission the opportunity to play a role in the external dimension of 
the EU’s internal energy market by, in the first instance, promoting EU legislation in 
non-EU countries.  
Data suggests that the preferences of the principals and the preferences of the agent 
can be defined as homogenous (IV2). The Member States and the Commission both 
had a preference for a “legal framework for trade of and investment in energy”. That 
same preference, however, is supposed to serve different interests. On the one hand, 
Member States expected that a legal framework for trade and investment would have 
beneficial consequences for their national energy policies. Being part of the ECT then 
is a means to maintain control over national energy policies when it comes to the 
external dimension. On the other hand, a “legal framework for trade of and investment 
in energy” would also serve the interest of the Commission for competence-
maximization.  
To summarise this section, data indicates that the preferences among the principals 
was heterogeneous (IV1) and homogenous were the preferences between the 
principals and the agent (IV2). In the next section, the effect of these variables on the 
Commission’s deviation from Member States’ preferences are analysed. More 
precisely, the next section investigates whether the Commission tried to deviate from 
the preferences of the Member States on the ECT.   
7.4. The Commission in the ECT 
This section analyses the conditions under which the independent variables– the 
preference alignment among the principals (IV1) and the preference alignment 




between the principals and the agent (IV2) – affected the Commission’s deviation from 
Member States’ preferences in the ECT. This section investigates whether the 
Commission behaved as a faithful agent or whether it deviated from the preferences 
of the Member States in the ECT. In doing so, the section looks at the role played by 
the independent variables in affecting the Commission’s behaviour.  
Given the values of the independent variables on this case, the following hypotheses 
are tested: when the preferences among the principals are heterogeneous, the agent is 
more likely to try to deviate from preferences of the principals (H2) and when the 
preferences between the principals and the agent are homogenous, the agent is less 
likely to try to deviate from the preferences of the principals (H4).  
As described in more depth in the research design of this thesis (3.5.), the situation that 
the Member States have heterogeneous preferences may be exploited by the 
Commission to deviate from Member States’ preferences. As has been stated by 
Pollack (1997, 129), the Commission can exploit circumstances where Member States 
have different preferences “to shirk within certain limits, exploiting cleavages among 
the member states to avoid sanctions, Council overruling of decisions, or alteration of 
the agent’s mandate”. This is assumed to be because the use of control mechanisms 
and sanctions would be costly, as the Member States have different preferences.  
The logic behind H4 is that the agent and the principals, or some of the principals, even 
if they have different interests, might share homogeneous preferences.  If this is the 
case, the Commission is not expected to deviate, as the homogeneity of preferences 
between the principals and the agent may open the way for some scenario of 
cooperation in order to achieve the common preferences. In that situation, the 
Commission is not expected to deviate from Member States’ preferences as those 
preferences are similar to their own.  
In order to test the two hypotheses, this chapter looks at the ECT as an ongoing process 
which began in 1995 immediately after the Treaty was signed by the Commission and 
by each of the Member States. This case study therefore looks at the post-delegation 
phase of the PA relation between the Commission and the Member States. This section 
distinguishes between two units of observation: the first one looks at the process 




leading to the conclusion of the ECT i.e. the negotiation phase of negotiations of the 
ECT. The second part of the analysis the role of the Commission in the institutional 
framework created by the ECT, notably the Energy Charter Conference.  
7.4.1. The Commission as negotiator of the ECT 
Literature on the genesis of the Energy Charter, although limited and not very recent, 
offers some useful insight about the dynamics among the Member States and between 
the Member States and the Commission during the negotiations of the Treaty. Doré 
and De Bauw (1995, 1–2) for instance, highlight that Lubbers’ initiative was first met 
with “some scepticism” in the European Council. Matlary (1997) stresses the different 
positions of the UK, France, Germany and Italy. As was illustrated in more depth in 
section 7.3.1. above on the preference alignment among the Member States, France 
was initially reluctant on the ECT and only when the work progressed, did it begin to 
participate fully. The UK and Germany strongly favoured the Charter as a means to 
extend liberalisation of the energy market, but were opposed to any transferral of 
power to the EU institutions or a new supranational institution.  Italy supported the 
Charter from the beginning. Starting from the scenario depicted by those sources, this 
chapter has argued that the preferences among the principals are heterogeneous. It is 
again Matlary (1997) who suggests that while Member States were struggling to find 
an agreement on which international organisation would take the lead of the Charter, 
the Commission exploited that moment to take the lead in the process. This behaviour 
of the Commission is in line with PA literature which assumes that when principals 
have different preferences, the agent is likely to exploit the situation to avoid the 
imposition of sanctions, especially if any effort to sanction the agent requires a 
unanimous agreement among the principals (Pollack 2003; Mathew D. McCubbins, 
Noll, and Weingast 1987; Matthew D. McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989). 
Building on this theoretical assumption, this case seems to suggest that the 
Commission exploited the differences among the Member States in order to play a 
leading role in the ECT. As stated by Matlary (1997, 117):  




“while the States were trying to decide which international organisation 
should be the seat of the charter, the Commission had gone to work and 
had completely taken over the process by defining the topics for 
negotiation, and then, after this framework had been established, 
presenting it to the States.” 
Data indicates that the ECT was a Dutch initiative. Member States were initially 
sceptical towards the initiative and had different preferences. Finally, they agreed that 
a general mandate would be given to the Commission to negotiate a Charter.  Lubbers’ 
proposal found a strong supporter in the Energy Commissioner Cardoso e Cunha and 
in the former President of the Commission himself, Jacques Delors who “took an 
active interest in energy policy” (Matlary 1997: 109). Potentially exploiting the 
confusion among the Member States at the time, the Commission took the lead in the 
negotiations with Russia and CIS countries, and the secretariat was initially established 
in Brussels at the Energy Directorate (Matlary 1997, 99).  
What was the rationale underpinning the Commission’s behaviour during the 
negotiations of the ECT? Matlary argues that the Commission exploited the window 
of opportunity available in the 1990s to emerge as an “international actor to forge a 
comprehensive policy towards Eastern Europe” (Ibid, 77).  Matlary also argues that 
“development of the Energy Charter was successful and provided the Commission 
with a new institutional role for itself.”  Other authors such as Mayer (2008, 255) argue 
that the Commission intended to “appropriate” the Charter process “to widen its energy 
competences.”  
Literature on the ECT depicts the Commission as a competence-maximizer that took 
advantage of the heterogeneity of preferences among the Member States in order to 
widen its competences. It could then be argued that during the negotiation of the ECT, 
the Commission tried to satisfy its interest for competence-maximization. This raises 
the question, however, which of the categorisations presented in section 3.3. (deviation 
or responsive autonomy) can best represent the Commission’s behaviour for the 
purpose of this case study. As with the negotiation of the EnCT (7.1.) the Commission 
seems to behave as an agent trying to satisfy its interest, but still responsive to Member 
States’ demands for, in this case, a  “legal framework for trade of and investment in 
energy.” An analysis limited only to the negotiation of the ECT would be insufficient 




to understand the role of the Commission as an external representative. For this reason, 
the next section turns to the behaviour of the Commission in the Energy Charter 
Conference.  
7.4.2. The Commission as external representative of the 
Member States in the Energy Charter Conference 
A second unit of analysis concerns the Commission’s behaviour at the Energy Charter 
Conference. Again, the logic behind this analysis is to understand whether the 
Commission behaved as a faithful agent in the Conference or whether it deviated from 
Member States preferences. In order to address this question, official documents, 
secondary sources and interviews have been studied.   
The procedures for establishing a common position in the Energy Charter Conference 
are established in a Decision adopted by the Council and the Commission on 23 
September 1997.56 The Decision declares that the position which the EC/EU may be 
required to take within the Energy Charter Conference shall be adopted by the Council 
by qualified majority voting or unanimity, according to the subject matter of the 
decision to be taken.57 In PA terms, the Decision can be seen as an ex-ante control 
mechanism as it establishes the administrative procedures which the agent must follow 
(Pollack 1997).  
Public EU documents tell us little about the process through which common EC/EU 
positions to be presented in the ECT have been adopted by the Council.58  The 
documents reporting the decisions of the Energy Charter Conference, recently 
derestricted and made available online by the Energy Charter Secretariat, also say little 
                                                 
56 Decision adopted by the Council and the Commission on 23 September 1997 on the conclusion, by 
the European Communities, of the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter Protocol on energy 
efficiency and related environmental aspects (98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom) 
57 The final decision provides that the position which the European Community may be required to take 
within the Energy Charter Conference with regard to decisions requiring the introduction or 
modification of Community legislation shall be adopted by the Council, acting in accordance with the 
relevant rules of the Treaty establishing the European Community. Notably, the Council shall act by 
qualified majority. The Council, however, shall act by unanimity if the decision to be taken by the 
Conference covers a field for which unanimity would be required for the adoption of internal 
Community rules. The Decision foresees that in other cases, the position to be taken by the European 
Community shall be adopted by the Council.  
58 Research carried out on Eurlex of the documents mentioning Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom 
has not produced any results useful to understand the dynamics between the Member States and the 
Commission in adopting a common position to be presented in the ECT.  




about the position of the individual signatories. This scarcity of public official 
documents therefore is filled with the analysis of interview data and secondary sources.  
Secondary sources such as press releases, reports issued by think tanks or NGOs, and 
journalistic reports, do not seem to provide any evidence of conflict between the 
Member States and the Commission over the ECT. Rather, most of the sources focused 
on the limits of the ECT given that Russia has not ratified the Treaty. This point will 
be discussed later in this chapter.  
Interview were carried out with officials working in the Commission and in a number 
of Permanent Representations. Interviewees provided a rather consistent description 
of how the position of the Commission in the Energy Charter Conference is taken. 
Officials working in the Permanent Representations argued that a common EU 
position is usually defined within the Council where a line to take is adopted and then 
presented by the Commission in the Energy Charter Conference (Interviews No 7, 10, 
12). An official working within the Commission also confirmed that lines to take are 
discussed with the Member States before the meetings at the Energy Charter 
Conference where the Commission presents. Then, according to an interviewee 
working at the Commission, “there is also no problem whatsoever if Italy, Spain, 
Netherlands [...] take the floor to put more emphasis on that line that has been agreed” 
(Interview No 1). This scenario was also confirmed by a document of the UK 
Government, the Energy Report on the Review of the Balance of Competences 
between the United Kingdom and the European (UK Government 2014). 
Asked about the coordination between the Commission and the Member States, 
interviewees from the Permanent Representations argued that it works most of the time 
(Interviews No 10, 12) and an official of the Commission stated that “coordination 
works extremely well” (Interview No 3).59 Generally speaking, interview data did not 
                                                 
59 A representative of a Permanent Representation stressed that the voting and the decision making 
process within the ECT were not really well defined especially as far as the appointment of a Secretary 
General is concerned (Interview No 7). At the time the research on the field was carried out, discussions 
on those rules and procedures were still ongoing. At the time of writing, not only has the issue not been 
resolved but also – given that “no agreement can be reached” – the mandate establishing the Working 
Group on Rules of Procedure for Appointing the Secretary General has been repealed (See: ).  Given 
the limited amount of sources available, however, it is not possible to understand the reason for the lack 




reveal any major difficulty in the decision-making process. Of course, different 
Member States have different priorities (interviewees acknowledged that) but none of 
the interviewees complained about the Commission trying to abuse its position within 
the ECT.  
Interview data also confirmed the role of a very useful control instrument that Member 
States can utilise. Indeed, Member States have a seat at the Energy Charter Conference 
and can take the floor. In PA terms, this means that the Member States can monitor 
the Commission. In PA terms this seems to be a very powerful ad locum control 
mechanism (Delreux 2011, Kerremans 2006;  see also section  2.3.4. of this thesis).   
Data indicates that the Commission has not tried to deviate from the preferences of the 
Member States while performing its role of external representation at the ECT. 
Hypothesis 4 developed in this thesis suggests that when the preferences of the 
principals are homogenous with those of the agent the latter would not try to deviate. 
Earlier in this chapter the preferences of the principals have been determined as 
homogeneous. In order to compare those preferences with the preference of the 
Commission, a small subset of principals sharing homogenous preferences has been 
identified. Comparing the preferences of that small subset to the Commission, the 
conclusion is that the preferences between the principals and the agent were 
homogeneous. All actors have a preference for a “legal framework for trade of, and 
investment in energy.” Data analysed in this section seems to suggest that the 
Commission did not deviate from Member States preferences.  
Section 7.2.2. stressed the homogeneity of preferences between the Commission and 
the Member States. The fact that secondary and interview data did not provide any 
evidence of conflict or disagreement between the actors in the ECT seems to confirm 
the hypothesis that when the preferences between the principals and the agent are 
homogeneous, deviation is less likely to occur. Both the Commission and the Member 
States seem to understand the ECT as a means to promote a regulatory framework for 
the EU and neighbouring countries in energy trade and investment. As foreseen by the 
                                                 
of agreement on the issue. Notably, is not clear whether it is due to a disagreement between the Member 
States and the Commission or a more general disagreement across all the parties of the Treaty.  
 




PAM however, the actors maintain different interests. On the one hand, the 
Commission sees the ECT as a means to expand its competences, while Member States 
see the ECT as a way of keeping control over their national energy policies.  
Is there any other reason – exogenous to the PA relationship - that might explain this 
absence of deviation? An official working at the Commission stressed that because the 
ECT covers trade, investment, and energy efficiency, which are EU competencies, the 
division of competences is very clear and coordination works extremely well 
(Interview No 3). Interviewees working in Permanent Representations also provided 
some useful insights on as to why there are no apparent conflicts between the 
Commission and the Member States. Firstly, some of them stressed that the ECT is 
very technical and does not really have a political impact (Interview No 21). More 
precisely, it is the Secretariat that updates the process and unless one of the signatories 
infringes the rules of the ECT and a dispute-settlement procedure is started, the ECT 
is not really a priority for Member States. The question must then be asked, as to 
whether other factors different from the preference alignment among the principals 
(IV1) and the preference alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2) might 
have affected the agents’ behaviour in this case study. This point will be revisited in 
the Conclusion (chapter 8) of this thesis.  
7.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the ECT as a case of external representation of the 
Commission in international fora.  The case analysed whether the preference 
alignment among the principals (IV1) and the preference alignment between the 
principals and the agent (IV2) affected the Commission in its behaviour vis-à-vis the 
preferences of the principals 
The chapter defined the preferences of the principals on the ECT as heterogeneous 
across three groups: a) energy producers and traders that attach particular importance 
to the ECT, which is seen as an instrument of investment protection; b) EEC countries 
highly dependent on energy coming from Russia, that see the Treaty as a means to 
reduce their dependency, and finally c) Member States less dependent on energy from 
Russia that do not attach great importance to the ECT. In order to compare the 




heterogeneous preferences of the principals with those of the Commission, an 
empirically informed small subset of Member States sharing homogeneous preferences 
was defined. The preferences of the principals were therefore been defined as a “legal 
framework for trade of and investment in energy.” Consequently, the preferences of 
the principals were compared to those of the Commission which were also defined as 
a “legal framework for trade of and investment in energy.” The preferences of the 
principals and those of the agent, then, were determined as homogeneous.  
Given the values of the independent variables, the two hypotheses below were tested 
in this chapter. The hypothesis according to when the preferences among the principals 
are heterogeneous, the agent is more likely to try to deviate from preferences of the 
principals (H2) and the hypothesis according to which when the preferences between 
the principals and the agent are homogenous, the agent is less likely to try to deviate 
from the preferences of the principals (H4). As far as the negotiation phase of the ECT 
is concerned, the chapter has shown that the literature on the topic (Matlary 1997; 
Mayer 2008) suggests that the Commission exploited the fact that the Member States 
had heterogeneous preferences to widen its energy competences. Section 7.4.1. 
indicated that, rather than deviation, this situation can be better described as responsive 
autonomy, because the Commission did try to satisfy its interests for competence-
maximization, but was still responsive to the Member States’ preferences for “a legal 
framework for trade of and investment in energy.”  Looking at the second phase 
however, the data suggests a different scenario. Given the limited amount of public 
documents available, the analysis was primarily based on secondary data and 
interviews. The analysis indicated that the Commission did not try to deviate from 
Member States’ preferences as operationalised in the empirical subset for a “legal 
framework for trade of and investment in energy.” This seems to suggest that, even 
during the negotiation phase, there was a homogeneity of preferences between the 
Commission and the Member States and, potentially, this might explain why the 
Commission did not deviate from the preferences of the Member States.  
The analysis has highlighted many points in line with the PAM. Firstly, data seems to 
confirm the PA assumption that when Member States have heterogeneous preferences 
the Commission may deviate (Pollack 1997, 129). This hypothesis can be confirmed 




by investigating the negotiation of the ECT. If we look at the ECT as a whole however, 
data seems to provide more support for hypothesis 4. Even if the Commission tried to 
maximize its competence during the negotiation of the ECT, it did not deviate from 
the Member States preferences for a “legal framework for trade of and investment in 
energy” in the Conference. Indeed, interview data does not provide any evidence for a 
deviation as such. This chapter has suggested that the reason for the Commission’s 
behaviour can be found in the homogeneity of preferences between the Commission 
and the Member States. The fact that the Commission shared the same preferences as 
a subset of the Member States deprived the Commission of a real reason to deviate. 
The homogeneity of preferences, however, does not imply a homogeneity of interests. 
In line with the theoretical model presented in this thesis (2.3.2.), the common 
preferences for a “legal framework for trade of and investment in energy” are deemed 
to serve different interests: competence-maximization for the Commission and control 
over energy policy for the Member States.  
The analysis has also stressed the importance of control mechanisms in preventing 
deviation. Firstly, the Decision for the conclusion of the ECT establishes that the 
position which the EC/EU may be required to take within the Energy Charter 
Conference shall be adopted by the Council (by qualified majority voting or unanimity, 
according to the subject matter of the decision to be taken). Interview data confirmed 
that before the meeting of the Energy Charter Conference, the Member States and the 
Commission discuss lines to take. Secondly, the institutional framework of the ECT 
also provides a powerful control mechanism, as both the Member States and the 
Commission have a seat at the Conference (ad locum control mechanism). The 
principals can therefore monitor the agent. Moreover, the chapter has investigated 
whether other reasons exogenous to the principal-agent relationship, such as its 
technical character and its low political sensitivity, may explain the absence of 
deviation in the ECT. The chapter concludes that the homogeneity of preferences 
seems to provide some explanatory power for the absence of deviation in this case 
study. The extent to which the independent variables chosen for this thesis can explain 
the agent’s behaviour is analysed more in detail in the next chapter (Conclusion) in 
light of the results of the analysis of the four case studies.  




Table 7.2: List of the signatories of the ECT with ratification dates 
Country ECT signed ECT ratified 
Afghanistan n/a 19 January 2013 
Albania 17 December 1994 15 December 1997 
Armenia 17 December 1994 18 December 1997 
Australia* 17 December 1994 pending 
Austria 17 December 1994 12 August 1997 
Azerbaijan 17 December 1994 02 December 1997 
Belarus*   17 December 1994 Provisional application 
Belgium 17 December 1994 16 April 1998 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
14 June 1995 10 January 2001 
Bulgaria 17 December 1994 31 July 1996 
Croatia 17 December 1994 31 October 1997 
Cyprus 17 December 1994 02 January 1998 
Czech Republic 08 June 1995 29 March 1996 
Denmark 17 December 1994 22 August 1997 
Estonia 17 December 1994 09 April 1998 
European Union and 
Euratom 
17 December 1994 n/a 
Finland 17 December 1994 11 July 1997 
France 17 December 1994 01 September 1999 
Georgia 17 December 1994 22 February 1995 
Germany 17 December 1994 14 March 1997 
Greece 17 December 1994 16 July 1997 
Hungary 27 February 1995 01 April 1998 
Iceland* 17 December 1994 x 
Ireland 17 December 1994 30 March 1999 




Italy 17 December 1994 05 December 1997 
Japan 16 June 1995 23 July 2002 
Kazakhstan 17 December 1994 18 October 1995 
Kyrgyzstan 17 December 1994 08 April 1997 
Latvia 17 December 1994 10 November 1998 
Liechtenstein 17 December 1994 03 December 1997 
Lithuania 05 April 1995 29 July 1998 
Luxembourg 17 December 1994 07 February 1997 
Malta 17 December 1994 21 May 2001 
Moldova 17 December 1994 10 June 1996 
Mongolia 21 July 1999 21 July 1999 
the Netherlands 17 December 1994 11 December 1997 
Norway* 16 June 1995 x 
Poland 17 December 1994 24 November 2000 
Portugal 17 December 1994 11 December 1997 
Romania 17 December 1994 10 March 1996 
Russian Federation60 17 December 1994 Provisional 
application until 18 
October 2009 inclusive 
Slovakia 17 December 1994 07 September 1995 
Slovenia 17 December 1994 23 July 1997 
Spain 17 December 1994 11 December 1997 
Sweden 17 December 1994 13 November 1997 
                                                 
60 On 20 August 2009 the Russian Federation officially informed the Depository that it did not intend 
to become a Contracting Party to the Energy Charter Treaty and the Protocol on Energy Efficiency and 
Related Environmental Aspects. In accordance with Article 45(3(a)) of the Energy Charter Treaty, such 
notification results in Russia's termination of its provisional application of the ECT and the PEEREA 
upon expiration of 60 calendar days from the date on which the notification is received by the 
Depository. 




Switzerland 17 December 1994 28 May 1996 
Tajikistan 17 December 1994 17 December 1994 
The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 
26 March 1998 26 March 1998 
Turkey 17 December 1994 13 February 2001 
Turkmenistan 17 December 1994 10 July 1997 
Ukraine 17 December 1994 06 February 1998 
United Kingdom 17 December 1994 13 December 1996 
Uzbekistan 05 April 1995 22 December 1995 
 
 (Source: http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=61










8.1.  Introduction 
This chapter aims to draw some conclusions about the research conducted in this 
thesis. It is structured as follows. The next section (8.2.) recapitulates the results of this 
thesis. Section 8.3 then turns to the implications of the findings and the contribution 
of this thesis to the PA literature. The sections revisits the main assumptions of the 
model used in this thesis in light of the analysis conducted in the empirical chapters.  
Section 8.4. stresses some of the shortcomings of the Principal-Agent Model of 
Delegation (PAM) and, at the same time, highlights some possible avenues for future 
research.  
The aim of this research was to explain the Commission’s behaviour vis-à-vis its 
principals in the external dimension of the EU internal energy market. In doing so, this 
thesis has explored under what conditions the Commission tries to deviate from the 
preferences of the principals. Developing from the analytical requirements proposed 
by this research question (actor-centric, state-centric and inter-institutional relations) 
the PAM was chosen as the theoretical framework (Chapter 2). Two factors were 
suggested as conditions, independent variables, likely to affect the Commission’s 
deviation (the dependent variable): the preference alignment among the principals 
(IV1) and the preference alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2) 
(Chapter 3). Looking at the different possible values of the independent variables, this 
thesis developed four hypotheses about the conditions under which the Commission 
tries to deviate from the preferences of the Member States (3.5.).  These hypotheses 
were then tested across four different case-studies.  As will be illustrated in this 




chapter, this research suggests that the agent’s behaviour is affected by the preference 
alignment among the principals (IV1) and the preference alignment between the 
principals and the agent (IV2). In addition, the distinction between preferences and 
interests (Milner 1997) seems to be a useful simplification for focusing on the actual 
policy choices of these actors and to give a more realistic picture of the Commission’s 
behaviour beyond the dichotomy of deviation/non deviation.  
8.2. Recapitulation of the results 
This section summarises the main results of this thesis recalling the hypotheses tested 
and the outcome observed in each case study. The implications of these results, 
together with the broader implication of the findings, are illustrated in more depth in 
the next section (8.4).  
Chapters 4 and 5 provided some evidence of deviation of the Commission from the 
preferences of the Member States. These two case studies seem to support the third 
hypothesis of this research that when the preferences between the principals and the 
agent are heterogeneous, the agent is more likely to try to deviate from the preferences 
of the principals (H3). In both cases, the preferences alignment between the principals 
and the agent was defined as heterogeneous (IV2). The Commission seems to have 
taken advantage of its position as initiator of legislation and put forward very 
ambitious proposals that had to be dealt with by co-decision. The Commission’s 
proposals generated a “conflict situation” (Da Conceição 2010: 1110) between the 
latter and the Member States.  
As far as the preference alignment among the principals (IV1) is concerned, chapter 4 
tested the first hypothesis of this thesis: when the preferences among the principals 
are homogenous, the agent is less likely to try to deviate from the preferences of the 
principals (H1). Chapter 5, instead, focused the second hypothesis according to which 
when the preferences among the principals are heterogeneous, the agent is more likely 
to try to deviate from preferences of the principals (H2). Chapter 4, did not provided 
any strong evidence to support the first hypothesis because, although the Member 
States had homogeneous preferences against the Commission’s proposal, the latter 
pushed that proposal forward. Chapter 5, instead, tested what might occur when the 




preferences alignment among the principals is heterogeneous (IV1). The chapter 
indicated that the hypothesis according to which when the preferences among the 
principals are heterogeneous, the agent is more likely to try to deviate from 
preferences of the principals (H2) appears to be verified in this case. Notably, the 
chapter showed that the Commission was aware that the Member States had different 
preferences on unbundling and proposed Ownership Unbundling (OU) as preferred 
option, possibly aware that Member States would struggled to amend the proposal 
(5.4.2.). This was indeed the case: finding a common position in the Council of 
Ministers proved very hard and some countries proposed a third option as an 
alternative to the two proposed by the Commission (5.4.4.).  
Chapters 6 and 7 looked the Energy Community Treaty (EnCT) and the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT) respectively. Distinct from the case studies about EU internal 
legislation, in these cases, the preferences of the principals were homogeneous with 
those of the agent (IV2). Both chapters then tested whether when the preferences 
between the principals and the agent are homogenous, the agent is less likely to try to 
deviate from the preferences of the principals (H4). Chapters 6 and 7 suggested that 
the fourth hypothesis of this thesis seems to be verified, as the Commission did not 
deviate from Member States’ preferences. More precisely, both chapters looked at two 
different phases. The first phase dealt with the negotiations of the EnCT (6.4.1.) and 
the ECT (7. 4.1.) respectively while the second phase looked at the actual role of the 
Commission as representative of the Member States in the institutions created by the 
relevant treaties studied (6.4.2. for the EnCT and 7.4.2. for the ECT). In both chapters, 
data suggested that during the negotiation phase, the Commission behaved as 
competence-maximizer, trying to grant itself as much competence as possible in both 
the EnCT and the ECT. Both chapters also highlighted how the Member States used 
several control mechanisms to constrain the Commission in its role of external 
representative. The sections on the actual behaviour of the Commission in both the 
EnCT (6.4.2.) and the ECT (7.4.2.) however, did not provide evidence of a “conflict 
situation” between the Member States and the Commission over the role of the latter 
as external representative. For this reason, both chapters concluded that the 
Commission did not deviate from the preferences of the Member States and the fourth 




hypothesis of this thesis seems to be verified. These cases indicated a scenario of 
responsive autonomy in the case of negotiation of both the EnCT and ECT. Although 
trying to satisfy its interest for competence-maximization, the Commission was still 
responsive to Member States’ preferences for a “common energy market with the SEE 
countries” (chapter 6) and for a “legal framework for trade of and investment in 
energy” (chapter 7).  
As far as the preference alignment among the principals (IV1) is concerned, chapters 
6 and 7 present different scenarios. On the EnCT (Chapter 6) the preferences among 
the principals were defined as homogeneous and, therefore, the first hypothesis of this 
thesis was tested i.e. when the preferences among the principals are homogenous, the 
agent is less likely to try to deviate from the preferences of the principals (H1). By 
contrast, for the ECT (Chapter 7), the preferences of the principals were defined as 
heterogeneous and the second hypothesis of this research was tested: when the 
preferences among the principals are heterogeneous, the agent is more likely to try to 
deviate from the preferences of the principals (H2). Chapter 6 concluded that the first 
hypothesis of this thesis seems to be verified, as the Commission did not deviate from 
the preferences of the Member States. As mentioned earlier in this section, although 
the Commission tried to maximise its competences in the negotiation phase of the 
EnCT, it did not create any conflict situation with the Member States while performing 
its role as representative in the institutions of the EnCT (6.4.2.). On the other hand, 
Chapter 7 did not seem to provide any significant evidence in support of hypothesis 2. 
Although the Commission tried to maximize its competences in the negotiation phase 
of the ECT, the case study did not seem to provide any evidence of conflict situation 
between the Member States and the Commission on the role performed by the latter in 
the institutions of the EnCT (7.4.2.). 




























































































































This section has therefore recalled the main results of the empirical chapters which 
include deviation (chapters 4 and 5), responsive autonomy, and full compliance 
(chapters 6 and 7). These results raise several questions about, for instance, the 
usefulness of the categorization of agent’s behaviour, the explanatory powers of the 
independent variables, and the existence of other possible explanatory factors. 
Unexpected findings also emerged. These points are discussed more in detail in the 
following section.  
8.3. Implication of the findings and contribution to 
knowledge 
This section reflects upon the implication of the findings of this thesis and their 
contribution to knowledge. The section is structured around seven main points: the 
categorisation of the agent’s behaviour, the explanatory power of the independent 




variables, the control mechanisms, Milner’s (1997) distinction between interests and 
preferences, the use of an empirically informed small subset of Member States sharing 
homogenous preferences as an analytical device, the use of a wide range of sources 
and, finally, some consideration about the generalizability of the findings of this 
research. In doing so, the section reviews some of the theoretical and methodological 
choices presented in chapters 2 and 3. In revisiting these choices the section also 
reflects some unexpected results, such as the importance of conflict as an indicator of 
deviation (8.3.1), the different agent behaviour in internal legislation and external 
representation (8.3.3), and the importance of control mechanisms (8.3.3.). 
8.3.1. Categorisation of the agent’s behaviour: deviation, 
responsive autonomy or compliance  
What do these results say about the agent’s behaviour and its categorisation as 
proposed in the research design of this thesis (3.3.)? The categorisation was as follows: 
a) compliance or absence of deviation, b) responsive autonomy and c) deviation. The 
case studies analysed in this thesis seemed to suggest a varied scenario that a mere 
dichotomy of deviation or no deviation was unlikely to capture fully. There were cases 
in which the Commission tried to satisfy its own preferences and yet tried to be 
responsive to the Member States’ demands. So far, most of the literature has 
distinguished between shirking (stressing the opportunism of the agent) and slippage 
(stressing the incentives coming from the structure of delegation) (Pollack 2003). This 
distinction, however, is not always clear, as the same Commission’s behaviour may be 
interpreted as one or the other (Kerremans 2006). PAM does not really offer many 
analytical tools to assess whether the agent acts according to opportunism or 
incentives. Stemming from Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI), the PAM assumes 
that the actors aim to maximize their utility and satisfy their interests. RCT however, 
tell us little about the deep meaning underpinning of the actions of both the principals 
and the agent. 
Chapters 4 and 5 suggested that the Commission behaved as “own actor”, issuing 
proposals aiming at satisfying its own preferences and not those of the principals. 
These chapters provided some evidence of a conflict situation in existence between the 
Member States and the Commission. The chapter seemed to suggest that when the 




agent deviates from the preferences of the principals, it triggers their reaction leading 
to a situation of conflict or tug-of-war between these actors (see 4.4. and 5.4.). An 
important finding of this research then is that the conflict situation might be an 
indicator that deviation has occurred: the agent has crossed the red line and has 
triggered a reaction by the principals. This seemed to be the case in both chapter 4 and 
chapter 5 where Member States fought against the Commission’s proposal.  
Chapters 6 and 7 however offered a more complicated picture. These chapters looked 
at two distinct phases: the negotiation of the EnCT and the ECT on the one hand and 
the actual behaviour of the Commission in the institutions created by these treaties on 
the other. The negotiation phases of both the EnCT (6.4.1.) and the ECT (7.4.1.) 
indicated that Commission tried to maximize its competences. However, this did not 
seem to go against Member States preferences for a common market in energy with 
Southern-Eastern European countries and for a legal framework for trade of and 
investment in energy respectively. Moreover, the behaviour of the Commission did 
not generate a conflict likely to result in questioning the very existence of the EnCT 
or the ECT.  The Commission seemed to take advantage of its autonomy or discretion, 
but was still responsive to Member States’ preferences. This Commission behaviour 
seems to be better described as “responsive autonomy.”   
If we look at the actual behaviour of the Commission in the institutions created by the 
EnCT (6.4.2.) and the ECT (7.4.2.), data did not seem to suggest any strong evidence 
of a conflict situation between the Commission and the Member States. On the 
contrary, Member States’ officials that were interviewed were rather satisfied about 
the role of the Commission. Chapters 6 and 7 also stressed that Member States used 
several control mechanisms to control the Commission. As far as the EnCT is 
concerned, they made sure that the Commission always had to consult the Council 
before a decision affecting the Member States was to be taken in the EnCT institutions. 
In the ECT, Member States are also present at the meetings and can take the floor at 
any time.  These points might also explain the Commission’s compliance. While this 
chapter will return later to the reasons underpinning this state of affairs, for the purpose 
of this sub-section, it is important to stress that in chapters 6 and 7 the Commission 
seemed to behave as a compliant or responsive agent in the post-delegation phase. For 




this reason, the categorization of agent’s behaviour offered in chapter 3 (3.3.) of this 
thesis seems to be supported by empirical evidence and might therefore be a useful 
starting point for further research on the agent’s behaviour. The following section now 
turns to the explanatory power of the independent variables to investigate to what 
extent they can account for the Commission’s behaviour.  
8.3.2. Explanatory power of the independent variables 
To what extent can the preference alignment among the member States (IV1) and 
preference alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2) account for the 
Commission’s deviation from the preferences of the Member States? The results of 
this thesis suggest that the explanatory factors proposed for this study do not seem to 
have the same weight. Rather, the preference alignment between the principals and the 
agent (IV2) seems to affect the Commission’s deviation more than the preference 
alignment among the principals (IV1) does.61 This subsection reflects upon the 
explanatory power of the first independent variable, recalling the first and second 
hypotheses of this thesis. A second subsection turns to the second independent variable 
and recalls the third and fourth hypotheses.  
The preference alignment among the Member States (IV1) (hypotheses 1 and 2). 
The explanatory power of the preference alignment among the Member States (IV1) 
was tested in the first and second hypotheses of this thesis.62 Chapter 6 (on the EnCT) 
seemed to provide some evidence in support of the first hypothesis, suggesting that the 
preferences among the principals were homogeneous (IV1) and that the Commission 
did seem to try to deviate from the preferences of the Member States. The same 
hypothesis, however, was not particularly well-supported by the evidence in chapter 
4, where the homogeneity of preferences among the Member States did not seem to 
                                                 
61 Results suggested that in two instances (Chapter 4 and Chapter 7) the hypotheses concerning the 
preference alignment among the principals (IV1) – notably hypotheses 1 and 2 - were not fully 
confirmed by data. The homogeneity of preferences among the Member States in chapter 4 did not stop 
the Commission from deviating from the preferences of the Member States. Similarly, chapter 7 – where 
the preferences among the principals were heterogeneous – did not seem to provide any strong evidence 
of Commission’s deviation or conflict situation between the Commission and the Member States. 
62 H1: when the preferences among the principals are homogenous, the agent is less likely to try to 
deviate from the preferences of the principals;  
H2: when the preferences among the principals are heterogeneous, the agent is more likely to try to 
deviate from the preferences of the principals.  
 




prevent the Commission from deviating from the Member States’ preferences. In both 
chapters, it is the second independent variable rather than the first one that seems to 
better explain the deviation in the dependent variable. Chapter 6 also suggested that 
the preference homogeneity between the principals and the agent might explain the 
absence of deviation from the Commission. Chapter 4 suggested that despite the 
preferences among the principals being homogenous on the IGAs, the Commission 
behaved hazardously and tried to deviate from the preferences of the Member States 
by issuing a very ambitious proposal close to its own preferences, rather than those of 
the principals. This raises the question of why this happened.  Interview data collected 
both from the Commission (Interview No 3) and from the Member States (Interview 
No 11) suggested that the Commission tried to realise an information exchange 
mechanism for the IGAs, despite that Member States opposed such a mechanism. The 
chapters also suggested that the heterogeneity of preferences between the principals 
and the agent (IV2) has greater validity at explaining the Commission’s behaviour on 
IGAs. The preferences of the Commission were different from those of the Member 
States and the Commission seems to have tried to satisfy its own preferences even if 
it knew that Member States did not have a preference for an information exchange 
mechanism. This point will be analysed further in the next subsection.  
As for the second hypothesis (when the preferences among the principals are 
heterogeneous the Commission is more likely to try to deviate), it seemed to be 
verified in chapter 5 and only partially verified in chapter 7. In chapter 5, the case 
study seemed to suggest that the Commission exploited the fact that the Member States 
had heterogeneous preferences on unbundling by issuing a proposal pushing forward 
its own preference for OU. It should be noted however, that the main reason for the 
Commission deviation seemed to be – again – the heterogeneity of preferences with 
the Member States (IV2). Heterogeneous preferences among the principals (IV1), only 
seems to come second in terms of explanatory power. This seems to verify the second 
hypothesis. On the other hand, in chapter 7 on the ECT, the second hypothesis was not 
fully verified.  This was because, in the negotiation phase of the ECT, the Commission 
tried to maximise its competence but without challenging the Member States’ 
preference for the ECT itself. In the previous subsection of this chapter (8.2.) this 




behaviour has been labelled as “responsive autonomy.” Indeed, the chapter did not 
provide any evidence of a conflict situation arising between the Member States and 
the Commission on the ECT. The chapter also suggested that one reason that the 
Commission did not try to deviate in performing its role of external representative in 
the institutions created by the ECT seemed to be a shared preference for a “legal 
framework for trade of and investment in energy.” This point leads us to the second 
independent variable upon which the next subsection reflects. 
The preference alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2) (hypotheses 
3 and 4).  Different conclusions can be drawn as far as the preference alignment 
between the principals and the agent is concerned (IV2). This independent variable 
seems to provide greater explanatory power for the Commission’s deviation. Chapters 
4 and 5 provided strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that when the preferences 
between the principals and the agent are heterogeneous, the latter is more likely to try 
to deviate (H3). Chapter 4 suggested that the Commission had a preference for a legal 
instrument for the exchange of information on IGAs while Member States had a 
preference for the protection of commercially sensitive information. By the same 
token, chapter 5 showed that the Commission had a preference for OU while Member 
States had a preference for a third option. The second independent variable of this 
research, then, seems to provide more explanatory power for the Commission’s 
deviation from the preferences of the Member States in chapters 4 and 5. In both 
chapters, the behaviour of the Commission seemed to be better explained by the 
attempt of the latter to satisfy its own preferences rather than those of the principals.  
In addition, chapters 6 and 7 suggested that the homogeneity of preferences between 
the Commission and the Member States seem to explain why deviation did not occur 
in these case studies. These chapters tested whether when the preferences between the 
principals and the agent are homogenous, the agent is less likely to try to deviate from 
the preferences of the principals (H4). The case studies provided some evidence of the 
Commission behaviour as “responsive autonomy” or “compliance”, supporting this 
hypothesis. As mentioned above, rather than the homogeneity or heterogeneity of 
preferences among the principals (IV1), the behaviour of the Commission in the ECT 




and the EnCT seemed to be better explained by a convergence of preferences between 
the latter and the Member States.  
To sum up this section on the explanatory power of the independent variables, the 
second independent variable (IV2) seems to affect the Commission’s deviation from 
the preferences of the Member States more than the first independent variable (IV1) 
does. Although the preference alignment among the Member States (IV1) does matter 
because it allows an effective use of control mechanisms and, potentially, sanctions by 
the Member States, when the Commission deviates, the dominant reason seems to be 
that its preferences are different from those of the principals (IV2). When this happens, 
deviation seems to be more likely when the preferences among the principals are 
heterogeneous and less likely when the preferences among the principals are 
homogeneous.  As the next subsection (8.3.3.) will show however, data also suggested 
that factors other than the independent variables could have affected the Commission’s 
behaviour in the case studies analysed in this thesis. One of these factors could be the 
control mechanisms.  
8.3.3. Control mechanisms  
The empirical chapters showed that the Member States made an extensive use of ex-
ante, ex-post and ad-locum mechanisms. Chapters 4 and 5 suggested that the co-
decision procedure (or ordinary legislative procedure after the Lisbon Treaty) can be 
seen as an ex-ante control mechanism, as it establishes the procedure to be followed 
for the creation of EU legislation. This procedure ensures that the Parliament and the 
Council agree on the text of new legislation.63  These chapters showed that the Council 
has made use of the tools offered by the legislative procedure to push its preferences 
further. In both cases studied, the Council amended the Commission’s proposal in 
order to make the final legislation as close as possible to its own preferences. Chapter 
4 on Decision 994/2012 showed that the Council used the threat of rejection of the 
Commission’s proposal to constrain the Commission and force it to step back (see 
4.4.3.). The chapter also suggested that the Decision itself contained an ex-post control 
mechanism because it ensured that the Commission has to submit a report on the 
                                                 
63 The role of the Parliament is discussed later on in this chapter 




application of the Decision (see 4.4.5.). Chapter 5 also confirmed the Council’s use of 
the tools offered by the legislative procedure to push its preferences further. As a 
result, Directive 2009/73/EC does not only offer OU and ISO, as proposed by the 
Commission, but also a third option (EEU) as requested by the eight Member States 
most active in their opposition to the Commission. Member States also used an 
informal tool to affect the legislative process on Directive 2009/73/EC:  a letter to the 
President of the ITRE Committee, to the President of the Energy Council, and to the 
Energy Commissioner (5.4.4.). Chapter 5 also suggested that other control 
mechanisms were set in the Directive itself, such as criteria for the certification to be 
given to a non-EU company in order to operate within the EU (see section 5.5.).  
Chapters 6 and 7 also seemed to highlight the use of control mechanisms. Both cases 
(Decisions for the Conclusions of the EnCT and the ECT respectively), contained the 
rules for the procedures on the position to be taken by the EC/EU in the institutions 
created by the EnCT and the ECT. In both cases, the Council proposed several 
amendments to the Commission proposals for the Decisions, to ensure they (the 
Council) were in control of the process. The Council, therefore, set the rules before the 
game (that is, the representation of the EC/EC in the EnCT) began (6.4.1.).  In addition, 
Chapter 7 showed that the institutional framework of the ECT also provides another 
powerful control mechanism, as both the Member States and the Commission have a 
seat at the Conference (7.4.5.). This can be seen as an ad locum control mechanism 
where principals “are able to observe and control the agent’s negotiation behaviour 
directly” (Kerremans 2006).  
What consideration can we draw from the results above? The first one might be about 
the link between preferences and control mechanisms. In the research design (3.4.), it 
was argued that when the preferences among the principals are homogeneous, 
principals can make a more effective use of control mechanisms and sanctions. As 
recalled in the previous paragraph, Member States used control mechanisms not only 
when the preferences among the principals were homogeneous (Chapter 4 and 6), but 
also when their preferences were heterogeneous (Chapter 5 and 7). As far as the 
preferences alignment between the Member States and the Commission is concerned 




(IV2), control mechanisms were used both in case of homogeneity (Chapters 6 and 7) 
and heterogeneity (Chapters 4 and 5).  
Since the purpose of this thesis was to look at how the homogeneity of preferences 
(and not the control mechanisms) affect the Commission’s deviation from the 
preferences of the Member States, drawing some conclusions about the correlation 
between control mechanisms and deviation would be hazardous. The research 
however, unexpectedly showed the important role of the control mechanisms. The 
empirical chapters suggested that the Member States always used control mechanisms. 
When the preferences among the principals were homogeneous (as in Decision 
994/2012 and in the EnCT), Member States used both ex-ante and ex-post control 
mechanisms. Member States did the same, however, when the preferences among 
them were heterogeneous (as in Directive 2009/73/EC and in the ECT). It is possible 
that more extensive use of control mechanisms has been made in the cases where the 
Commission and the Member States had heterogeneous preferences (Decision 
994/2012 and Directive 2009/73). The conflict situation that  emerged between the 
Commission and the Member States pushed the latter to use all the means at their 
disposal to fight a proposal which they deemed contrary to their own preferences. 
Member States, however, used control mechanisms even when their preferences were 
homogenous with those of the Commission. Chapters 6 and 7 showed that Member 
States constrained the Commission with precise rules about the adoption of an EC/EU 
position in the EnCT and the ECT.  In the former, the Council established ex-ante 
control mechanisms to make sure it could not lose control of the situation in the EnCT 
institutions. Chapters 6 and 7 then, suggest that even when they share homogenous 
preferences with the Commission – in these cases for “common market in energy with 
Southern-Eastern European countries” and a “legal framework for trade of and 
investment in energy” – Member States wanted to make sure that the Commission was 
not left with the opportunity of taking advantage of its role of external representation 
and satisfy its own preferences rather than those of the principals.  
This latter point about the use of control mechanisms raises another question about the 
reasons for non-deviation in chapters 6 and 7. Was that as a result of homogeneity of 
preferences (IV2) or because of the effectiveness of control mechanisms, or was it due 




to other characteristics of the EnCT and ECT? All the explanations could actually 
address this question. The real problem is that a clear measurement of the effect of 
preferences and control mechanisms on the dependent variable is still lacking in the 
literature. The empirical chapters of this research showed that both the preferences and 
the control mechanisms affect the Commission’s deviation from the preferences of the 
Member States. Chapters 6 and 7, however, leave the question open about the extent 
to which the preference alignment between the principals and the agent on the one 
hand and the control mechanisms on the other affected the Commission’s behaviour. 
In addition, chapters 6 and 7 also pose another question about what in the literature is 
called observational equivalence (Weingast and Moran 1983; Damro 2007).  
Observational equivalence means that a perceived absence of control or conflict 
between principal and agent can be explained as either a case of extreme agent 
autonomy or near perfect principal control. This could actually be the case in the EnCT 
and ECT, where data has not suggested any conflict between the principals and the 
agent over the EU representation in the institutions created by those treaties. As far as 
control is concerned, it can be argued that the ex-ante control mechanisms established 
by the Decisions for the conclusions of these treaties were so effective as to prevent 
deviation.   
To summarise this section on control mechanisms then, the empirical chapters of this 
thesis showed that the principals made extensive use of ex-ante, ex-post and ad locum 
control mechanisms. Data provided in the chapter seems to support the PAM claim 
that the control mechanisms affect agent autonomy and prevent deviation. The results 
about control mechanisms also highlighted some limitations that future research may 
address, such as the lack of a clear measurement of control mechanisms and 
observational equivalence. The next section offers some considerations about some of 
the methodological choices taken in this thesis that may contribute to PA literature. 
8.3.4. The distinction between interests and preferences 
(Milner 1997) 
This thesis has used Milner’s (1997) distinction between interest and preferences 
(2.3.2.); interests were defined as “fundamental goals, which change little” and 
preferences as “the specific policy choice that actors believe will maximise either their 




income or chances of re-election on a particular issue” (Ibid.). As analysed in depth in 
the theoretical framework of this research (2.3.2.), interests can be seen as given and 
exogenous but preferences are seen as endogenous and need to be inferred empirically 
on a case-by-case basis. Empirical chapters showed that looking at the interests as 
given is sensible because data supports the claim that the interest of the Commission 
is competence-maximization. Notably, data seems to suggest that all the preferences 
identified across the four cases were meant to serve that interest. A legal instrument 
for the exchange of information on IGAs (Chapter 4), Ownership Unbundling (Chapter 
5), a common energy market with the SEE countries (Chapter 6) and a “legal 
framework for trade of and investment in energy” (Chapter 7) were intended to serve 
the Commission’s interest for competence-maximization. As far as the preferences are 
concerned, the empirical chapters suggested that for the preferences to be inferred, a 
wide range of sources is necessary. For this reason, the empirical chapters built on a 
range of primary and secondary sources. The chapter also confirmed that preferences 
cannot be assumed, as is perhaps more the case with interests, but need to be inferred 
through careful analysis of data.  
The main advantage of the distinction between interests and preferences however, is 
that it accounts for situations in which the principals and the agent share the same 
preferences even if they have different interests. In turn, this goes beyond the mere 
dichotomy of deviation/non-deviation and accounts for situations “in-between” these 
two scenarios.  More precisely, chapters 6 and 7 showed that on the EnCT and the ECT 
respectively, the Commission and the Member States had homogeneous preferences, 
even if those preferences were intended to serve different interests. These chapters 
showed that during the negotiations for these treaties, the Commission acted as 
competence-maximizer, trying to satisfy its interest for further integration of the 
internal energy market but at the same time, was still responsive to Member States’ 
demands for an EnCT and an ECT. This means that the Commission behaved as 
somewhere in-between a faithful agent and own actor.  This state of affairs is better 
described as “responsive autonomy” than it would be by using the mere dichotomy of 
deviation/non-deviation. Chapters 6 and 7 also showed that the distinction between 
interests and preferences also accounted for the absence of deviation in Commission 




actual external representation in the EnCT (6.4.2.) and ECT (7.4.2.). Despite the 
Commission having different interests from the Member States, both shared the same 
preferences for the EnCT and ECT and this seems to have prevented deviation by the 
Commission (On other factors that may explain this absence of deviation see section 
8.3.2.).  
Milner’s distinction is, however, a simplification of a much more complicated picture. 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis (chapter 2), the assumption that the Commission 
has fixed, fundamental goals is challenged in the same PA literature (see for example 
Norman 2015; Randour, Janssens, and Delreux 2014; Dijkstra 2013). For the sake of 
simplification, this assumption was used in this thesis to build a testable model.  
In summary, it is important to stress for the scope of this subsection, that the empirical 
chapters of this thesis suggest that the distinction between interests and preferences 
might be useful in going beyond the simple dichotomy of deviation/non-deviation and 
provide a more realistic picture of the Commission’s behaviour.  
8.3.5. An analytical device: the empirically informed small 
subset of Member States sharing homogenous 
preferences 
Chapters 5 and 7 operationalised the preference among the principals (IV1) as 
heterogeneous. As described in depth in the research design section (3.3.), comparing 
the preferences of the agent to those of the principals can be particularly difficult in a 
situation characterized by heterogeneous preferences among the principals (Delreux 
2011, 55). Delreux uses the pivotal player preference within the collective principal as 
benchmark for “the preference of the principals” in order to compare them to those of 
the agent. The preferences of the agent are considered homogenous with those of the 
principals if they fall within the majority group of the Member States’ preferences, 
and heterogeneous if they fall outside the scope of the majority of the Member States. 
This thesis has argued that, sometimes however, applying this system in a strict way 
could be misleading or not even possible. This research has used an analytical device 
to compare the heterogeneous preferences of the principals with those of the agent to 
determine the preference alignment between the principals and the agent. In the case 
where the preferences among the principals were heterogeneous – as in chapters 5 and 




7 - a small subset of Member States sharing homogenous preferences was identified 
to represent the preferences of the principals. The small subset was identified through 
preliminary research revealing which Member States were the most relevant and active 
in a particular case.  The “active” Member States were identified on the basis of their 
engagement in an initiative in the field of energy or their being particularly vocal about 
their preferences and effort in pushing these preferences further.   
In chapter 5, the small subset was identified among the eight Member States that 
proposed a third option on unbundling.64 These Member States essentially led the fight 
against the Commission proposal and were highly influential during the legislative 
process. They sent a letter to the President of the ITRE Committee, to the President of 
the Energy Council, and to the Energy Commissioner, affecting the legislative process 
in a substantial way. In chapter 7, the small subset was identified as the Netherlands, 
the UK and the EEC that had a strong preference for the ECT. All of them saw the 
ECT as a tool to protect and facilitate trade and investment in the energy field (7.3.1.). 
The chapter showed that those countries were actually the more active and involved in 
the development of the ECT (7.4.). 
Chapter 7 showed that looking at a small subset of Member States sharing homogenous 
preferences is particularly convenient where several Member States with different 
preferences need to be taken into account in the research. Identifying a small subset, 
however, requires deep preliminary analysis across a wide range of sources in order to 
identify which States are actually active and relevant for the research. As far as 
chapters 5 and 7 are concerned, secondary data and interview data were the most 
important sources for understanding which Member States were the most relevant for 
the purpose of the analysis. Data gained from these sources was supplemented with 
data from official EU sources.  
In summary therefore, the use of a small subset of Member States sharing homogenous 
preferences seems to be particularly useful when the preferences of the principals are 
heterogeneous. This analytical device allows an understanding of which principals are 
actually determining the dynamics of the principal-agent relationship in a particular 
                                                 
64 Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Latvia and Slovakia (See 5.3.1.) 




case. The small subset is particularly important in cases where a small number of 
Member States is actually able to dictate the dynamics of the relation between the 
Commission and the Member States on a particular initiative. In these cases, 
investigating the majority of Member States would be misleading. The small subset, 
however, required careful preliminary research across a wide range of sources, among 
which interview data and secondary data are the most relevant. This latter point leads 
to the next subsection that deals with the data used for this research.  
8.3.6. Breadth and variety of the range of sources used 
As mentioned several times in this chapter, this thesis relied on a broad range of 
sources aiming to capture and reflect the variety of preferences of the actors involved 
in this study. Although this latter point may seem obvious, this research showed how 
using as many different sources of data as possible is paramount when preferences 
need to be identified. 
As far as the interview data is concerned, the aim during data collection was to 
interview not only interviewees involved in the PA relationship but also interviewees 
external to that relationship, in order to have a third and neutral point of view. Although 
this interview data was not incorporated into the thesis for specific arguments, it has 
broadly contributed to the understanding of the bigger picture and the analysis and 
interpretation of all the other data. For this reason, Appendix I at the end of this study 
distinguishes between cited and not-cited interviews.  
Chapters 4 and 5 relied heavily on official documents concerning the legislative 
processes, such as Council conclusions and summaries drafted by the Legislative 
Observatory. These sources alone, however, would have told us little about the 
preferences of the actors and the intensity of the conflicts between the Commission 
and the Member States. Secondary data, especially journalistic reports, were more 
useful in this regard. Secondary data, however, was supplemented by a large amount 
of interview data that was particularly useful in this regard. The use of interviews, 
however, also revealed that energy is a very sensitive topic and interviewees were not 
always willing to share the deep motivations underpinning their policy choices.  




Chapters 6 and 7, instead, relied more heavily on interview data and secondary data as 
far as the analysis of the actual behaviour of the Commission in the institutions of the 
EnCT and ECT was concerned. There is not much official data on this aspect and so 
interviews were quite important sources of information. In addition, the fact that 
secondary data did not report any conflict between the Commission and the Member 
States over these treaties also contributed to their categorisation as having an absence 
of deviation. Official documents were used more extensively for the phase concerning 
the decisions of the conclusions of the EnCT and ECT as the interview data on these 
negotiations, especially for the ECT, was rather limited (the analysis in Chapter 7 has 
therefore also relied on secondary data (Matlary 1997; Doré and De Bauw 1995)).  
The empirical chapters showed that in order to get a clear picture of the preferences of 
the Member States and the Commission, several sources need to be taken into account. 
Indeed, while official documents can be very vague about the preferences of the actors, 
secondary data can provide clearer information. Secondary data, however - especially 
journalistic reports – can often be misleading and need to be supplemented by other 
sources such as interview data. By the same token, over-relying on interview data 
could also produce negative effects on the validity and reliability of the research. All 
the sources, therefore, were taken into account and compared across the entire analysis.  
To sum up this sub-section, this thesis suggested that the use of a wide range of data 
is paramount if the preferences of the actors are to be explained. This thesis has shown 
that using and comparing a wide range of primary and secondary sources increases the 
validity and reliability of the research. 
8.3.7. Generalizability 
One of the aims of this research was to derive generalizable results about the effect of 
preferences and interests on the Commission’s behaviour (see sections 1.4 and 3.2.). 
This thesis looked at a specific policy area, the external dimension of the EU’s internal 
energy market. How can this analysis contribute to a broader understanding of the 
Commission’s behaviour?  
Despite some limitations (which will be illustrated in the next section), this thesis 
seems to contribute to the understanding of the Commission’s behaviour as agent of 




the Member States. If Milner’s (1997) distinction is found useful, for the purpose of 
simplification, then the findings about the Commission’s behaviour can be generalised 
to – or at least tested in – other policy areas. Taking the interests of the actors as given 
and focusing on their preferences – or specific policy choices – seems to be useful 
analytically for investigation of the Commission’s behaviour as an agent vis-à-vis its 
Member States. Doing so allows the research to go beyond the dichotomy of 
deviation/non-deviation and consider more cooperative scenarios, responding to some 
criticism of the PAM (Bocquillon and Dobbels 2013). 
The main findings that can be generalized from this thesis are that the Commission is 
a complex actor and that its behaviour cannot simply be defined in terms of 
deviation/non-deviation. Rather, it makes sense to make distinctions about its goal or 
preferences, some of which are more fixed and general (interests) and some of which 
are more specific and might vary (preferences). Consequently, another generalizable 
finding is that the Commission might share some of these preferences with the Member 
States and therefore be willing to satisfy these preferences without creating a conflict 
situation with the Member States. Finally, another important and possibly 
generalizable finding is that the explanatory factors chosen for this thesis – the 
preference alignment among the principals (IV1) and the preference alignment 
between the principals and the agent (IV2) seems to carry some explanatory power of 
the Commission’s behaviour and can therefore be tested in other policy areas.  
The findings of this thesis about the agent’s behaviour and the factors likely to affect 
it, therefore present some features of generalizability. This thesis has also offered a 
model and some hypotheses which can be verified in other policy areas.  
8.4. Limitations of the research and avenues for future 
research 
So far this chapter has looked at the main findings of this research and their 
implications and contribution to the PAM. This sections turns to the limitations of this 
research and highlights some possible avenues for future research. The section 
highlights two main points. Firstly, the section stresses the lack of a clear measurement 
of the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable and investigates 




whether other possible explanatory factors might contribute to explain the agent’s 
behaviour. Secondly, the section reflects upon some limitations in data collection65.  
8.4.1. Other factors likely to explain the agent’s behaviour 
At this point, the question arises as to whether there are factors other than the 
independent variables chosen for this thesis that can explain the absence of deviation 
in chapters 6 and 7.  In light of the result of the empirical chapters, the following points 
can be made. Firstly, Member States seem to have made an effective use of ex-ante 
control mechanism when they established the procedure for the adoption of a 
common EU position at the institutions created by the EnCT and the ECT. Using 
control mechanisms, they made sure that the Council was involved every time a 
decision likely to affect their interests was to be taken. In the case of the ECT, it should 
also be noted that the Member States sit at the Energy Charter Conference together 
with the Commission. The use of control-mechanisms could also be seen as a 
consequence of the homogeneity of preferences among the Member States (IV1). The 
use of control mechanisms, therefore, can still be somewhat explained by the first 
independent variable.  In chapter 7 however, the preferences of the Member States 
were identified as heterogeneous. In this case, however, the Member States have even 
more powerful ad-locum control mechanisms, as they participate in the Energy Charter 
Conference together with the Commission and can therefore control the agent. A 
possible explanation for this might be that while having heterogeneous preferences, 
the Member States designed the ECT to ensure that they all had a say and could control 
the Commission in the ECT Conference. The use of control mechanisms seems still to 
be explained by the PAM.  
                                                 
65 One of the main criticism moved against the PA model is that, it might at times be too static and 
simplistic. The model is particularly effective in accounting for the relation between the Commission 
and its Member States but less so in considering other actors external to the principal-agent relation. 
This thesis, for instance, deliberately kept other actors such as the European Court of Justice and the 
European Parliament out of the model. This was because the European Parliament has been described 
as being an outlier in terms of PA analysis (Pollack 2003, 13–14). Indeed, the Parliament has been 
delegated a primarily legislative role but not the right of initiative (Ibid).   
Although the Parliament has been mentioned several times across the four empirical chapters, data does 
not seem to suggest that a full treatment of the role of the European Parliament might be warranted. 
This is so because the results do not seem to suggest that the position of the European Parliament on the 
initiatives analysed in the empirical chapters strongly affected the Commission’s deviation from the 
preferences of the Member States. 




A second possible explanation for the absence of deviation in the EnCT and ECT is 
that both treaties are rather technical. They deal with the expansion of the EU energy 
acquis and regulatory framework to non-EU countries. These treaties do not create 
new obligations on the Member States and are not highly politically sensitive. Chapters 
6 and 7 suggested that the Member States supported the EnCT and the ECT because 
these treaties did not imply any negative implication on their own energy choices 
(6.3.3). As one interviewee, working for DG Energy, stated: “as long as you do not 
touch the nuclear and the major companies there is always room for cooperation” 
(Interview No 4).  
As with the first independent variable, the question arises as to whether other factors 
may explain the Commission’s deviation in chapters 4 and 5. These chapters do not 
seem to provide evidence for such a claim. Chapter 5 showed however, that German 
companies, for instance, started to unbundle while German government 
representatives were still fighting the Commission’s proposal (5.4.5.).  Although the 
amount of primary data for this case was somewhat limited, interviewees suggested 
that, on unbundling, there was a battle against the Commission led by France, and that 
Germany was France’s ally. The data, therefore, seems to suggest that preferences can, 
to a degree, still account for the Commission’s deviation.  
In summary therefore, the independent variables chosen for this research – the 
preference alignment among the principals (IV1) and the preference alignment 
between the principals and the agent (IV2) seem to provide sufficient explanatory 
power for the explanation of the deviation in the dependent variable – the 
Commission’s deviation from the Member States’ preferences. The section has also 
suggested that preference alignment between the principals and the agent (IV2) seems 
to provide more explanatory power than the preference alignment among the 
principals (IV1). While these two independent variables seem to account somewhat 
for the deviation of the Commission in chapters 4 and 5, other factors may also 
contribute to an explanation of the behaviour of the Commission in chapter 6 on the 
EnCT and chapter 7 on the ECT. This thesis suggests that the homogeneity of 
preferences between the Commission and the Member States might account for the 
absence of deviation by the Commission in the EnCT and in the ECT. The thesis, 




however, also raises the question as to whether there could be other reasons – such as 
the technical aspect of these treaties, the ex-ante control mechanisms, the institutional 
framework set up by the treaties and so on – that may have affected the Commission’s 
behaviour in these cases. Future research is needed to address this point in detail.  
Along similar lines, this sub-section also emphasised that a clear measurement of the 
use of control mechanisms, and the effect of the preferences on the Commission’s 
behaviour, is still lacking. This research suggested in chapters 6 and 7, for instance, 
that the Commission has probably not deviated from the preferences of the Member 
States because its preferences were homogeneous with those of the principals (IV2). 
To what extent the Commission’s behaviour can be explained by the homogeneity of 
preferences (IV2) and to what extent can it be explained by the effectiveness of the ex-
ante control mechanisms established by the principals? These questions also open the 
floor to further questions about the intentionality of the Commission, which is 
particularly hard to detect and operationalise. 
8.4.2. Limitations in data collection  
Given its importance for the economy, energy policy is, and will probably always 
remain, a highly sensitive topic. This characteristic of energy policy has particularly 
affected the data collection of this thesis. Firstly, energy is very much linked to other 
policy areas such as foreign policy which is possibly one of the most secret policy 
areas. In addition, energy is also linked to commercial interests, which are also guarded 
jealously by national governments. The data collection for this thesis revealed that the 
officials working in the Commission, the Council and the Permanent Representations 
were rather reluctant to share information about their energy policies and the reasons 
underpinning their policy choices in this area.  
Another factor that affected data collection concerns chapters 6 and 7. The EnCT and 
the ECT are initiatives that cover several years. The ECT was signed in 1994 while 
the EnCT was signed in 2005. The treaties are both still in force today. This 
characteristic has been particularly challenging in terms of data collection and data 
analysis. Firstly, operationalising the preferences of the Member States over a long 
period of time has required the imposition of some simplifications and preliminary 




assumptions for the sake of clarity of the analysis. Secondly, collecting data among 
the interviewees was also challenging because interviewees can only provide 
information for the limited amount of time during which they have been involved on 
a particular initiative. This is so also because institutions such as the Commission and 
Permanent Representations routinely ensure that staff are moved to new positions on 
a regular basis. 
8.5. Conceptual and empirical contribution  
In light of the reflection conducted so far, this section stresses the conceptual and 
empirical contribution of this thesis. Firstly, the section states the contribution to the 
PA literature in terms of understanding of the agent behaviour. Secondly, the section 
moves to consider what this study adds to the knowledge of energy policy more 
broadly.  
The main theoretical contribution of this thesis consists in the distinction between 
interests and preferences which allows accounting for a more nuanced classification 
of the agent behaviour. Stemming from Rational Choice Theory, most of PA literature 
assumes that “actors have a fixed set of preferences or tastes” and that they “behave 
instrumentally as to maximize the attainment of these preferences” (Hall and Taylor 
1996, 944–5). This thesis, instead, has argued that not all of these “tastes” are equally 
fixed or given. Using Milner’s (1997) distinction between interests and preferences, 
this study has argued that while the former are fundamental goals which change little, 
the latter are specific policy choices. Taking this distinction seriously allows an 
additional level of analysis of the relationship between the agent and the principals. 
While most of PA literature simply assumes these actors have different interests or 
preferences – both terms are used almost interchangeably – Milner’s distinction allows 
accounting for situations in which the actors might have similar preferences even if 
keeping divergent interests.   
The analysis conducted in this thesis has suggested that the distinction between 
interests and preferences is useful in providing a more nuanced classification of the 
Commission behaviour.  More precisely, the Commission behaviour might fall into 
one of the three following categories: absence or deviation or compliance, responsive 




autonomy, deviation (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.). While most of PA literature simply 
accounts for deviation or not deviation, this thesis has suggested that the principals and 
the agent might share some preferences even if keeping different interests. When this 
is the case, the agent will be responsive to Member States’ demands. This thesis has 
categorized this kind of scenario as “responsive autonomy”. Chapter 6 and 7 have then 
provided some empirical evidence to support this theoretical claim.  
This study has also offered some empirical contribution in terms of understanding of 
energy policy. Firstly, this study has suggested that energy policy is peculiar in terms 
of delegation with little executive power been delegated to the Commission. On this 
regard, energy policy differs from other policy areas such as trade and fisheries where 
delegation of power has been more substantial.    
Secondly, the study has addressed a gap in the existing literature on energy policy (See 
Chapter 1, section 1.3.). While existing scholarship reflects upon several themes in this 
policy area – such as the difficulties in building a common energy policy, the external 
dimension, the role of the Member States and the role of the Commission – a set of 
testable hypotheses about the relationship between the Member States and the 
Commission is still needed. Trying to address this gap, this thesis has offered some 
hypotheses about the conditions under which the Commission might try to deviate 
from the preferences of the Member States. Doing so, the thesis has contributed to a 
better understanding of energy policy.  
Testing four different hypotheses, some important features of energy policy have 
emerged.  First of all, Member States and the Commission have divergent interests 
when it comes to energy policy: the former aims to keep control over energy policy 
while the latter aims to expand its competence. The study has also suggested, however, 
that these actors might also agree on some specific policy choices such as a common 
market in energy with Southern-Eastern European countries (Chapter 6) or a legal 
framework for trade of and investment in energy (Chapter 7).  
The analysis conducted across the four empirical chapters has also revealed a 
difference between the two ways in which the external dimension of the internal 
energy market manifests itself. On the one hand, the relationship between the 




Commission and the Member States seems to be more conflictual as far as internal 
legislation is concerned (see Chapter 4 and 5). On the other hand, some more 
cooperative scenario seems to emerge when it comes to initiatives aiming at the 
creation of an integrated energy market with third countries (i.e. Energy Community 
Treaty, Energy Charter Treaty, see Chapter 6 and 7).  
To summarize this section, this thesis has provided both a conceptual and empirical 
contribution. From a conceptual point of view, the distinction between interests and 
preferences has proven useful to achieve a better understanding of the agent behaviour 
going beyond the dichotomy of deviation/not deviation of current PA literature. From 
an empirical point of view, this study has revealed some important features of energy 
policy such as the peculiarity of delegation of power in this policy area and the variety 
of interests and preferences of the actors involved. This variety might lead to more 
conflictual (internal EU legislation) or cooperative (creation of an integrated energy 
market with third countries) scenarios between the Commission and the Member 
States. 
8.6. Conclusion  
What does this research add to the knowledge about the Commission as an agent of 
the Member States in the post-delegation phase? This chapter has recalled the main 
results of this thesis highlighting the implications for, and contributions to, the PAM, 
together with some limitations that future research might address. It has suggested that, 
despite some limitations, the PAM seems to be useful in explaining the conditions 
under which the Commission is likely to deviate from the preferences  of the Member 
States’ (DV) in the external dimension of the EU internal energy market. The 
independent variables chosen for this thesis – the preference alignment among the 
principals (IV1) and the preference alignment between the principals and the agent 
(IV2) – seem to be rather persuasive in accounting for the deviation of the dependent 
variable in this thesis.  
The chapter has shown that this research might contribute to the PA literature in several 
ways. Firstly, this thesis tested the model in a policy area in which PA has not been 
used extensively to date. The results of this thesis might be generalised to, or at least 




tested in, other policy areas as well, contributing to an explanation of the principal-
agent relationship more generally. Secondly, the thesis focused on post-delegation 
behaviour – on which the literature is not abundant. Thirdly, the analysis has applied 
Milner’s (1997) distinction between interests and preferences systematically on four 
cases, seeking to look beyond the dichotomy of deviation/non-deviation that 
characterises most PA studies. Fourthly, the thesis has used an analytical device to 
compare the heterogeneous preferences of the principals to those of the agent. Finally, 
the thesis has shown the importance of relying on a wide range of sources in order to 
infer the preferences of the actors involved in this study.  
This chapter has also highlighted some limitations of this thesis together with avenues 
for future research. Despite the PAM being very useful in looking at the relations 
between an agent and its principals, it does not take into account other actors such as, 
in this thesis, the European Parliament. Secondly, this thesis has focused on two 
independent variables for investigating the role of preferences while other factors 
might also contribute to explaining the behaviour of the Commission. Finally, the case 
studies selected for this research have presented several challenges in terms of data 
collection and data analysis.  
The analysis conducted in this research has also suggested some unexpected findings 
on which future research might investigate. Firstly, conflict situations seems to be a 
good indicator that deviation has occurred and the agent has crossed a red line, 
triggering an opposing position from the principals. Secondly, focusing on 
preferences, the thesis has suggested that control mechanisms are particularly 
important in affecting the Commission’s behaviour and that, while in internal 
legislation the agent has the opportunity to issue very ambitious proposals, the same is 
not in the external arena, where ex-ante and ad locum control mechanisms seem to 
constrain the agent to a greater extent.  
In light of the research carried out in this thesis, it seems safe to argue that this work 
contributes to the knowledge of the Commission as agent of the Member States. This 
thesis has gone beyond the most common assumptions about the divergent interests 
that exist between the Commission and the Member States in energy policy. It tried to 




conceptualise this conflict in a principal-agent relationship, while also developing 
hypotheses about the conditions under which the Commission would try to satisfy its 
preferences rather than those of the principals. Certainly, future research might 
improve the explanation of the principal-agent relationship in this policy area and 
beyond.
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Cited: 
- Interview with an official from the European Commission – DG ENERGY, 
6/06/2013, (Interview No 1) 
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